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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL ERROR IN THE 
INTENSIVE CARE UNIT 
 
 
 
By 
Saleh A. Alnahdi 
May 2017 
 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill 
  The very facts that humans are fallible and that they are integrally involved in the 
delivery of healthcare and medical treatment guarantee that medical errors will occur 
despite the best of training, skills and vigilance, precautions, or preventive procedures. 
While medical errors occur across the spectrum of care and treatment, the propensity for 
their occurrence and the severity of the damage they are likely to inflict are undeniably 
greatest in the hospital intensive care unit (ICU).  
The fundamentals of biomedical ethics require nothing less than a thorough 
systematic analysis of the sources of error in the ICU, along with a comprehensive, 
coordinated approach to preventing error to the extent humanly possible and to handling 
and mitigating the effects of error whenever they do occur. Through the chapters of this 
dissertation, the research and analysis has provided the following: 1) a detailed account, 
 v 
to the extent that it has been documented, of the high frequency of errors occurring in the 
U.S. in general and specifically in hospital intensive care units, as well as the range and 
extent of the harm done to patients and family members, both physically and financially; 
2) a classification and analysis of the proximate, intermediate and ultimate causes of and 
contributing factors to medical errors, which in addition to identifying causation has 
formed the basis for this dissertation’s recommendations aimed at developing procedures 
and protocols to effectively reduce errors to the greatest degree possible while 
minimizing their harmful impact; 3) an in-depth analysis of expectations, grounded in 
biomedical ethics, for dealing with the consequences of medical errors including 
disclosure and communication, the expectations of patients and family members, the 
attitudes and concerns of medical professionals, the disconnect between these two 
groups, and recommendations for procedures and protocols to ensure prompt, complete, 
and just handling of all consequences of the error; 4) an in-depth framework, based on 
Western religious and cultural foundations, for both those responsible for and those 
injured by medical errors to interact in handling the consequences of the error, as well as 
all of the communication which it engenders; and 5) proposals for numerous procedures 
and protocols, both for lessening the vulnerability of hospital ICU patients to suffering 
the effects of an error and for addressing and counteracting the variety of systemic 
problems which create or heighten the propensity for the occurrence of medical errors. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Standard hospital procedures and law in the United States require medical staff to 
disclose information to patients concerning their treatment and outcomes, as well as 
information not protected by patient confidentiality to relevant agencies. However, the 
increasing threat of lawsuits, the desire to hide negative treatment statistics, higher 
insurance premiums, and the threat of loss of employment all contribute to the incentive 
for staff to underreport medical errors. As a consequence of this gap in information, not 
only do hospital staff risk failing to learn from these errors, but patients also lose a 
measure of their autonomy. Depending on when and how these unreported medical errors 
occurred, patients may unwittingly be unable to prevent or plan for worst-case scenarios, 
provide information to their doctors that is necessary for their treatment, write their last 
or living wills, choose the location of their passing, and prepare for other key issues 
related either to their health or to their demise. The ethical issues associated with 
disclosure of patient information involve patient rights to obtain their medical records, 
choose between treatment options, refuse treatment, and make decisions about end-of-life 
care. These issues become more nuanced when examined in the context of the scope and 
timing of the disclosure of such information, as well as the circumstances that create the 
system of incentives and disincentives in which medical staffs operate with regard to 
disclosing or withholding information.   
There has been significant analysis in the literature of biomedical ethics regarding 
medical errors and their causes. This focus has led to significant discussion of the need 
for appropriate discourse following the occurrence of medical errors in the field as a 
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whole. In terms of healthcare settings, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that the 
hospital intensive care unit (ICU) constitutes an area where the need for highest quality 
care is acute and the potential for severe harm is great. However, a thorough search 
through the literature in the field has failed to identify any research, analysis, or 
discussion specifically focusing on the crucial connection between these three topics (i.e., 
disclosure, medical error, and the intensive care unit). 
This dissertation seeks to address this substantive gap in the literature. Because 
these distinct topics are intricately connected, the dissertation deals with them in an 
integrated manner. The analysis explains that disclosure of medical error in the intensive 
care unit is so important to efforts to improve patient safety that protocols must be in 
place to prevent these errors and to handle their consequences in a manner consistent with 
the highest standards of biomedical ethics when they do occur. The various reasons that 
disclosure of medical errors in the intensive care unit is so important include: 
A. The ICU is a constantly changing environment, which is the confluence of patients at 
high risk with critical, often life-threatening and immediate treatment needs and 
multiple care providers, who routinely manage complex interventions and intensive 
monitoring under stressful conditions. 
B. There exists a clearly definable correlation between certain groups of patients and the 
likelihood of experiencing positive health outcomes, based on patient demographics 
and illness or injury, with ICU patients, by definition, falling into one of the least 
promising of categories.  For example, during 2005 among hospital ICUs throughout 
the U.S., 20% experienced an event with negative consequences. Among such events, 
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45% of which were later found to have been preventable while 13% of the latter group 
proved life threatening or even fatal.  The rate of medical errors in ICUs is estimated 
to stand at 15 serious errors/100 patient-days, of which 11% are potentially life 
threatening; moreover, 78% of such errors occurred during treatment involving the 
administration of medication. The most prevalent type of errors consist of slips and 
lapses. First, given that patients who are in critical condition tend to be receiving on 
average twice the number of medications as their counterparts who are in the rest of 
the hospital, the severity of a patient’s condition constitutes the strongest predictor of 
an adverse drug event (ADE). Second, given that they are in critical condition, ICU 
patients have fewer natural defense systems, and those that they have are severely 
weakened and far less able to cope with the physiological burden of ADEs. Third, 
even when their condition improves and ICU patients transition toward recuperation 
and/or less intensive levels of care, they face a significant lack of coordination and 
continuity in the lack of continuity of care beyond the point of discharge from the ICU. 
This extensively documented flaw in the medical care system creates an additional 
vulnerability, for the patient, to medical errors during the transition phase. In light of 
this weakness and its accompanying danger, coordination and communication between 
ICU staff and the patient’s subsequent caregivers constitutes an essential, albeit 
neglected aspect of care. 
C. The rapid advance of technology within healthcare in general and in the ICU in 
particular, has fostered a growing dependence on equipment and systems which are 
sophisticated, yet not thoroughly understood by those medical professionals who must 
employ them in administering essential care within the ICU.  Moreover, medical 
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equipment failure and its associated safety risks and consequences is poorly 
understood at all levels. This complex clinical scenario presents the context for the 
bioethical analysis of the dissertation.  
Two realities of the healthcare system in the United States are beyond dispute. 
First, as a group, patients being treated in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of any given 
hospital are the most vulnerable in terms of the seriousness and volatility of their 
conditions, as well as their need for extensive medical care to be delivered without delay. 
Second, throughout the hospital errors in the provision of medical treatment constitute a 
significant, even at times life-threatening danger to patients’ health and well-being. 
Therefore, it follows that medical errors occurring in the ICU can be expected to have 
grave consequences and that eliminating or minimizing such errors should receive the 
highest priority. However, as this dissertation explores, medical errors in this part of the 
hospital are alarming both in respect to their frequency and to the severity of their 
ramifications.  
The thesis of this dissertation is that there is an ethical obligation for disclosure of 
medical error in the ICU. Biomedical ethics facilitates a systematic analysis of the 
sources of error in the ICU to suggest a coordinated approach to preventing errors and to 
mitigating the effects of errors whenever they occur.  
The analysis begins with a survey of medical errors in the ICU. This chapter is 
followed by a discussing of the ethical problems concerning medical error in the ICU. 
The subsequent chapter considers the ethical obligations of the medical staff and 
administration of the institution in terms of honesty to patients. Within this context of the 
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problem and obligations regarding medical error in the ICU, the following chapter 
examines protocols for disclosure and addressing the consequences of medical errors. 
The final analytical chapter suggests how to establish a systemic endeavor to diminish 
medical error in the ICU. 
 The following is a summary of the analysis that is described in the remaining 
chapters. This includes the extent of medical errors in the ICU, ethical problems that 
result, ethical obligations to patients, disclosure protocols in the ICU, systematic 
endeavors to mitigate these errors, and conclusions. 
Two realities of the healthcare system in the United States are beyond dispute:  
first, that the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the hospital cares for and treats the most 
vulnerable patients in need of medical care; and second, that errors in the provision of 
medical treatment constitutes a significant threat to patients’ health, up to the point of 
threatening their very lives. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that medical errors occurring 
in the ICU are of grave consequence. Indeed, as dissertation documents through an 
extensive survey of research to date, medical errors in this part of the hospital are 
alarming in their frequency and in the severity of their ramifications. As applied to this 
increasing problem, the fundamental principles of biomedical ethics require nothing less 
than: 1) a thorough, systematic analysis of the sources of error within the ICU, 2) 
handling the consequences of medical error with full disclosure and sensitivity to the 
religious and culturally expectations of patients, 3) to the greatest extent possible, 
reversing, mitigating, or otherwise dealing with any negative effects of errors whenever 
they do occur, 4) establishing protocols for handling all aspects of dealing with medical 
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errors, mindful of the need to counteract disincentives to full disclosure, as well as the 
patient’s condition, needs, and concerns and 5) taking a comprehensive, coordinated 
approach to preventing error to the extent humanly possible.  
The dissertation surveys the potential causes of error in the ICU from the smallest 
causes that may or may not lead to injury and loss to the largest potential causes that can 
lead to death.  In addition, it describes in detail the extent of medical errors in the ICU, 
including those within the broadest scope, namely all occurrences which consist of 
unintended failures of one kind or another that are not caused by the disease, injury or the 
condition being treated.  Moreover, the types of these errors will include both errors of 
commission (execution, planning, diagnosis, delays, medication, complex equipment 
failure, communication error) and omission (lack of prophylactic treatment, and missing 
or poor medical management).  From a larger perspective, the dissertation provides 
overall statistics regarding the human impact and cost of medical errors. 
Following this analysis of the errors themselves, the discussion focuses on the 
biomedical ethical challenges that medical errors pose for healthcare providers and the 
ethical obligations that the medical staff and institutional administration have in 
responding to these errors.  Next the dissertation elaborates on those ethical principles, 
overtly expressed by the American Medical Association and the American College of 
Physicians, which call upon medical providers to fully disclose all relevant details of 
medical errors to all patients, holding themselves (the medical professionals) accountable 
for their actions.  The dominant ethical theories that stand behind these recommendations 
and guidelines will be analyzed including the consequentialist theory, which focuses on 
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medical outcomes rather than the process; utilitarianism, which focuses upon the use of 
resources, delivering the greatest good to the greatest number of people; and deontology, 
specifically its variant – principlism – the polar opposites of consequentialist theory, in 
which moral process principles dominate, namely the principles of autonomy, justice, 
beneficence and non-maleficence.  The dissertation demonstrates that while these varying 
approaches to ethics may disagree, and even lead to ethical dilemmas in the practice of 
healthcare, they are unanimous in their position on how to treat the patient who has 
suffered the consequences of a medical error. 
In addition to these broad principles, there are also western cultural and religious 
ethical expectations and attitudes that specifically apply to what to do following the 
occurrence of a medical error.  Specifically, certain principles and societal expectations 
hold individuals and institutions accountable for the harm they create which results in 
losses and costs to others.  Applying these principles to medical errors in the ICU, all 
involved parties connected with the institution, the hospital itself and medical 
professionals working in that setting, are ethically responsible to disclose, fully confess, 
apologize with contrition, compensate victims and ask for forgiveness.  Not fulfilling 
these expectations may further traumatize the victim psychologically and physically, in 
this case the ICU patient, and furthermore, may initiate legal action.  Statistics attest to a 
significant deviation in practice from these expectations, indicating a major weakness in 
current medical institutional behavior; it has been estimated that there may only be 30% 
compliance with these expectations in the wake of medical errors in U.S. hospitals.  
Potential reform here would first include the proper notification and documentation of the 
medical errors that occur – critical procedures that are rarely followed at present.  
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With this foundation, the dissertation will then elaborate on protocols for 
disclosure and handling of the consequences of medical errors addressing scope and scale 
of errors, acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk of patient outcome 
and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipating consequences, 
disclosure timing, apologies and losses, and compensation.  
Finally, the dissertation focuses on establishing the systemic, preventative 
approach that will be necessary in order to bring the problem of medical errors in the ICU 
under control. Protocols will be called for to reduce the amount and severity of medical 
errors including prevention planning, better communication, better medication execution, 
and planning to prevent, or if not possible, deal with equipment failure. The elimination 
or reduction of system failure and tort reform will be recommended although these two 
goals are beyond that which can be addressed through the establishment of protocols. 
Chapter 2 provides, in broad scope, a picture of the prevalence and frequency at 
which medical errors of various types, causes, and characteristics occur in the intensive 
care units of hospitals throughout the United States. In order to proceed, it will be 
necessary to understand how medical errors have been defined and understood in general 
within the field. Further subsections will classify the types of medical errors that may 
occur, survey the statistics which document the frequency and severity of the problem, 
and analyze the principal risk factors that increase the likelihood of errors occurring. 
 The sub-section of the chapter defines medical errors, analyze the potential for 
their occurrence in general, and enumerate various types or categories into which they 
fall. In particular, the discussion will lay the foundation for the position that the 
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propensity for a type of error to occur is related to the medical setting, such as the 
hospital ICU and that this relationship will be important in proposing measures to combat 
medical error in general.  
 In the abstract, medical errors may be defined to include all those occurrences, 
actions, and their results, which are neither intended as part of the course of prescribed 
treatment nor directly attributable to the disease, injury, or condition being treated.1 Thus, 
in the hospital Intensive Care Unit (ICU), a wide range of occurrences can be classified 
as medical errors, including the administration of incorrect medications or dosages, the 
improper administration of infusions, errors in the use of medical equipment, deviations 
from standard protocol, as well as any other unintended variation in the course of patient 
care that could compromise proper medical treatment.2 The Institute of Medicine 
characterizes medical errors more broadly, thereby including any failure in following 
through to completion on a prescribed plan for treatment, as well as the intentional 
implementation of any inappropriate plan or steps in such a plan.3 
Frequently, these errors inherently cause some form of harm or setback to the 
patient and his or her recuperation process; furthermore, they may vary widely in the 
severity of their consequences.4 As Angus and Carlet note, the effects of medical errors 
may be so slight as to cause no physiological or biochemical difference in the patient, 
thus requiring no rectifying action. On the other hand, over much of the continuum of 
severity the error adversely affects the patient, necessitating treatment specifically for the 
purpose of correcting or mitigating the damage and restoring the patient’s health.5 
Complicating the issue, these adverse consequences can be temporary or permanent, even 
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to the point of causing death. In order to provide more precision, the Ohio State 
University Severity Scale was created to serve as a seven level basis for assessing the 
severity of effect of the medical error on the patient, as follows: a) Level 0 for errors that 
are caught and dealt with promptly enough that the patient does not experience any 
effects from them; b) Level 1 for errors that cause no change in the patient’s clinical 
outcome; c) Level 2 for errors that necessitate increased monitoring but possibly no 
action; d) Level 3 for errors that require additional laboratory tests, or produce any 
alteration in vital signs; e) Level 4 for errors the require either additional treatment or 
procedures, a prolonged stay in the hospital or (re)admission to it; f) Level 5 for errors 
that either result in admission to the ICU or necessitate invasive procedure, or otherwise 
cause irreversible harm; and g) Level 6 for errors that are ultimately fatal.6 
Bauman and Hyzy have asserted that in spite of the intensive training which the 
large majority of health care professionals assigned to ICUs are required to go through, 
the fact that these individuals are human beings inherently means that they will from time 
to time, commit errors.7 Furthermore, the ICU, along with other hospital units, is an 
environment of medical care that is especially vulnerable to the occurrence of errors.8 
Bohomol et al, credit the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report, which bears the clichéd title 
To Err is Human, with focusing the attention of the community of medical professionals 
on the extent and seriousness of medical errors and their adverse consequences.9 The very 
nature of the life threatening severity of illnesses and injuries that lead to admission to the 
ICU presupposes a significantly elevated potential for errors in treatment, along with an 
elevated level of seriousness in their repercussions. Fundamental to this need for constant 
 11 
monitoring, intensive and complex treatment interventions, and urgent response to critical 
situations is the greatly increased risk of medical error.10  
The potential for medical errors to occur is inextricably linked to the 
fragmentation of healthcare services, as opposed to their being integrated into a 
functioning network system.11 McGowan and Healey, noted that this fragmentation 
forces the patient into interactions with numerous providers in various environments. 
These researchers contend that the resulting lack of access to complete information, 
coupled with the disincentive to take on expanded responsibility or admit responsibility 
for mistakes, creates an environment that actually fosters medical errors, increasing their 
likelihood and frequency.12 
In pursuit of the goal of dealing with medical errors, various researchers have 
categorized potential errors according to how they occur. Among the most frequently 
occurring types of errors is that of execution, which involves a presumably efficacious 
plan for treatment that is not implemented as prescribed and thereby yields negative 
consequences.13 Distinct from errors of execution are those that result from failures of 
health care providers in creating a plan for treatment, either by neglecting needed steps or 
procedures or by calling for those that have unjustifiable risks in relation to anticipated 
benefits. Detailed contrastive analysis of these two types of errors leads to the conclusion 
that in addition to the errors themselves, errors of execution and errors of planning differ 
in the settings in which they most often occur, which individuals in the system most often 
commit such errors, and how the errors are to be remedied.14 
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A third distinct category of medical errors are known as diagnostic errors consist 
of the failure to accurately diagnose either an initial condition which the patient has or a 
subsequent development in the course of treatment; such errors are relatively common in 
the ICU.15 Obviously, safe and effective medication and treatment cannot be 
implemented in the absence of proper diagnosis; moreover, the consequences of such 
inaccuracy are far more serious and potentially life-threatening in the ICU.16 At the same 
time, however, delays in diagnosis prompted by an effort to be certain of accuracy have 
an equal potential for serious or even fatal consequences. Thus, if not thoroughly 
justifiable, such delays also constitute medical errors.17  
Given the conditions of those patients who populate the ICU, the most rigorous 
measures to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases must be adhered to. 
Consequently, any lapse in preventative procedures or failure to provide prophylactic 
treatment to patients in need of it constitutes a serious medical error. Another set of 
medical errors closely related in terms of how they transpire arises out of the inability of 
ICU staff, for whatever reason, to follow through with the administration of all treatment 
protocols, the implementation of which necessitate continuous monitoring.18 
Medication errors, by contrast, represent the commission of an inappropriate act 
rather than a failure to take proper action.19 This category of errors includes not only 
administering the wrong medicine or dosage, but also any deviation from prescribed 
procedures in administering the medication which would compromise the efficacy of the 
treatment. In the ICU, the most prevalent occurrence of this type of error stems from one 
of two mistakes; either a health care provider prescribes the wrong dosage or even the 
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wrong medicine itself, or else the healthcare worker misinterprets written instructions. 
Either of these errors can easily lead to critical consequences for a patient in the ICU.20 
Beyond the obvious, direct medical errors of omission and commission described 
above are failures of those activities, entities, and technologies that need to function 
reliably in support of the delivery of care. One of these categories of medical errors can 
be characterized as failures at communicating effectively. Given the added urgency of the 
circumstances surrounding a patient’s being in the ICU and the greater numbers of 
physicians, healthcare workers, and support staff involved, the need for timely and 
accurate communication cannot be overstated.21 ICU facilities depend upon equipment 
functioning properly, in some cases to provide automatic delivery of supportive care, 
while in other cases to monitor and deliver accurate, up-to-the-second information about 
the patient’s status. Any technical failure of this equipment constitutes a medical error.22 
Complicating the issue, the source of this failure may be either a defect in manufacture or 
either improper use or simply overuse of the equipment. The error may also occur due to 
the institution’s neglecting to inspect and ensure that the equipment is functioning 
properly; on the other hand, the malfunction may be undetectable despite rigorous 
monitoring until the moment it occurs. As a defined and integrated health system, the 
ICU must have all support systems, whether human or mechanical, functioning 
dependably; otherwise, medical errors are all but inevitable.23  
Given that the organizational structure of hospitals is extremely complex, 
effective management at all levels is essential for the coordination of interacting systems, 
which in turn is necessary for the prevention of medical errors.24 In spite of these 
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seemingly obvious considerations, the extent to which many institutions fail to address 
this need for effective management in the ICU is remarkable and contributes significantly 
to the occurrence of medical errors. Poor medical management has been documented in 
numerous cases as an underlying cause medical errors and their negative consequences. 
Conscientious management needs to be a high priority for health care institutions for a 
multitude of reasons, not merely for the prevention of medical errors. Given the 
seriousness of the conditions that place patients in the ICU, hospitals need to place the 
proper management of this area of the institution at the top of their priority list.25  
Human error can be defined broadly and typically plays a role in the aggregate, 
whether it is due to negligence, substandard performance of duties, or failure to be 
vigilant in monitoring; as a result, human error is often viewed as the primary cause of a 
majority if not all errors in the hospital setting overall and especially in the ICU.26 
Consequently, much of the research to date into medical errors in the ICU has 
concentrated on human error as the principal source.  Even recently, some theorists have 
conceived of critical medical errors as solely the result of an anomaly within the 
performance of the healthcare staff, based upon the assumption that all systems of 
procedure and technology in the ICU would otherwise function perfectly.27 
 The next sub-section begins with an overview of facts and figures documenting 
the frequency of medical errors and their associated costs, comparing in-patient versus 
out-patient errors rates and explaining how despite the high level and complexity of risk 
for medical errors in the ICU, such factors may still be isolated and analyzed as a 
prerequisite to being eliminated or at least minimized. 
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Although precise calculation may be impossible, a recent study estimates that as 
many as 20% of Americans pass away after a final hospital stay involving time in the 
ICU. Whether or not these patients survive, they often endure prolonged pain and 
suffering while being obligated to pay for their treatment and care.28 Quantifying the cost, 
Multz has estimated that expenditures on ICU care reached approximately $62 billion in 
United States in 1998, constituting 34% of hospital budgets and about 1% of U.S. gross 
domestic product. Both the potential benefits and the costs in the ICU are enormous, 
making the problem of medical errors in that part of the hospital of vital significance. 
Notably there are at least twice as many medical errors in the ICU as occur in any other 
hospital unit.29 One major study claims that for every critically ill patient spending time 
in the ICU, approximately 1.7 medical errors of some level of seriousness occur each 
day; furthermore, it is quite common for a patient to have at least one life-threatening 
error occur during the course of his or her treatment in the ICU.30 If anything, such 
statistics grossly underestimate the frequency of medical errors since their documentation 
depends on self-reporting – a method that has been demonstrated to be flawed in favor of 
underreporting. Even in teaching hospitals, where monitoring is more intensive and 
reporting is a high priority, a tremendous gap has existed between the intention to report 
and the actual act of doing so.31  
While the determination as to whether an individual patient has died directly 
because of a medical error is complicated and in the end often a matter of judgment and 
dispute, generally accepted estimates have concluded that somewhere between 44,000 to 
98,000 people die annually because of preventable medical errors.32 McGowan and 
Healey cited the Institute of Medicine’s report from 1999, which claimed that 98,000 
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deaths per year were attributable to preventable medical errors.33 Summarizing the scope 
of the problem and the inadequacy of the response, Sultz and Young contend that the 
medical error problem in hospitals is quite well-known in the healthcare community, but 
largely ignored by those with the power and authority to effect change.34 
The same 1999 report from the Institute estimates the annual U.S. economic 
losses from medical error at $17 to 29 billion dollars. While more recent 2008 data place 
losses closer to the lower end of that range, the $19.5 billion dollar figure from the 
Millennium Research Group is still quite high, especially in light of an estimated 
additional 17 billion loss each year due to prescription errors.35 In comparative terms, 
more individuals are believed to have died from consequences of medical errors that have 
perished in motor vehicle accidents or succumbed to either breast cancer or HIV. This 
highlights the seriousness of the issue and reveals the need for initiatives to ensure that 
medical errors are reduced. One contributing factor to the costs is that in the ICU in 
particular, patients run up huge additional expenses any time that a medical error must be 
treated, causing extensions of stay in the ICU, along with the added costs of new, 
corrective, or prolonged original treatment.36 
While research has been undertaken to compare inpatient with outpatient care, in 
terms of the cost of medical error, it is primarily the cost of errors in the context of 
inpatient care that is the subject of the dissertation’s focus.37 Unfortunately, research into 
the specific costs of medical errors within the ICU has not been addressed to any 
significant extent, making accurate extrapolation to the U.S. population as a whole 
impossible.38 What is understood is that patients admitted to the hospital have a greater 
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risk of suffering the consequences of a medical error than do outpatients; moreover, 
among inpatients, those in ICUs are at greater risk that those in the general hospital 
inpatient population. The overall price tag for inpatient medical errors today (including 
those occurring in the ICU) stands at approximately $2.7 billion annually.39 
Numerous studies have established that the frequency at which different types of 
medical errors occur varies, depending on the origin and type of error, as well as other 
related factors.40 For instance, in considering errors that are attributable to human 
mistakes, certain factors such as overburdening responsibility or understaffing will tend 
to increase the error rate and frequency while equipment failure will not be subject to the 
same forces.41 Despite the apparent complexity in the interaction of influential factors, 
research exists documenting common trends which explain the frequency of the various 
types of errors.42 Furthermore, one overarching factor in determining the types and 
frequency of errors in the ICU is the healthcare system that is in place in the specific 
institution. Procedures for drug storage at one facility may promote the likelihood of 
medication errors, while another hospital might be prone to errors that stem from poor 
communication systems.43  
The desire to better understand the sources and likelihood of medical errors has 
led to a notable amount of research into identifying risk factors.44 This sub-section of the 
chapter provides an in-depth analysis of these risk factors such as patients, medications 
and ICU equipment, and the mechanism by which they trigger medical errors.  
 18 
A variety of factors, together with characteristics of the patient constitute risk 
factors for medical errors, all of which have heightened significance in the environment 
of the ICU. These factors include:  
1) Severity of the primary illness or injury.  
All those admitted to the ICU by definition already have life threatening 
conditions. However, medical experts are quick to note that the severity of these 
conditions can vary widely. The more severe the case is, the greater complexity exists 
along with greater propensity that any need for urgent action will confuse or hamper the 
ICU staff.45  
2) Age related need for special care.  
While most ICU patients have seriously weakened bodily systems, patients at the 
extremes of youth and advanced age are at greater vulnerability to injury cause by 
medical error. Young children, for example, have immature physiological system with 
less tolerance for any variation their level of treatment as the result of a medical error, 
especially when in the ICU.46 
3) Extended stays in the hospital or ICU.  
More lengthy stays in the ICU correlate with more complicated conditions, which 
in turn require adaptive treatment strategies, and consequently a greater potential for 
error.47 
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4) Patients under sedation.  
Church and MacKinnon note that many of those in the ICU are under sedation as 
a necessary component of their treatment. Unfortunately, sedation dulls the senses which 
renders patients more susceptible to the effects of medical error.48  
Medication errors form a category comprising a variety of things that can occur 
stemming from different risk factors for medical errors in general.49 This variety of 
factors and their potential causes presents challenges for the anticipation and prevention 
of errors, given the multiplicity of possible triggers.50 The three primary factors include:  
1) Special types of medication.  
As Bucknall notes, certain medications require highly precise and inflexible 
protocols of administration.51 Adding to this problem is the risk of confusion, given the 
plethora of combinations of active ingredients, with similar sounding names. 
2) The number of medications.  
It is a given that patients in the ICU normally need a combination of medications, 
which require carefully planning and administering protocols.  
3) The number of interventions.  
Sometime patients in the ICU present life-threatening conditions that may require 
a number of different interventions to save their lives. When such an intervention 
becomes necessary, the interactive effects of all medications currently or soon to be in the 
patient’s system must be anticipated and allowances for these interactions must be 
made.52 
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According to Moyen and his colleagues, the potential for malfunctioning or 
failure of equipment constitutes another class of risk factors for medical errors in the 
ICU.53 These factors include:  
1) The complexity of the environment. 
The equipment and facilities that provide life support to patients in the ICU are 
quite sophisticated, yet must function with near-perfect reliability. Moreover, the ICU 
staff must be fully competent in their use.54  
2) The need to handle emergency admissions. 
A characteristic that sets the ICU apart from other hospital units is that those 
staffing the unit do not have the luxury of running checks on the equipment before use. 
Emergency admissions to the ICU may occur in rapid succession, challenging ICU staff 
to heightened competency and responsiveness at the same time.55  
3) The multiplicity of care providers  
The round-the-clock need for intensive care and monitoring in the ICU requires 
staffing, which consists of rotating shifts of numerous health care providers who possess 
varying levels of experience and understanding of the appropriate treatment and 
diagnostic procedures in relation to the equipment and to the patient.56 
This chapter of the dissertation focuses on errors in the ICU and consists of a 
broad category of occurrences, which are unintended failures of one kind or another and 
which are not caused by disease, injury, or the condition being treated. There are many 
potential causes of error in the ICU, the results of which can range from little to no effect 
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all the way up to serious injury and death.  These errors include errors of commission 
(execution, planning, diagnosis, delay, medication, complex equipment failure, 
communication error) and omission (lack of prophylactic treatment, and absent or poor 
medical management).  Most errors by far are medication errors. It has been roughly 
estimated that annually somewhere between 44,000 and 98,000 people die of preventable 
medical errors in the ICU, tallying economic losses between $17-29 billion. Furthermore, 
twice as many errors occur in the ICU as in the rest of the hospital. More than a third of 
most hospitals annual budgets is spent on the ICU. Most patients admitted to the ICU 
have life threatening conditions, are weak, physically vulnerable, and under sedation, as 
well as in need of complex drug regimens. 
Chapter 3 discusses medical errors in the ICU in the context of biomedical ethics, 
beginning with an analysis of the major principles of ethics which apply, including: 
autonomy, distributed justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence. Beyond this discussion, 
the section focuses on the process of preserving patient autonomy and informed consent 
in the context of the potential for medical errors interfering with the prescribed course of 
patient treatment.  
In the broader context of medicine, as well as in the hospital environment, ethical 
conflicts arise from factors as diverse as the preferences and opinions of patients or their 
surrogates; the duties and professional judgments of physicians, specialists, and other 
medical staff; the administrative concerns of hospital management and legal counsel; and 
social concerns over equitable allocation of medical resources. It is incumbent upon all 
medical professionals to be conversant with the basic fundamentals of biomedical ethics 
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as applicable to hospitals and other institutional healthcare settings. These functions serve 
as guidelines for professional ethics.57 An understanding of ethical principles by all those 
involved facilitates accomplishing the mission of the ICU, especially when urgent action 
is called for. Principles of ethics, such as respect for the patient’s autonomy, justice 
(particularly with regard to resource allocation), beneficence, and non-maleficence are 
cornerstone values in bioethics, which play an enhanced role in the ICU.58 
Recognition of the prevalence of and need to prevent, or at least minimize, the 
effects of medical errors has already come to family practice and post hospital-discharge 
medical settings.59 Ethics guidelines for doctors, nurses, medical researchers, and others 
in the healthcare field are already being implemented in various global settings, 
monitored by established ethics committees.60 The attention to ethics in the broader 
context of healthcare is not merely a response to trends in litigation, but rather is part of 
the growing recognition of the burden placed on society as a whole when medical errors 
proliferate. By comparison, recognition of the need to address the problem of medical 
errors from the perspective of biomedical ethics has been slow to gain attention in 
institutional healthcare settings, such as in hospitals and their ICUs.61  
As Youngberg and Hatlie, note the code of ethics adopted by the American 
Medical Association (AMA) obligates physicians to inform the patient of any mistakes 
they (the medical professionals) have made any time the error causes complications for 
the patient’s health or medical treatment.62 This ethical disclosure responsibility extends 
to all pertinent facts concerning the occurrence. The only significant exception to this rule 
is in the case of an error that results in no material consequences to the patient’s health or 
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prognosis. Despite years of rigorous medical training and this very concrete obligation, it 
appears that a significant number of medical practitioners are not cognizant of the ethical 
responsibility that is inherent in every piece of medical advice, directive, medication, 
prescription, or course of treatment they choose to give. Ethical practice requires that for 
every case in which the disclosure would lead to improvement of the patient’s health, 
medical ethics demands full and honest disclosure.63 The American College of 
Physicians, concurs on these demands, to which the ethical treatment of the patient 
obligates the doctor, calling on the physician to fully disclose all relevant details 
concerning errors in both procedure and professional judgment committed in the course 
of care. The condition is that this information should be material to the patient’s well-
being. It is understood that while any particular unintentional medical error may not 
qualify as improper, negligent, or unethical, the failure to disclose the error to the patient 
qualifies as all of these things.64  
One of the most applicable theories of ethics, consequentialism, or teleological 
theory focuses on the outcome of an action as distinguished from evaluating the action 
itself.65 Under this approach, the goal is to identify and pursue the optimal outcome under 
any given set of circumstances, such as a medical error, and subsequently to follow the 
best course of action in order to achieve those optimal results. Utilitarianism follows from 
this theory, advocating for the course of action that will bring the greatest good to the 
greatest number of people.  Understandably, in the context of the ICU, this would hold 
accountable those people who are directly or indirectly involved in the effects of the 
error.66 Going back many centuries, consequentialists have called for the application of 
this theory on the basis of a belief in the fundamental benevolence of human nature.67 
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This utilitarian perspective clearly takes a position with regard to the allocation of 
healthcare resources, and in particular what happens in the context of the ICU.68 A 
consequentialist might label as immoral, or at least unethical, the heavy expenditure of 
funds and resources on surgery to benefit a single patient if it means that other patients 
cannot be helped. In sharp contrast to this position stands non-consequentialist theory. 
The tension in balancing these conflicting theoretical approaches as well as considering 
other approaches, such as the practice of triage, is what informs the ethical practice of 
medicine and its consequences for treatment in the ICU.69  
In contrast to both consequentialism and utilitarianism, deontology, as espoused 
by Kant and Rawls, posits fundamental principles of ethics that individuals, in this case 
medical professional in the ICU, should always endeavor to follow without exception on 
the basis of duty as the foundation of all moral action.70 Deontology asserts that moral 
rules are the fundamental criterion for judging whether an action can be considered 
ethical, making the consequences of actions whether harmful or beneficial largely 
secondary to the action’s ethical basis. Following this approach could place the quality of 
a decision, for example by a medical provider, a priority ahead of the patient’s outcome.71 
A variant of deontology in the area of applied ethics – principlism - is founded on the 
concept of core principles – autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice - which 
control and determine ethical behavior, while allowing for their being superseded in 
exceptional cases by compelling reasons.72  
The ICU has functioned as an essential component in the U.S. hospital system for 
more than half a century.73 From its beginning, the ICU and its specialized treatment, 
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care, and interventions, which include increased monitoring and special equipment such 
as mechanical ventilators, have often though not uniformly extended and improved the 
quality of life for patients with severe and urgent medical problems. By the late 1970s, 
the necessity of possessing a distinct skill set in order to care for ICU patients within 
ethical guidelines had become apparent to members of the nursing profession who 
focused on matters of ethics.74  
Conflicts among the four basic principles of biomedical ethics constitute the 
source of most of the ethical dilemmas that arise in the ICU, those principles being: 1) 
autonomy, 2) distributed justice, 3) beneficence, and 4) non-maleficence. Ethical 
dilemmas today constitute an almost routine concern in the ICU, one of the most 
fundamental examples being whether to administer potentially lifesaving medicine to a 
patient who vehemently opposes doing so. Efforts to appeal to the judgments of experts 
in the field serve merely to create yet another dimension to the controversy.75 
By virtue of their need to be there, patients in the ICU are more likely to be 
suffering impaired decision-making capability, sometimes even in the extreme. The 
patient’s judgment is likely to be impeded, not only by the organic disease, condition, or 
injury which sent the individual to the ICU, but also by the symptoms and side effects of 
the condition and its treatment. Such hindrances to sound decision-making could 
conceivably include metabolic disturbances, pain, sleep deprivation, or sedatives.76 
Therefore, the responsibility of medical professionals in the ICU is to ascertain the 
patient’s ability to competently give informed consent prior to taking any action with 
potentially life-changing consequences.77 The situation is complex considering the 
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heightened mortality rate in the ICU, coupled with the fact that each patient’s condition is 
unique and may involve decision-making competence in some matters, but not in others. 
This problem necessitates a decision based on evidence from the patient’s medical history 
and a mental status assessment, along with input from other healthcare professionals and 
family members. Any suspicion or disagreement may constitute sufficient cause for 
gathering additional information, and possibly even a formal psychiatric consultation at 
the patient’s request.78  
As these considerations apply to medical errors, respect for the ethical principles 
that are overtly expressed by the American Medical Association and the American 
College of Physicians calls upon all providers of medical care to fully disclose all 
relevant details of medical errors to all patients (patients, surrogate family members, 
hospital, regulators, insurers) in such manner that these medical professionals hold 
themselves accountable for their actions.  Several major theories of ethics stand behind 
these guidelines. In particular, consequentialist or teleological theory does so by focusing 
on the medical outcome rather than the process. Utilitarianism supports such 
accountability by focusing on the use of resources, delivering the greatest good to the 
greatest number. Deontology or its variation, principlism, although the polar opposite of 
consequentialist theory dictates that moral process principles should dominate, namely 
autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence.  These ethical principles stand in 
contrast to one another, prompting biomedical ethical dilemmas almost daily in the ICU.  
An example of one persistent dilemma is the extent to which patients are competent to 
provide informed consent for various medical interventions necessary or desirable to 
resolve their medical needs.  
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Chapter 4 begins with an analysis of Western cultural and religious attitudes that 
shape expectations of how those involved should respond to the discovery of a medical 
error. The discussion leads into the more focused consideration of what patients 
specifically are likely to expect in such cases. Next, the section considers the process of 
disclosure of and apology for medical errors, including barriers to full disclosure, ethical 
perspectives, and the importance of having a specific, detailed, and predetermined 
disclosure process, as well as an examination of key features of that process.  
Given the state of science and information technology, along with an increased 
understanding of ethical considerations, patients in western, developed nations are in a 
position to become aware of mistakes and errors made by medical professionals and 
institutions in the course of their treatment.  Moreover, patients in these countries are 
empowered to assert their rights and take appropriate action in response to medical errors 
(MEs).79 Interacting with this likelihood that MEs will be detected and trigger action are 
certain underlying moral tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which call for responses 
to MEs in terms of confession, repentance and forgiveness.80 Berlinger and Wu describe 
the impact that these traditions have on expectations of ethical conduct in relation to 
errors in terms of a set of functionally specified actions with expectations for both the 
party causing the harm and the party that has been injured. The offending individual is 
fully expected to disclose the error to all affected parties and apologize for it, an action 
often referred to as confessing.81 This action may include an explanation of the reasons 
for the error, but must be accompanied by an expression of contrition for the harm caused 
and a good faith effort to provide compensation and restitution to the extent possible. The 
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injured party is then expected, at the point when it becomes appropriate, to respond with 
some form of absolution or forgiveness.82 
Based on an extensive evaluation of multiple research studies, Robbenolt 
concluded that the primary motivation behind lawsuits triggered by the occurrence of 
medical errors is the goal of establishing the ultimate causes of the error and ensuring that 
such errors are not allowed to recur.83 A significant additional or alternate motivation is 
monetary compensation, which those experiencing harm from the medical error believe is 
justified to alleviate the physical and emotional trauma and any monetary loss resulting 
from the medical error. Institutions such as hospitals typically have established policies 
and procedures designed to minimize medical errors and the resulting law suits in order 
to preserve their public reputation, goodwill, and prospects for continuing the provision 
of health services. However, these institutions have been less likely to have in place fully 
transparent internal and external policies and procedures for the disclosure of medical 
errors and acknowledgement of responsibility, largely due to the potential uncertainty and 
adverse consequences brought on by the involvement of courts, regulators, and insurers.84 
Beyond monetary compensation, patients and families injured through medical 
errors seek to secure a commitment to and plan for correcting the physical and 
psychological results of the error, as well as to insure the medical and healthcare support 
needed to cope with the effects of the error.85 From the standpoint of ethics, disclosure of 
information relating to minor, less impacting medical errors is no less the duty of 
physicians and hospitals in cases for which it will not affect subsequent treatment.86 In 
addition to helping provide continuity of medical treatment, the disclosure of errors forms 
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an essential part of the foundation of any relationship of trust between medical 
professionals and their patients - a fundamental purpose behind the comprehensive codes 
of ethical conduct formulated by medical bodies such the American Medical 
Association.87 Wolf and Hughes have analyzed various ethical considerations implicit in 
the reporting and disclosure of medical errors, along with any negative consequences to 
patients and other related parties. By respecting the autonomy of the patient, the medical 
professional is able ascertain whether the patient has been harmed in the first place. 
These authors conclude that adherence to the ethical principles of fidelity, beneficence, 
and non-maleficence ensures that the effects of any medical errors will be minimized.88 
 The sub-section of the chapter focuses narrowly on contrasting the negative 
consequences of withholding information or avoiding disclosure in the wake of a medical 
error and the duty, along with the positive effects of full disclosure. 
One situation which could foreseeably prompt hospitals and medical professionals 
to withhold information about medical errors would be a scenario in which the motive for 
withholding was to avoid causing any more distress than was necessary to patients, 
thereby avoiding further physically or psychologically incapacitating or traumatizing the 
patient.89 Edwin provides a strong counter to this argument, by asserting the importance 
of physicians’ and hospitals’ acknowledging and disclosing errors rather than having the 
patients or family members learn of the errors from another source, thereby jeopardizing 
the trust relationship. Supportive of this argument, honest and timely disclosure has been 
linked to lower level of distress in patients.90 Hammami, Attalah and Al-Qadire have 
found corroborating evidence in studying the direct relationship between patients’ 
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reactions to and the source from which they learned of medical errors, with the patients 
showing a clear preference for being informed by the at-fault physician in the case.91 
Aside from the cogency of various studies which demonstrate that the non-
disclosure of medical errors on the part of staff who are at-fault can stimulate negative 
reactions potentially leading to legal action, physicians and other medical professionals 
are obligated to disclose any and all errors at the earliest time, according to codes of 
ethical conduct, as well as their fiduciary duties.92 Edwin asserts that the relationship 
between doctors and those in their care constitutes a fiduciary rather than a transactional 
relationship, necessitating good faith trust, confidence, and candor. Such a relationship 
enables the achievement of the ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence, and justice for both parties at all times.93 Beyond adherence to these 
principles, Finkelstein et al. highlight the mandatory nature of complying with ethical, as 
well as fiduciary requirements, which would require physicians and institutions to both 
apologize for medical errors and provide monetary compensation. The foundations of 
medical ethics guarantee patients access to all forms of information that they might need 
in order to make informed decisions regarding their treatment, thus necessitating 
disclosure of medical errors.94 
A fundamental discrepancy exists between the expectations of medical 
professional and those receiving treatment as to the circumstances under which disclosure 
of medical errors is warranted.95 Physicians and colleagues tend to see the issue as a 
balancing of risks against benefits both for and against disclosure, presuming 
circumstances in which they would appropriately decide to conceal an error. Patients in 
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contrast, when asked hypothetically, would say they expect complete disclosure with all 
relevant information regardless of the circumstances.96 The result of this discrepancy of 
expectation has been analyzed statistically, showing that medical errors are followed by 
full disclosure and apology in no more than 30 percent of the cases where they have been 
documented to have occurred, often in spite of the patient’s need or expressed request for 
full information.97  
It is imperative that both physicians and hospitals have an established, detailed 
process in place, along with a commitment to disclose medical errors that have threatened 
patient’s wellbeing, following it systematically in preparation for whenever there are 
medical errors to be disclosed. This process begins by ensuring the discovery and 
documentation of all relevant information, along with its corroboration by medical 
specialists wherever needed.98 
As part of the process of preparation for disclosure, both institutions and the 
procedures they implement need to anticipate, acknowledge, and prepare to deal with 
emotional responses from those on both sides of the occurrence.  On the part of 
physicians and medical staff, who are or may be perceived to be at fault, there are likely 
to be feelings of failure, incompetence, and self-deprecation, as well as fears of legal 
liability.99 These feelings may be expressed in efforts to gloss over or withhold relevant 
information or to deflect blame and must be countered with institutional support for full 
disclosure as the ethical course of action. On the part of patients and family members, 
there are likely to be feelings of betrayal, anger, fear of unidentified negative 
consequences of the error, and a tendency to suspect a cover-up by responsible 
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authorities, all of which can easily lead to mistrust.100 Risk management personnel are 
critical actors in the disclosure process, in particular if there is any likelihood that the 
error could lead to additional injury or trauma to the patient beyond the condition which 
is already being treated. At the same time, the disclosure process should include only the 
minimum of those directly involved, including risk management and medical staff 
directly, so as to avoid the patient feeling confronted by an overwhelming adversary, as 
well as to ethically preserve the patient’s confidentiality.101  
Proper notification and documentation, both of the standard implementation of 
procedures in treatment and of any non-routine or unanticipated results, is critical to 
effectiveness in disclosing MEs.102 While the institution’s policies and procedures play 
the dominant role in how effectively the disclosure of any given error is, thoroughness in 
reporting and documentation encourages, as well as signals, the preparedness and 
willingness of the at-fault medical staff to admit and fully disclose all errors. When the 
mechanisms for reporting and documenting errors involve only the physicians and other 
staff at-fault, complete and accurate descriptions, necessary for full disclosure, as well as 
subsequent prevention of reoccurrence, tend to suffer. Therefore hospitals need to make 
sure that general physicians, risk managers, heads of relevant agencies, and specialists in 
patient safety play a crucial role in the process of investigating and documenting any and 
all errors.103 Beyond the documentation of occurrences of medical errors, hospitals 
should have procedures in place to document near-miss events since information about 
them can be invaluable in establishing patterns of heightened risk and in enabling 
preventative measures to be taken, or in countering allegations of a pattern of 
negligence.104 According to Fein et al. issues surrounding disclosure arise from several 
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sources. For one, healthcare professionals and institutions have issues stemming from 
fears of potential outcomes, as well as concerns about their training in dealing with errors 
and their overall professional responsibility. Issues involving patients relate to their desire 
for information, their sophistication in following the course of their healthcare, and the 
quality of their relationships with their physicians. Patients are also concerned about 
issues related to the extent and level of the harm caused by the error and who is aware of 
its occurrence. The degree to which the institution accepts the inevitability of error and 
maintains a supportive infrastructure has the greatest influence on the likelihood of full 
and accurate disclosure. An understanding and prior consideration of all the above factors 
enables the development of a system which can promptly detect, document, and mitigate 
the adverse effects of errors in the maximum number of occurrences.105 
Fundamentally, western cultural and religious attitudes form the basis of the 
medical disclosure process in that all individuals and groups are held accountable for any 
harm they create that results in losses and costs to others.  As this applies to medical 
errors in the ICU, all parties connected with the ICU – the hospital, as well as medical 
professionals and staff are ethically responsible to disclose, fully confess, apologize with 
contrition, compensate victims and ask for forgiveness.  This is a societal expectation. 
Not doing so may further psychologically and physically traumatize the victim, in this 
case the ICU patient.  Such failure may also initiate legal action.  Despite the 
pervasiveness of these dictates of society, there is a clear gap between the cultural and 
religious expectations and the behavior of medical care providers, which has been 
estimated to leave expectations unfulfilled in nearly 70 percent of cases, calling for major 
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a change in institutions’ procedural behavior. Proper notification and documentation of 
medical errors is a critical first step in closing this gap. 
Chapter 5 describes the issues involved in establishing and implementing 
protocols for disclosing medical errors whenever they occur. Issues which must be 
addressed through protocols include: ethical acceptance of responsibility, anticipation in 
terms of risk management, determination of known and foreseeable consequences, 
identification of patients in the process, and timing of disclosure. Specifically, individual 
protocols which need to be adopted will be discussed in relation to acknowledgement of 
responsibility, and compensation.  
The scope and scale of medical errors in the ICU span a spectrum that begins on 
the low end with no error and ranges through errors termed unnoticed, inconsequential, 
minimally unsettling, to those deemed discomforting, all of which may be labeled as 
minor errors.106 At the other end of the spectrum are those errors classified as major, 
which include those labeled as troublesome, disabling, or life threatening, all the way up 
to those which prove fatal. From one perspective, every medical error creates a 
disruption, in turn necessitating corrective action due to undue effects or at minimum a 
modification of prevention procedures; nevertheless, all errors do not merit the same 
degree of response or action.107  
While minor errors cause minimal injury, disruption, or damage, it is clear that the 
public expects full disclosure of even these types of error. One of a number of groups 
with similar research findings, a New England health maintenance organization (HMO) 
recently found that 92% of respondents in a hypothetical survey thought that every 
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medical error ought to be disclosed, regardless of whether it led to any injury or harm.  In 
another study, only 12% of those surveyed felt it was acceptable not to inform an affected 
patient if the error had not affected his or her health. Similar attitudinal results have been 
obtained using focus groups.108 Biomedical ethics, professional codes of conduct, and 
public perception are in unanimous agreement on the necessity of full disclosure of major 
errors, given that they endanger patients, potentially leading to death or serious physical 
or psychological injury, and as such demand immediate responsive action. Errors 
involving medication constitute the most frequent of any type in the ICU, likely because 
of the complexity of administering such a variety of medications, accounting for 
approximately 78% of all serious medical errors.109  
The standard protocol for the delivery of each individual medication to each ICU 
patient involves five steps: prescription, transcription, preparation, dispensation, and 
administration; these steps in turn subdivide into as many as several hundred sub-
procedures with the potential for error at each step in the process. Thus, the risk of error 
for any given patient is high, and it is remarkable and to the credit of ICU staff that, as 
frequently as errors do occur, there are not many more of them.110 A study which ranked 
the frequency of medication errors in terms of the five steps in the process, found the 
majority to have occurred during the last step - administration (53%) - followed by 
prescription (17%), preparation (14%), and transcription (11%) in that order.111 
Rooted in Judeo-Christian ethics and its traditions of confession, repentance, and 
forgiveness, the generic protocol presented here emphasizes accepting ethical 
responsibility for the medical error, fully disclosing the circumstances and consequences 
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of the error, and apologizing and being accountable for the error, as well as mitigating, 
correcting effects of and preventing future occurrences of the error.112 These principles 
form the foundation for professional medical standards in organizations, such as the 
AMA, ANA, ACP, and ACEP. From another perspective, this process is a necessity for 
the medical professionals involved, so that they experience the absolution that leads to 
the self-forgiveness, which in turn allows them to continue providing medical care to 
others in need.113 
Protocols involving disclosure need to be focused primarily on patient outcome 
rather than on the complex details of procedures and their implementation.114 Three 
principles ought to guide such disclosure: 1) the use of language should be easily 
comprehensible to the layperson, both in terms of vocabulary and grammar, in all 
communications between medical professionals and patients; 2) an explanation of 
medical error protocols should be provided in terms of risk or injury, rather than simply a 
description of the error and its antecedents; and 3) a clear explanation of corrective 
options for dealing with any eventualities should be included.115 
Consistent with principles of ethics as applied to healthcare on a broader scale, the 
use of informed consent is particularly appropriate when those medical interventions such 
as are common in the ICU involve foreseeable, elevated risks of error, injury, or even 
death. As part of the protocol, the written permission should be supported by a verbal 
discussion of risks and benefits, conducted so as to insure that the patient or surrogate 
fully understands what is being prescribed as treatment.116 
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The format of the informed consent document should conform to principles of 
communication already discussed, should be integrated with any future communication in 
the event of medical error, and can even incorporate information on anticipated remedial 
procedures for foreseeable errors and unanticipated occurrences.117 
When there is any potential for danger or harm, humans have a seemingly innate 
dislike of uncertainty; unfortunately, medical treatment typically involves both of these 
components.118 Therefore, any protocol for advance communication of the timing of and 
of what to expect during the course of treatment provides relief from concern or worry, 
circumstances which create a clear path for avoiding errors, and a means for 
understanding errors in context, should they occur.119 Although not always possible in the 
ICU, wherever it is feasible, such pretreatment disclosure incorporates the patient into the 
process of medical decision-making and implementation, setting the foundation for 
understanding the potential for medical error.120 
 For any case of treatment in the ICU, patients include not only the patient and his 
or her immediate family, but also the hospital, all members of the medical team providing 
direct or supportive care, the patient’s insurance provider, and government regulators (as 
representatives of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Proactive disclosure 
to patients, possibly as part of informed consent documentation, would go a long way 
toward minimizing unnecessary uncertainty. Such disclosure would need to cover any 
risks involved with anticipated interventions and outcomes, along with contingency 
procedures for the mitigation of harm in case of a major medical error and advance 
provisions for disclosure to all relevant parties.121 
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Medical errors that are minor in their consequences may be addressed through 
protocols for informal apology and would typically involve the patient and immediate 
family, friends or other acquaintances as the situation dictates, the medical caregiver team 
and colleagues.122 In contrast, formal apology protocols need to be established 
beforehand in anticipation of the consequences of major errors, as well as of the need to 
involve a broader range of parties, including those more indirectly connected to the event. 
Drafting a thorough outline for formal apologies to be given in the case of such events 
with provision for adding the specifics would be perspicacious, as it would reduce the 
potential for compounding problems through errors in communication.123  
On one hand, adequate and fair compensation is demanded by the principles of 
biomedical ethics and potentially requires adjudication and enforcement.124 On the other 
hand, when compensation can be agreed to without having to resort to formal legal 
procedures and the creation of an adversarial relationship, the cost in terms of time and 
resources consumed, distraction from regular responsibilities, and emotional stress is 
greatly reduced. In order to achieve both of these goals simultaneously, specific protocols 
in terms of detailed compensation criteria, procedures for validation and payment, 
prescribed forms of and limits to compensation, need to be developed and made publicly 
available before the occurrence of any error to which they might apply.125 
In the final analysis, a critical step in improving ethical behavior involves 
establishing and implementing protocols for disclosing medical errors when they occur in 
the ICU.  Protocols need to be commensurate with the scope and scale of errors and 
proactively address the acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk to 
 39 
patient outcomes and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipation 
of consequences, identification and involvement of patients, and disclosure timing, 
apologies, and compensation.  
Beyond the protocols relating to disclosure, as described in the previous section, 
the chapter 6 of the dissertation is devoted to protocols required as part of the large effort 
to institute systems which will function to prevent or reduce the severity of medical 
errors. These protocols include prevention planning, communication, administering 
medication, as well as preventing and managing equipment failure and system failure. 
Subsequently, the discussion will center on the role of and prospects for tort reform, as a 
means of dealing with the legal issues surrounding medical errors. 
The principle goal in planning is to avoid the occurrence of medical errors when 
and wherever possible, which involves anticipation of the risks, along with understanding 
their characteristics and probability of occurring, whether in the ICU or the hospital in 
general.126 Prevention planning needs to address three facets simultaneously: 1) 
prophylaxis, i.e, concrete preventative actions in diagnosing and administering treatment; 
2) monitoring; and 3) taking steps to avoid adverse events such as near misses, slips, 
lapses, mistakes, omissions, and commissions.127 Steps as simple as providing checklists 
for procedures have successfully and significantly reduced the rate of errors in some 
hospital ICUs, diminishing the severity of the consequences of those errors.128 In other 
institutions, situational risk factors such as sterilization procedures have been directly 
targeted, decreasing the life-threatening impact of staph infections.129 Some hospitals 
have made significant improvements in cutting down on medical errors by adopting 
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investigative and evaluative procedures comparable with those used by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).130 Alternatively, a number of hospitals have taken the 
approach of fundamentally reorganizing their medical team operations in the ICU, 
adopting innovative models of staffing focused on promoting increased teamwork with 
diminished reliance on a single specialist in any given situation.131  
Accurate, effective, and timely communication is essential, not only in preventing 
but also in dealing with medical errors.132 While the education of doctors is rigorous, 
broad in scope and in depth, and continuous, it is remarkably deficient in building 
communications skills.133 At the same time, the need for these skills in interactions with 
patients and their relatives, colleagues, hospital staff and administrators, as well as with 
representatives of insurance companies and government agencies is critical, all the more 
so when dealing with the effects of a medical error.134 Anywhere in the hospital, but 
especially in the ICU, communication mistakes may well damage or end careers, in 
addition to compounding the costs of a medical error exponentially.135 While most 
physicians understand these dangers cognitively, many are nonetheless unprepared for 
the situation or unwilling to remedy this deficiency of skills.136 
Hospital administrations need to make fundamental revisions to two forms of 
protocols, namely in external communications, something far more extensive than merely 
expanding the use of informed consent paperwork or increasing internal communications 
between the care-giving staff, administrators, and support personnel.137 
Within the environment of the ICU, medication errors predominate, most 
frequently at the point of final administration of the medication.138 Furthermore, it is a 
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significant cause for concern that such errors point to systemic deficiencies in training, 
communications, monitoring, or carrying out of protocols.139 This fact implies that such 
systemic errors may be the cumulative result of numerous sequential errors, each with its 
own source.140 This multiplicity of causes in turn, requires a systematic in-depth response 
in order to determine causes, which in turn involves time consuming investigation 
leading possibly all the way back to the earliest diagnosis, possibly through various 
settings outside the ICU.141  
Equipment failure is perhaps the most frustrating and potentially difficult to 
handle among medical errors in the ICU, given that medical professionals and hospital 
administrations alike lack the expertise to diagnose machine weakness or malfunction; 
moreover, while control and prevention is at least initially in the hands of the equipment 
manufacturer, the healthcare provider is proximately responsible for preventing harm.142 
Adding to the complexity of these circumstances is the fact that the varieties and uses of 
ever more technologically sophisticated equipment are increasing rapidly. Ironically, 
while hospitals and their personnel are increasingly less able to handle the maintenance 
of the equipment, they are becoming increasingly more dependent on its flawless 
operation.143 Although both involve significant additional cost, the two most promising 
means of forestalling equipment failure errors would be having access to a sufficient 
quantity of backup equipment and involving manufacturing personnel more integrally in 
all phases of medical planning.144 
Undoubtedly the most difficult of any type of medical error to find and fix is 
system failure occurring at the junctures where systems interface or overlap, making it a 
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challenge just to identify the source or sources of the failure.145 The complexity of such 
failures makes each occurrence relatively unique, rendering any standardized set of 
protocols ineffective.146 Given that the ICU is the area of the hospital that is the nexus of 
the greatest number of interacting systems, it should not be surprising that medication 
failure, possibly the quintessential example of a system failure, is so prevalent in that part 
of the institution.147 
From a legal perspective, the process by which a patient or relatives obtain 
redress, including compensation, for physical and emotional damage and economic losses 
suffered is part of tort law, which deals explicitly with medical errors as part of civil 
jurisprudence. While justice for victims of medical error is the purpose of legal recourse, 
there is a growing consensus that the goals of providing correction of injustice and 
compensation, along with deterrence of future injustices, are poorly achieved at best 
through the current legal system.148 The tort systems currently in effect actually 
discourages patients who have been legitimately injured by physicians and hospitals from 
seeking redress in civil court, makes their chances of prevailing slim, and allows 
attorneys and others entities not directly involved with the original error and its 
consequences to take an inordinate share of any compensation. Faced with the rise in the 
incidence of medical errors, reforms have been proposed, and some enacted, aiming to 
deter negligence on the part of physicians and other medical professionals, albeit 
instituted typically in order decrease liability premiums rather than increase the safety of 
patients.149 Gilmour notes that such tort reform commonly includes capping damage 
awards, offsetting payments from collateral sources, limiting the fees lawyers can charge, 
instituting discretionary or mandatory periodic payments of damages, restricting the 
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labeling of damages in terms of joint and several liability, raising the standards for 
designating of a potential witness as an expert, along with various other measures. All 
these efforts at tort reform have primarily functioned to bring down the expense of 
malpractice litigation and the size of awards; however, at the same time they have made it 
much harder for injured persons to establish the liability of any negligent party and their 
own right compensation.150 
The status quo is unacceptable; thus, educational, institutional-administrative, and 
legislative reforms are all mandated. Accomplishing educational reform begins in the 
curricula of medicine and nursing schools, where prevention and correction of the effects 
of medical errors needs to become an integral part of the curriculum, along with 
inculcating a respect for the fundamentals of medical ethics connected to errors of all 
types.151  
Legislative reform must shift the focus away from suppressing medical liability 
toward patient safety. Previously adopted measures such as capping non-economic 
damages or attorney fees, setting statutes of limitation, and revising joint and several 
liability statutes are all actions that need to be reassessed in light of placing first priority 
on patient safety. Two other specific areas that will make tort reform more responsive to 
the need for ethics and justice in the face of medical errors are establishing or raising 
minimal standards for ‘expert’ witnesses and monitoring trends in the insurance industry 
with an eye to ensuring justice and ethical treatment for all parties.152 Continuing 
modification of pay-for-performance incentives can, in the long run, support litigation-
based reform, while reforms to make Medicare more efficient and effective will further 
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help to prevent medical errors and provide rapid, comprehensive, and compassionate 
response on occasions when preventable medical errors add to the patient’s medical 
problems.153  
The aggregate effect of recent legal reforms has been to foster a ‘conspiracy of 
silence’ among medical professionals, from hospital administrators and physicians on 
down the ranks of the institutional hierarchy; in contrast, these individuals and the 
institutions for which they work need to take on the challenge of fostering ethical 
behavior towards combating and handling medical errors, which begins with developing 
and implementing appropriate error-reduction protocols, beginning with the ICU.154 
These measures must be directed at creating a non-punitive atmosphere based on honest, 
thorough mechanisms that will encourage the prompt and full reporting of and learning 
from errors, while at the same time ensuring organizational accountability and just 
compensation for patients who have been harmed.155 
On a scope far broader than just disclosure and apology, protocols are called for 
to reduce the frequency and severity of medical errors, which include prevention 
planning (prophylaxis, monitoring, avoidance of adverse events, organization of team 
operations), better communication (doctors to patients, relatives, hospital staff, 
administrators, insurers, and regulators), improved administration of medication (training, 
communications, monitoring, and protocol execution), and prevention of equipment 
failure (access to backup equipment and involvement of manufacturing personnel). 
Preventing system failures and tort reform would significantly help in reducing medical 
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errors, yet while they are conceivable they are beyond being effectively brought about 
through protocols.  
Chapter 7 provides a brief conclusion to the dissertation. The inevitability of 
medical errors is beyond dispute as long as humans involved in providing medical care 
and treatment for illness and injury.  The discussion presented here demonstrates that this 
reality hold true despite any level of skill or rigor of training; moreover, the propensity 
for medical errors is compounded, not alleviated by the increasing integration of 
technology and equipment into care and treatment. The setting in which the likelihood of 
medical errors is greatest and their consequences potentially the most severe and 
irreversible, with the highest probability of fatality is that of the hospital intensive care 
unit (ICU). This dissertation seeks: 1) to assemble and provide documentation of the 
alarming frequency and level of harm caused by medical errors in the ICU, 2) to 
categorize and analyze their causes and contributing factors with the goal of identifying 
measures to prevent and minimize the effects of as many errors as possible, 3) to present 
a framework for handling incidents of medical errors, which is based on the convergence 
of a variety of approaches to biomedical ethics, 4) to outline religious and cultural 
expectations of how those on both the causing and receiving sides should respond when 
errors occur, and 5) to propose a variety of protocols, which target specific aspects of 
vulnerability to the occurrence of medical errors in the ICU, along with proposals to 
address the broader scope of systemic problems which tend to promote medical errors. 
This dissertation makes the case that, regardless of philosophical position within 
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the field, the biomedical profession must accept as ethically justifiable nothing short of a 
constant, vigilant effort to do everything possible to prevent medical errors.  When errors 
occur in the ICU, standards of biomedical ethics and the profession demands a response 
that is full and honest in disclosing errors and their potential consequences to the patient 
and other patients; this disclosure must include the circumstances and effects of the error, 
an acceptance of responsibility for its occurrence, the proposed action to mitigate or 
correct any negative effects or repercussions from the error both direct and indirect, and 
proposed arrangements to compensate the patient for all negative impacts of the error. 
Given the high risk of medical error in the ICU, protocols must be in place to prevent 
these errors to the greatest extent possible; furthermore, the highest standards of 
biomedical ethics must form the foundation for procedures and actions taken when 
medical errors inevitable occur. The final two sections of the dissertation present 
specifics for establishing these protocols and proposals for dealing with system-wide 
barriers to combating medical errors in the ICU and elsewhere in healthcare. 
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Chapter 2: Extent of Medical Errors in the ICU 
Introduction 
Of all the departments in the hospital, the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) is the one in 
which the consequences of medical errors are potentially the most serious. This 
conclusion stems from the fact that patients in this section of the facility are the most 
vulnerable in terms of their weakened physical condition and inability to cope with 
stresses of any kind to their body systems. This susceptibility applies regardless of what 
is the source of the error or whether it is classified as one of commission or omission. 
Rates of medical errors in the ICU, along with those for the emergency and operating 
rooms, in particular have risen alarmingly, with reported estimates of error-induced 
fatalities as high as 98,000, spurring a great deal of concern within the U.S. healthcare 
system. Compounding the gravity of the situation is a growing awareness that many of 
these errors could have been prevented through the adoption of concrete policies and 
procedures calculated to head-off their occurrence. Tully et al, define medical errors in 
general as constituting the implementation of ineffective and deleterious strategies in the 
pursuit of the goals of care and treatment. While medical errors typically conjure up the 
notion of actions that constitute ‘mistakes,’ this category applies equally to any failure to 
implement a prescribed step in a course of treatment.1  In light of the severity of problems 
that require stays in the ICU, it is entirely foreseeable that errors, no matter how 
seemingly insignificant, may prove fatal. 
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a cogent report on how frequent  
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 and widespread concerning the prevalence, frequency, and ramifications of medical 
errors. The report includes data across the board for the field of healthcare, documenting 
the number of individual people experiencing the consequences, neutral or adverse, from 
medical errors. The Institute of Medicine’s findings detail the tremendous costs involved, 
in terms of both the abstract notions of human health and well-being on one hand, and the 
more tangible expenses of mitigating, rectifying, and/or compensating for errors, on the 
other. Among the more sobering of the statistics in the report is that medical errors 
account for more deaths in the U.S. than do all forms of cancer, AIDS, and automobile 
accidents combined. The release of the report triggered the need for advanced research on 
the rates of medical error and their potential adverse effects as well as the financial cost 
involved. This 1999 report highlighted the necessity of both further research more 
specifically tracking the frequency, prevalence, and consequences of medical errors, 
whether intangible, statistical, or financial.2 
This chapter presents an overall description and assessment of scope and extent of 
medical errors in intensive care units of hospitals across the United States, concentrating 
on the prevalence and frequency of errors, in general terms, and then more specifically, 
the variety classifications of errors, relating to some extent to their causes or origins. An 
essential preliminary step in this dissertation’s larger goal of analyzing the causes of 
medical errors and proposing ways to prevent or minimize their occurrence and to 
mitigate, ameliorate, or rectify their damages is to explain how medical errors have been 
conceptualized and categorized within the field of healthcare. Further sections of the 
chapter classify the types of medical errors and the causal circumstances and actions that 
lead to their occurrence.  Beyond this, the chapter provides a survey of relevant statistics, 
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documenting the frequency and severity of the problem, and analyze the principal risk 
factors that increase the probability that errors will happen. 
Chapter 2.A. Errors Concerning the Hospital ICU 
This section of the chapter will examine several definitions of medical errors in 
the literature, providing several perspectives on what the term encompasses, analyze the 
propensity for such errors in general, and discuss ways in which scholars have 
categorized them. This analysis will present the case arguing that, to some degree, a 
correlation exists between certain commonly occurring types of errors and the medical 
settings in which they most frequently occur.  The hospital ICU is one such case and its 
connection to certain error types will prove crucial to proposing policies and procedures 
aimed at preventing or minimizing medical errors in this setting.  Throughout this section, 
the discussion will frequently relate directly to the intensive care unit as a unique setting 
in which there exists a pronounced tendency for certain errors to occur. 
Chapter 2.A.1. Defining Medical Errors 
A consensus exists in relevant literature that medical errors are not only common, 
but also prevalent enough to be considered a daily occurrence in medical and healthcare 
practice; moreover, the hospital ICU has been repeatedly the focus of investigation into 
this phenomenon.  This attention is to be expected in that its role in the hospital is to deal 
with the critical, often life-threatening problems of patients who are, because of such 
injury or illness, in physically weakened condition with little stamina or resiliency. 
Predictably, whether admitted directly or transferred there, these patients need 
 62 
complicated, multi-faceted treatment, for which timing is immediate or precisely 
calibrated, and which requires vigilant monitoring, communication, and coordination by a 
larger network of healthcare professionals in different locations. Ironically, the setting in 
which medical errors can least be tolerated due to the heightened risk of adverse 
consequences is the very same environment in which they are the most prone to 
happen.  If indeed, as Grober notes, “Medical errors represent a serious public health 
problem and pose a threat to patient safety,”3  the intensive care unit is the environment 
where this problem and threat is most acute.   
As a starting definition for the purpose of analysis, a medical error any event or 
situation which deviates from prescribed treatment, care, or observation of a particular 
patient, and which furthermore is not a characteristic of the original illness or injury 
being treated. This definition portrays medical errors as being very broad in scope, yet it 
is necessary in order to encompass the full range of incidences occurring regularly within 
the ICUs of most hospitals. This broad range covers missteps as diverse as errors in 
medications, infusions, mistakes done using medical equipment, failure to conform to 
standard protocol and any other human errors, which may happen in the course of the 
practice of medicine and healthcare. The Institute of Medicine’s scope is broader yet, 
including errors of omission, describes as any failure to follow through to completion on 
a prescribed plan or individual step in of treatment, in addition to the intentional 
implementation of any inappropriate plan or steps in such a plan.4 Moskop et al, assert 
that, “In some cases, the application of this definition is unambiguous. In symmetry 
errors, for example, a procedure is performed on the wrong side; in medication errors, a 
dosing protocol or route is incorrectly administered. Other actions, particularly those 
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involving diagnostic processes and other cognitive processes, may be much more difficult 
to characterize as error, particularly given the information available to the provider at the 
time.”5 Clearly, some types of errors are the results of chance occurrences beyond the 
bounds of human influence or causation. Despite the severity of their consequences, these 
are not identified as medical errors, as the term is conceived of here. Ultimately, such 
negative patient outcomes will occur despite perfectly provided and administered 
treatment, and thus should not be categorized as medical,6 in particular not for the 
purpose of investigation in this dissertation.   
Yet another way of defining medical errors is to describe them as the failure to 
implement any designated action in the intended manner, or to implement either the 
wrong strategy or an appropriate strategy by the wrong procedure in spite of attempting 
to accomplish the goals of treatment. While not clearly implied in these definitions, 
medical errors typically incur adverse consequences for patients. Again Moskop et al. 
contend that, “Medical errors often result in harm to patients, and this explains our 
increased efforts to identify and minimize such errors. It is important to recognize, 
however, that there is no necessary connection between medical error and patient harm. 
Some errors may not harm the patient. For example, an obvious error may occur in a 
patient’s treatment, such as administration of a medication prescribed for a different 
patient, but the patient may experience no ill effects from that medication.”7 Beyond what 
these researchers allude to in this quote, medical errors extend over an entire continuum 
of severity of consequence, varying tremendously as to the level of seriousness they 
create. Angus and Carlet have observed that the effects of a given medical error could be 
so minimal that it ultimately made no discernable physiological or biochemical difference 
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in the patient. As such, that error would necessitate no corrective or compensating 
actions.8 For instance, a highly preventable adverse outcome known as the near miss, a 
category that can overlap with several others, is distinguished by the occurrence of an 
error, which however does not lead to any negative consequences. By contrast, over most 
of the spectrum of consequences of medical errors additional treatment is mandated 
beyond what the original injury or illness warranted- treatment specifically required to 
undo or at least ameliorate the negative effects of the error in an effort to restore the 
patient to the level of health prior to the error. Needless to say, that level was already in 
jeopardy in the case of an ICU patient; furthermore, regardless of the patient’s previous 
condition, the effects caused by the error can be either temporary or permanent, the most 
severe form of the latter being fatality.9  
In order to create a standard for gauging the ramifications of medical errors, 
researchers from the Ohio State University developed a Severity Scale bearing the 
institution’s name and consisting of a seven level categorization for assessing the effects 
of the medication error on the patient. These levels include:  a) Level 0, which denotes an 
error that is identified and handled swiftly enough that the patient suffers no ill effects; b) 
Level 1, which indicates that the error causes some effect but leads to no change in 
clinical outcome; c) Level 2, which identifies an error that will require close monitoring 
but may not need action; d) Level 3, which denotes an error that necessitates additional 
laboratory tests, or leads to an alteration in the patient’s vital signs; e) Level 4, which 
signifies an error that requires additional treatment or procedures, including admission, 
readmission, or a protracted stay in the hospital; f) Level 5, which denotes an error that 
either necessitates admission to the  ICU, requires an invasive procedure, or causes 
 65 
irreversible harm; and finally  g) Level 6, which means that the error so designated led to 
the patient’s death.10 
In his writings concerning medical errors, Bedevian has highlighted medical 
errors, as distinct from complications, which he describes as adverse reactions on the part 
of the patient to a medically justifiable procedure. The corollary to this assertion is that 
medical errors are intrinsically preventable to the extent of current medical knowledge, 
beyond the limits of which anything that in hindsight proved to be deleterious would not 
be classified an error. The fact that medical facilities routinely have in place and attempt 
to follow established standard operating procedures indicates an understanding that it is 
possible to forestall many if not all medical errors. As the specific subjects of these 
procedures implies, medical errors can be connected to either medical products or 
procedures, to general medical practices in a given setting, or to the medical system 
itself.11 
Chapter 2.A.2. Potential for Medical Errors 
The fact that all those working in the hospital ICU are, despite the intensive 
training they typically have undergone, fundamentally human beings, which in turn 
makes the inevitable that they will, at least on occasion, commit errors.12 Furthermore, 
given the nature of hospitals and their intensive care units, they are setting where errors 
are especially likely to occur.13  
The Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report, bearing the clichéd title To Err is 
Human, deserves credit for focusing the healthcare community’s attention on the 
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prevalence and seriousness of medical errors and their adverse repercussions for both 
patients and the healthcare system.14 Inherently containing a higher potential for error, 
given that its patients have life threatening conditions, the ICU bears a more urgent need 
for preventing or controlling the effects of medical errors. These conditions may include 
serious complications from accidents, infections, surgery, stroke, or cardiac arrest. 
Therefore, ICU patient are typically in need of critical care, involving continuous 
monitoring by the health care providers. In the process of delivering such care, a high 
potential exists for the occurrence of medical errors.15  
The potential for medical errors is intrinsically related to the fragmentation of 
healthcare services, in contrast with their integration in a functioning network system.16 
This fragmentation propels the patient into interactions with multiple providers of various 
aspects of treatment in a variety of contexts. McGowan and Healey posit that the 
subsequent lack of access to complete information, coupled with the disincentive on the 
part of healthcare professional to take on responsibilities beyond their personal 
involvement or to admit responsibility for mistakes, creates an environment that actually 
encourages medical errors, exacerbating the frequency at which they happen.17 
The accreditation and licensure of medical and healthcare professionals give 
adequate priority to ensuring that they are trained and prepared to prevent medical errors. 
This deficiency is arguably one of the primary causes of errors.18 On the other hand, 
medical errors are also closely connected with faulty systems and processes, along with 
other conditions that provoke people to make mistakes, or be unable to prevent their 
occurrence. The clear inference is that, not all errors occur because of recklessness on the 
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part of health care providers. As McGowan and Healey give prominence to in their 
article, “The system must be better designed so that it becomes more difficult for 
mistakes to be made. Brownlee argues that the system requires far too many people to do 
everything right every time in order to arrive at a successful patient outcome. This type of 
system is perfect for ‘latent errors.’ These are mistakes in medical care delivery that are 
waiting to happen.”19 Even though they are quite often labeled as never events they are 
occurring all too frequently causes health costs to rise and patients being hurt by the very 
system that is supposed to heal them. 
Particular circumstances or combinations thereof tend to increase the probability 
of errors occurring. For example, a hospital or other healthcare facility may be in the 
practice of stocking all their drugs in high concentrations, in spite of the known toxicity 
of such drugs when administered as an overdose. Such a procedure may elevate the risk 
of a healthcare provider administering such medication without diluting it first. Such a 
medical error would be far more attributable to the faulty system than to the healthcare 
provider who neglected to dilute the substance.20 Healthcare institutions need to establish 
and support systems that reduce the likelihood of medical errors; in this case, it must 
create procedures for storing such drugs in diluted concentrations. Intensive care units 
need to prioritize implementing functioning systems, designed to ensure, to the greatest 
extent possible, the safety of the patients. If such a system fails, the chances of medical 
errors in the unit will increase. In addition to faulty health systems, individuals may 
sometimes be responsible for errors if they have neglected to maintain the required level 
of vigilance. The criticality of the intensive care unit seems to increase the potential of 
medical errors occurring.21 
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While healthcare professionals, scholars, and researchers in the field all concur 
about the continual occurrence of medical errors, statistics documenting their exact 
frequency prove to be elusive. Although it is evident that medical errors occur, it proves 
difficult to estimate or measure their exact frequency. This is because healthcare 
providers only report some medical errors while a broad range of other errors go 
unreported. Challenging the representativeness of existing data, experts concur that such 
statistics are an underestimate actual occurrence, making the potential for medical errors 
difficult to adequately quantify.22 Unfortunately, as it can be quite difficult for 
researchers or even other medical professionals to spot a given instance of medical error 
and recognize it as such, obtaining a precise, reliable estimate of the frequency of medical 
errors is barely possible. Given this difficulty coupled with the obstacles to fully 
accessing relevant data, the general consensus in the field is however, that whatever 
estimates are put forth are grossly underestimating the numbers of medical errors which 
actually occurring.23  
Chapter 2.A.3. Types and Causes of Medical Errors in the ICU 
 This section presents a picture in the broadest scope of the prevalence and 
frequency at which medical errors of various types, causes, and characteristics occur in 
the intensive care units of hospitals throughout the United States. The first subsection 
surveys errors in terms of general activities into which the treatment of an individual 
patient may be divided. The second subsection analyzes medical errors, categorizing 
them in terms of general causes. 
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Chapter 2.A.3.a. Types of Medical Errors Regarding Hospital ICUs 
This subsection of the chapter presents a classification system for medical errors 
the kind of activity within the ICU during which certain errors are likely to occur.  This 
system of classification consists of the following seven areas: 1) devising and setting up a 
course of treatment, 2) diagnosing the injury or ailment, 3) implementing the treatment 
plan, 4) the preventing foreseeable ill-effects or complication, 5) prescribing and 
administering medicines, 6) ensuring the proper functioning of communication and 
equipment systems, and 7) avoiding negligence in medical management. 
(1) Errors in Planning and Execution 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) highlighted different types of medical errors that 
are considered prevalent. These different types of medical errors have been categorized 
and described by a variety of researchers. One of the most common types of errors is that 
of execution, as its name implies, occurring in the phase of carrying out a planned action. 
Healthcare providers may effectively planned the appropriate treatment; however, that 
action may not be executed in the manner in which it was intended leading to a definite 
error. In other cases, healthcare providers may fail in the planning process. Obviously, 
healthcare professionals need to plan their actions or intervention strategies effectively, in 
order to avoid errors. Some individuals fail in this, the initial planning phase, while others 
fail in the execution.24  
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(2) Errors in Diagnosis  
Diagnostic errors form yet another category of medical errors that happen 
frequently in the intensive care unit, there is an accurate diagnosis of the patient’s 
condition is a prerequisite before any treatment can be launched or medication given. 25 In 
the ICU, where all the patients have been diagnosed as being in some level of critical 
condition, effective diagnosis is indispensable. It is self-evident that any errors stemming 
from the diagnostic process may further threaten the life of the patient. Some diagnostic 
errors are simply the result of unnecessary delays of the diagnosis process.26 
Prompt diagnosis, with the greatest accuracy that state-of-the-art medical 
knowledge and technology permit, is a prerequisite to any level of quality medical care; 
medical professionals and institutions are responsible for ensuring that it occurs. In 
practice, numerous factors can interfere with this goal. For one thing, circumstances such 
as work overload may force healthcare providers into delaying diagnosis. Alternatively, 
misinterpretation of diagnostic data or overreliance on previous experience in the 
decision-making process may result in an inaccurate diagnosis. Another source of 
diagnostic error is inaccurate or irrelevant data stemming for the failure to employ 
standard diagnostic procedures or reliance on outdated methods of diagnosis.27 Two 
documented precipitators of diagnostic errors consist of: 1) healthcare professionals using 
outdated diagnostic kits, even when proper procedures are followed, and 2) healthcare 
professionals neglecting the required monitoring and control in performing tests, for 
example skipping less obviously necessary steps in the diagnostic process, even when 
using up-to-date procedures and equipment.28 Still another cause of diagnostic error is the 
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tendency on the part of many healthcare providers to trust expert medical opinion even 
when it appears to conflict with test results or when the validity of those results may be in 
question.  This tendency indicates that critical thinking on the part of all those involved in 
the diagnostic process is essential to achieving the goal of preventing or minimizing 
errors.29  
(3) Errors in Treatment  
The difference between treatment errors and diagnostic errors is that the former 
implies an accurate diagnosis and the optimal plan of treatment. The error consists of a 
failure in appropriately implementing non-diagnostic tests or other procedures ranging 
from changing dressings to performing major operations. Although they have been 
frequently categorized as medication errors, failures in administering the proper 
medication or dosage may also be considered treatment errors, as subsequently described. 
At times, follow-up procedures are not in place for healthcare workers to conduct or 
alternatively these workers are otherwise unable to or fail to carry out these procedures 
when or as required. During and in the follow-up to all treatment procedures, health care 
providers need to monitor the patient’s condition as fully as the protocol calls for.30 
In the manner that delays in diagnosis constitute medical errors, preventable 
delays in the treatment process must be characterized as treatment error. Alarmingly, 
Kleinpell et al, have documented instances in which healthcare providers have 
intentionally administered care inappropriately through deliberate delay.31  
(4) Preventive Errors 
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Preventive medical errors are also common, if less well understood; easily 
comprehensible examples would include healthcare providers not treating as a priority to 
administer standard prophylactic treatment preventive errors and providers neglecting to 
properly monitor any treatment. Granted, it is impossible to prevent all negative 
developments in treatment any given patient; the failure to take feasible, reasonable safe 
prophylactic measures is by definition a preventable error, the consequences of which are 
potentially critical. Anticipatable and preventable adverse outcomes further expand the 
class of prevention errors.32 Among the easiest to eliminate of these causes of error are 
the instances in which proper planning and appropriate execution of the intended 
procedure is known to obviate any negative consequences. In some studies, researchers 
have adopted a related category, named the slip, defined as an error that result from a 
misdirected routine in the execution of a procedure. As a type of error, researchers note 
that a large number of health care providers report this error to be common, occurring 
frequently.33 There appears to be little evidence, however, as to whether as the name 
implies, this type of error tends to lead primarily to Level 0 or 1 on the Ohio State 
University Severity Scale. 
Preventable errors can occur, simply because a health care professional fails to 
initiate a routine, prescribed action in the course of treatment as the result of a memory 
lapse stemming from a number of root causes. Alternatively, “knowledge based errors” 
occur when medical professionals and workers analyze a case thoroughly, yet based their 
treatment on either misinformation or faulty analysis. All of these errors are preventable, 
along with their adverse outcomes can be categorized as either errors of omission or of 
commission.34 Errors of omission are those in which the provider leaves a critical action 
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or procedure undone, while those of commission occur when a health care provider 
performs any action considered within medical practice to be inappropriate in this 
situation.35   
(5) Errors in Medication 
The most prevalent of this type of errors consists of slips and lapses. Exacerbating 
the risks of medication errors in the ICU, the situation for the typical patient in critical 
condition tends to have on average twice as many medications prescribed as do their 
counterparts in the rest of the hospital.36 With this fact in mind, unsurprisingly the 
severity of a patient’s condition constitutes the strongest predictor of becoming the victim 
of an adverse drug event (ADE). On top of this risk factor, given that they are in critical 
condition, the fact that ICU patients are in critical condition means that they have fewer 
and significantly weaker natural defenses; thus they are far less able to cope with the 
physiological stresses of ADEs.37 Furthermore, even when the conditions of these ICU 
patients improves and they transition toward recuperation and/or less intensive levels of 
care, they face a significant lack of coordination and continuity in their care as soon as 
they leave the ICU. This extensively documented flaw in the medical care system creates 
an additional vulnerability to medical errors for the patient during this transition phase. 
Thus, coordination and communication between ICU staff and the patient’s subsequent 
caregivers constitutes an essential, albeit neglected aspect of care.38 Given all these 
barriers to coordinated care, it is unsurprising that errors involving medication constitute 
the most frequent of any type in the ICU, accounting for approximately 78% of all 
serious medical errors.39 
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As has been alluded to previously in this discussion, medication errors cover the 
scope of all types of potentially preventable, yet frequently occurring errors involving the 
administration of medicine in the broadest sense of treatment.40 In terms of 
administration, such errors amount to giving a drug in the wrong dosage, following the 
wrong protocol in giving it, or simply in giving the wrong drug. These errors, in turn, 
may be the result of a medical or healthcare professional prescribing either the wrong 
pharmaceutical agent or the prescribed agent at an inappropriate dosage.  Furthermore, at 
any stage in the process, misinterpretation of communication or inadequate attention paid 
to it may torpedo the required procedures for effective, safe administration.41  
Beyond the obvious errors of administering the wrong medication or in the wrong 
dosage, the system of prescribing, procuring, delivering, and administering medicine, 
particularly in hospital settings, lends itself to creating delays, which also constitute 
medical errors.42  Furthermore, what pharmacological experts understand while the 
healthcare providers who administer medication may not, is the necessity of continuously 
monitoring both the physiological and biochemical effects of drugs, individually and in 
concert with all other medications and procedures that the patient is undergoing. In 
theory, all healthcare professionals understand this. However, when healthcare providers 
fail to put the concept into practice, medication errors can have dire, even fatal, 
consequences for the patient.43 
(6) Failures of Communication and Equipment in Health Systems 
In addition to the above categories of errors, research has revealed that within the 
ICU any failure to communicate effectively may actively contribute to medical errors. 
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Healthcare providers are obliged to develop effective channels of communication with 
regard the status and progress of patients in an effort to minimize the probability of errors 
occurring. Intensive care units rely on numerous technologies to sustain the life of each 
patient. Such equipment can and often does succumb to a wide range of technical failures 
resulting in medical error.44 Various types of equipment failure have been described as 
preventable because they can be avoided if health care professionals ensure that all the 
facilities are functioning properly, as they the providers are required to do. Sometimes, 
however, such checkups often fail to identify a dysfunction in the equipment eventually 
resulting in an error. Intensive care units usually operate using a defined health system. 
Any failure in this system may result in medical errors.45  
(7) Poor Medical Management 
Inherently, institutions such as hospital have extremely complex organizational 
structures, and in order to function safely and prevent medical errors, they must at all 
times maintain efficiently coordinated interacting systems.46 It is, therefore, both 
surprising and distressing to find how often, how, and how extensively many institutions 
fail to address this need for effective management in the ICU. Poor management systems 
in hospitals are a leading contributor to the occurrence of medical errors.47 This is 
because poorly managed systems or networks neither facilitate nor foster the efforts 
necessary to ensure that all the institution’s systems are working in tandem to advance 
and protect patients’ safety. Guard maintains that despite the efforts of a significant 
number of management systems, they fail to place their investigations at the level of 
patient safety within their respective facilities. Furthermore, poor management promotes 
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negligence, which in turn increases the propensity for medical errors.48 In numerous 
documented cases of significant medical errors, poor medical management has been 
ascertained to be an underlying cause, first of medical error itself, and second, of the 
negative consequences. Obviously, healthcare facilities must make conscientious 
management a high priority in their respective institutions for a numerous, wide-ranging 
array of reasons, beyond simply the prevention of medical errors. Because of the 
seriousness of the conditions of ICU patients, hospitals must give top priority to ensuring 
the proper management of this area of the institution.49  
Chapter 2.A.3.b. Causes of Errors Referring to Hospital ICUs 
Research has indicated that different factors contribute to the occurrence of 
medical errors. More specifically, various theories have been developed to describe the 
circumstances under which medical errors are more likely. It is critical to understand the 
complexity of causes of medical errors in order for any reduction of these types of errors 
are to be successful. The following discusses causes of medical errors, causes that are at 
least theoretically preventable. These causes may be categorized as, 1) Adverse events, 2) 
Adverse drug events, 3) Error in medication, and 4) Human errors which includes a) 
Fragmentation of the health system, b) Cognitive errors, and c) Ineffective skills and 
inadequate knowledge, and d) Long working hours. 
(1) Adverse Events 
Much of the investigative work of researchers has been directed toward the goal 
of identifying the principle causes of medical errors. One of these, which has been the 
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focus of work in recent years, is known as adverse events, a rather loosely defined 
category, but one that acknowledges the fact that multiple factors, often difficult to 
disentangle, contribute to the occurrence of medical errors.50 As Bohomol et al, have 
indicated, “The causes of MEs are multifactorial, crossing many lines of responsibility. 
At the same time, they involve similar circumstances. Leapeet al. defined broad 
categories in which the underlying problems that result in MEs be found, such as lack of 
knowledge of the drug, lack of information about the patient, violations of rules, slips and 
memory lapses, transcription errors, faulty interaction with other services, faulty dose 
checking, preparation errors and others.”51  
There is an urgent need to adopt effective approaches to managing any medical 
institution, merely to ensure that all the operations in every unit of the hospital are well 
coordinated.52 The intensive care unit requires a high level of efficiency in management, 
given that patients’ lives are at stake. Despite awareness of the need for effective 
management, some institutions typically fail to guarantee that proper management is 
implemented in the ICU. This situation alone can trigger errors in the ICU. Researchers 
have classified errors resulting from poor medical management as adverse events.53 Like 
other medical errors, adverse events can be prevented if health care institutions 
considered proper management to be a priority. Regarding the ICU, health care 
institutions must ensure that proper medical management is adopted.54  
(2) Adverse Drug Events 
Adverse drug events is the classification term for what is being identified as a 
leading causes of medical errors. This term denotes any damage caused by a faulty 
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medical intervention, specifically a drug administered incorrectly. Administering drugs 
wrongly, usually causes unwanted, often deleterious physiological and biochemical 
effects in the patient.55 Medical errors of different levels and types quite frequently 
involve a range of adverse drug reactions. Some of these effects include fever, vomiting, 
nausea, kidney failure, body rash, low blood pressure, diarrhea, heart rhythm 
disturbances, mental confusion, and bleeding.56 Some medical errors typically present a 
combination of these events, forcing health care providers to plan and implement 
intervention strategies, specifically to counter the consequences of these adverse drug 
events. All drugs have the potential to trigger adverse reactions even when administered 
properly.57 Nonetheless, adverse drug events stemming from medical errors are 
potentially preventable if the right drug is administered properly and in the right dosage. 
Normal adverse drug reactions, resulting from properly prescribed and administered 
medicines, are not classified as medical errors, given that they are usually beyond human 
control. In the United States and many Western nations, drug testing and licensing 
procedures are in place to ensure that any such adverse drug reactions are manageable 
and do not cause any permanent organ damage. In contrast, adverse drug events due to 
medication errors have the potential of inflicting permanent organ damage.58 Thus, 
adverse drug events usually require health care providers to develop prompt intervention 
strategies in an effort to alleviate the adverse consequences. It is possible to prevent 
adverse drug events if the proper prescription and administration of drugs occurs. 
Therefore, healthcare workers need to be alert for any signs of improper medication this 
vigilance will help prevent critical adverse drug events that might otherwise lead to death 
or serious complications. Certain studies have found that medical errors may occur as 
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health care providers prepare or dispense drug solutions. Some drugs need dilution, a 
factor that needs the health care providers to have adequate knowledge on the proper 
ratios for doing so.59 There is evidence that health care providers make mistakes 
relatively frequently in the dilution process and when transferring drug solutions from 
larger to smaller containers. This finding underscores the need for management systems 
to ensure that these procedures are properly monitored, to ensure that errors are 
minimal.60 
(3) Medication Error 
Far more than that more commonly envisioned process of obtaining medication 
through visits to a physician and a pharmacist, the process of prescribing, dispensing, and 
finally administering medicine to in-hospital patients is vulnerable to many types of error, 
whether or not they are ICU patients. Predictably, this latter group will need the most 
medications in terms of both number and complexity of administration of any group in 
the facility.61 As an obvious means of simplifying and minimizing delays in deliver, 
along with keeping costs as low as possible, institutions typically set up their own 
systems of procuring, storing, handling, and dispensing drugs, separating bulk medication 
in large containers to smaller, often diluted doses units for administration to individual 
patients. The system for managing this complex process within the institution plays a 
critical role in either augmenting or reducing the risk of medication errors, as well as the 
nature and severity of the effects they produce.62 The delivery of every specific 
medication to each individual patient in the ICU involves five steps: prescription, 
transcription, preparation, dispensation, and administration; as stated, this procedure is 
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overly simplistic however in that there can be several hundred sub-procedures There 
exists, of course, a risk of various forms of error at each stage in the process. Thus, the 
risk of error for any given patient is high; it is therefore noteworthy and laudable to ICU 
staff that the frequency and severity of errors, alarming and harmful as it is, is not far 
greater.63 As an example of one of the many opportunities for errors with medication, 
Dhillon reports that some health care providers have registered errors when prescribing 
dosages of drugs.64 According to David et al, in relatively serious cases, health care 
providers exhibited delays in responding to patients’ needs, and at other times failed to 
make any attempt to reversing wrong procedures which constitute medical errors.65  
(4) Human Errors 
According to Donchin et al, human errors are considered to have possible the 
highest potential for causing medical errors.66 The following subdivision of this section 
of the chapter analyze specific forms that human errors can take, leading to a variety of 
medical errors. Health care related institutions are dependent on the expertise and skill of 
professionals on many different levels within the broadest sense of the field of medicine. 
The Institute of Medicine’s 1999, acknowledges that it is an inherent part of human 
nature to make mistakes, clearly leading to the corollary that over a long enough period it 
is impossible for human being to consistently perform flawlessly. 67 While many human 
errors occurring in medical settings pose no significant threat to the well-being of a 
patient may easily be overlooked, human negligence is also at the root of errors that lead 
to serious and at times irreparable harm, even to the point of fatality. Among the authors 
in the literature who have indicated that that human errors account for 80% of all medical 
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errors,68 Bohomol et al, go on to assert that this statistic highlights the need for 
emphasizing enhanced vigilant and caution in the fight to prevent and minimize the effect 
of medical errors.69 In recent years, researchers have posited a number of explanations in 
analyzing the role of human error plays in the constantly increasing number of errors in 
medical settings. One of the most popular of these constructs is the bad apple theory.70  
The assumptions behind this perspective of medical errors leads administrators 
and researchers to view the staff member and medical professional whose actions led to 
the error as being individually negligent or incompetent, and subject to isolation from the 
larger group of competent healthcare professionals so that the ‘bad apple’ will not corrupt 
the rest.71 While such attitudes and action validate the feeling of those at whom no blame 
is being directed (whether or not they are actually culpable), this conceptualization is 
fundamentally inadequate when it comes to explaining human errors, addressing many of 
the ultimate causes, or combatting the problem of medical errors in general. Other recent 
research has shown that numerous health systems such as hospitals operate largely in a 
state of dysfunctionality, a flaw in the system that puts health care professionals in 
circumstances which exacerbates any tendency they have to commit an error.72  
4.i) Fragmentation of the Health System 
One of the ultimate reasons for dysfunction in healthcare systems is the lack 
effective communication, especially in relation to the numerous health care providers, 
whose activities the hospital must coordinate. One main symptom of a dysfunctional 
health system is poor channels of communication.73 Poor communication contributes to a 
range of medical errors because health care providers are unable to update each other on 
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the level of care needed for specific patients. Furthermore, distributed and dispersed 
responsibility, whether fragmented or not, inherently necessitates better-coordinated and 
ultimately more extensive communication.74 Thus, the dysfunction of many healthcare 
systems results from fragmentation. A fragmented system guarantees miscommunication, 
which inevitably leads to medical errors.75  One study found that, “A communication 
failure among services’ caused 8% of MEs. In these instances, institutional routines were 
not obeyed. These types of errors were particularly related to high-alert medications, such 
as psychotropic or sedation drugs that could only be requested using a handwritten 
special formulary. Failure to complete this special formulary often prevented the nurse 
and pharmacist from processing the request.”76 Boettger contends that this fragmentation 
stems from the absence of proper designation of authorities and responsibilities within the 
hierarchy of the facility or institution. Consequently, many responsibilities remain 
unassigned and the actions they represent remain unexecuted because each agent in the 
system assumes that someone else should and will carry out the particular duty.77 
McGowan and Healey explain saying, “The current health care delivery system is a 
fragmented system of care that usually requires patients to see multiple providers in many 
locations virtually guaranteeing that these providers do not have access to complete 
patient information. Making matters worse, there is no incentive to improve safety and 
quality of care. These medical errors are caused by a faulty system that actually 
encourages mistake.”78  
Among the results of this fragmentation is a level of general confusion, as levels 
of authority among staff members are unclear, precluding the effectively performance of 
responsibilities.  Compounding this problem is the tendency of those overseeing faulty 
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healthcare systems to assume that automating a system will guarantee the elimination of 
medical errors.79 While this solution sounds good in theory, in practice it is fully 
counterproductive in that the automated systems themselves necessitate constant 
monitoring and administration by properly trained experts in order to do their jobs 
without become another source of medical errors.80 Research has shown that the absence 
of effective information sharing systems in some hospitals has contributed to a causing 
greater numbers of errors.81 In hospitals and in the ICU in particular, a large number of 
different staff members attend to any individual patient. When these workers are 
prevented from sharing information and coordinate their actions with those of other 
healthcare professional errors will occur. This lack of information sharing severely 
impedes the accurate assessment of a patient’s medical condition, as well as the 
monitoring of treatment, all of which contribute to medical errors.82  
4.ii) Cognitive Errors 
One major group who are prone to a specific form of human, cognitive error are 
physicians who fall into a type of thinking, which does not conform to logic or reason. 
Such thinking processes constitute cognitive pitfalls and may be a type of occupational 
hazard. At times, some doctors hold certain beliefs held that hinder their level of clear 
judgment.83 For instance, a medical professional may hold fast to an interpretation of 
initial data concerning a patient and then ignore conflicting data from later phases of 
treatment that present a different picture of the case. In other cases, dramatic events in 
medical practice often impede the physician’s critical judgment exhibited. Such cognitive 
errors are significant factors that contribute to human errors in medical practice.84 
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Hurst declares that, along with errors of commission, cognitive errors of omission 
are undoubtedly among the most prevalent types of medical errors. These errors can be 
broken down into two types; those that result lack of or incorrect knowledge and those 
that occur as the result of misusing or not using knowledge. Although almost all 
healthcare providers commit these medical errors on occasion, it is apparent that such 
errors can be minimized.85 In this regard, physician-patient communication is very 
important in healthcare settings. The doctor needs to have an appropriate feedback from 
the patient before introducing medication; otherwise, lack of information can lead to 
cognitive, and in turn, medication error. Given that certain diseases have distinct subsets 
requiring divergent forms of treatment, a generalist needs to screen all aspects of the 
patient and to collect a complete set of data in order to identify correctly the patient’s 
actual condition.86  
 The application of knowledge is at the heart of the type of care the patient 
receives. Often, the physician lacks all the known information needed in caring for a 
patient. Beyond diagnostic related information, it is crucial for medical professionals to 
have feedback on the treatment decisions they make, promptly as implemented.87 This 
involves first ensuring that what the physician writes, says, thinks, and does correlates 
with what is documented in the medical record. In addition to this, the healthcare 
providers must ensure that all subsequent information produced in the course of treatment 
is duly recorded and compared with the initial data, diagnosis, and prescribed treatment 
plan.  All this important information must be kept in an uncluttered form and displayed 
conspicuously for rapid retrieval.88  
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Obviously, healthcare professionals need to be continuously improving their 
knowledge base, and thus avoid cognitive errors rooted in out-of-date information while 
providing care for their patients. Improving knowledge is the responsibility of healthcare 
providers for their entire careers in medical activities and research. In tandem with this, it 
is apparent that prevention of cognitive errors cannot be achieved if the trainees are not 
only trained with the most up-to-date information, but also are molded into the time of 
professional who is continually seeking out new knowledge, understandings, and 
techniques.89 Additionally, it is advisable for all healthcare providers, up to and including 
the most compassionate of doctors, to seek professional help when in doubt concerning 
any aspect related to treating a patient. Healthcare providers need to try as much as 
possible to avoid cognitive errors, but it is equally crucial for medical decision makers to 
appreciate the impact and contributions of cognitive errors in medicine. Everyone in the 
field should endeavor to prove false the notion that cognitive diagnostic errors are 
unavoidable, in addition to dismissing the pessimism that impairs approaches to reducing 
cognitive bias.90  
4.iii) Ineffective Skills and Inadequate Knowledge                                                 
Boettger contends that a significant number of human errors are attributable to 
ineffective skills and inadequate knowledge, deficiencies that compromise the effective 
performance of health care providers.91 Many of the institutions preparing healthcare 
trainees do not prioritize offerings in the required training that would equip health care 
providers to minimize medical errors, especially if they find themselves working in the 
ICU. Unfortunately, such training institutions often do not recognize the seriousness of 
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medical errors and their potential effects on patients. Health institutions, at times hire 
such healthcare providers to work in the intensive care unit, even though these new 
employees do not understand the pressing need to reduce medical errors through 
increased vigilance.92 
Yet another area in which there is a lack of skill or knowledge in the ICU are the 
healthcare providers who have not received the proficiency training required to operate 
the specialize highly complex equipment routinely used in the unit. Moreover, some 
healthcare institutions do not offer advanced training on the use of modern diagnostic 
kits, which are the products of the new technologies.93 Such health care professionals are 
then unable to utilize new technologies and techniques, critical to care of ICU patients. 
Undoubtedly, some negative patient outcomes seemingly arise because of chance and do 
not appear to be attributable to any specific medical error; nonetheless, they may be 
preventable with best practices for minimizing errors.94 
4.iv) Long Working Hours 
One of the most significant human factors, contributing to the increase medical 
errors is system of scheduling healthcare providers to work long hours at a stretch, 
leaving them exhausted long before they are able to rest and recuperate. Even breaks 
between workdays or shift are frequently insufficient. Such constant fatigue affects their 
capacity to think and carry out tasks accurately, making them much more prone to error.95 
Evidence from the field of psychological has established that fatigue affects one’s level 
of concentration, a critical faculty in even greater demand when working in the ICU. 
Healthcare workers are well aware of the strain they are under in such circumstances, and 
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thus ironically their motivation to deliver the highest quality care in spite of the fatigue 
level they feel adds to the stress of they experience, potentially triggering further errors.96 
As mentioned above, healthcare providers are too often working in a state of sleep 
deprivation, further eroding the quality of care they are able to deliver. Since these 
workers must deliver constant care in the ICU, most health care providers in the 
environment are physiologically engaged in a constant internal battle with sleep while 
attempting carry out medical procedures. This explains why medical errors are higher in 
intensive care units whenever health care professionals are assigned longer working 
hours.97 
Chapter 2.B.  Statistics of Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU 
 This section of the chapter begins with an overview of statistical data, which 
document the cost of ICU care under the best of circumstances, frequency of medical 
errors and their associated costs both in general and specifically in the intensive care unit, 
comparing in-patient versus outpatient errors rates.  This discussion attempts to 
demonstrate that, despite the frequency and causal complexity of risks factors for medical 
errors in the ICU, these factors are nonetheless amenable to isolation and analysis as a 
prelude to their elimination or at least minimization and mitigation. 
Chapter 2.B.1. Medical Errors Rates and Costs  
In the absence of precise statistics, Curtis et al. have posited that an estimated 
20% of people in the U.S. who have passed away in recent years have in the prior months 
spent time in a hospital ICU. However, regardless of the outcome of a patient’s stay, it 
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will involve significant pain or discomfort, along with enormous financial obligations in 
its wake.  According to the researchers cited above, approximately one quarter of the 
average individual’s lifetime healthcare costs re incurred during the final year of his or 
her life. Curtis et al. go further by suggesting a limitation on the time that patients with 
unstable medical conditions due to life-limiting, usually chronic, illnesses spend in the 
ICU, reducing suffering, expense, and risk of medical error all at the same time.98   
In their effort to put concrete cost estimates on ICU care in general, Multz has 
calculated a figure of approximately $62 billion for United States in 1998, and has given 
that figure context by characterizing it as 34% of a typical hospital’s budget and about 
1% of U.S. gross domestic product.99 Obviously, the potential benefits of feasible and 
properly administered treatment are as enormous, if less quantifiable, as are the costs of 
ICU care.  All these considerations serve to magnify the vital significance of the problem 
with medical errors in this unit of the hospital.100  
While the expenses incurred by a stay in the ICU are tremendous, not all of them 
can be justified. According to Garland et al, physicians working in or with patients 
destined for stays in the ICU exercise broad discretion in ways that influence the costs, 
deciding which patients to admit to the unit and what tests, therapies, and medications to 
order, for example radiology imaging, lab tests, blood bank, or echocardiography.101  
Unfortunately, while this discretionary authority influences spending and thus costs, it 
has demonstrated neither quantitative or qualitative difference in terms of better clinical 
outcomes.  According to Garland et al, found on the first day alone, of an ICU stay, the 
median discretionary costs was $1343 for 10.6 hours of stay while the costs created by 
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intensivists and their attending assistants, amounted to an interquartile range of $788-
$2208.102 A lack of cost awareness on the part of ICU intensivists is likely a major 
contributing factor in this problem; at the same time, it should be noted that every added 
test, treatment, or procedure carries the inherent additional chance of a medical errors 
happening at some point during the course of treatment. Backing up this contention, 
albeit with international data, a study of French ICU physicians found that only 29% of 
their estimates of the true hospital costs of 46 common prescriptions were within 50% of 
the true cost. The most widely (and by the greatest amount) underestimated cost were 
those for expensive medications.103 
Significantly, the medical error rate for the ICU in comparison any other hospital 
unit was two-to-one or greater.104 In a major study, Camiré, et al assert that for every 
critically ill patient who has spent time in an ICU, approximately 1.7 medical errors of 
some level of seriousness have occurred. Chillingly, these researchers found it to be quite 
common that any given patient will experience at least one life-threatening error at some 
point in his or her ICU stay.105 Best estimates of other researchers concur in that this 
statistic represents a gross understatement as to frequency of medical errors, given that 
the above statistic way based on self-report data, known to be extremely vulnerable to 
underreporting. Even in teaching hospitals with their intensive monitoring procedures and 
the high priority that they stringently place on reporting, a huge gap is believed to exist 
between the intention to report and the act of doing so.106  
Admittedly, it is extremely complicated to ascertain conclusively whether any the 
death any given patient is the direct consequence of a medical error, and most evaluations 
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end with judgments that are open to subsequent debate.107 In contrast, consensus exists 
that a reasonably accurate general estimate stands at somewhere between 44,000 to 
98,000 annual death, directly attributable to preventable medical errors.108  This figure 
would constitute approximately 2%-4% of the total annual deaths in the U. S.109 in 
making these claims, McGowan and Healey turn for support to the 1999 Institute of 
Medicine report. The report found that that up to 98,000 deaths per year were attributable 
to preventable health care errors, resulting primarily in adverse drug events (ADEs) and 
preventable complications, such as inadequate nutrition, incontinence, falls, pressure 
ulcers, and delirium.110  Coincidently, older adults, more frequently the patients in 
intensive care units, exhibit greater risk of experiencing these types of errors. While in 
this latter context, they are typically reported as geriatric syndromes, they consist of 
specifics that include pressure ulcers, delirium, functional declines, and falls.111 In 
response to the severity of the problem and the lack of institutional responses, Sultz and 
Young have charged that the problem of medical errors in hospitals is well known 
throughout the healthcare community, but is for the most part ignored by those with the 
power and authority to effect change.112 
In the 1999 report by the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Quality of Health 
Care in America entitled To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, Kohn et al. 
asserted that the annual cost associated with adverse events caused by medical errors was 
17 - 29 billion dollars.113 According to Vlayen et al, adverse events constitute health care 
management processes that result in unintentional complications, errors, morbidities, 
mortalities, or extended hospital stays.114 According to more-recent data from the 
Millennium Research Group in 2008, such losses amount to a more modest $19.5 billion; 
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nevertheless, this total is still distressingly high, particularly when added to the estimated 
$17 billion lost each year through prescription errors.115 Underscoring the severity of the 
problem, several studies assert that more individuals have died from consequences of 
medical errors than those who have been killed in motor vehicle accidents or died from 
either breast cancer or HIV. In response to this, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) instituted a major policy change beginning on October 1, 2008, which 
identified eight categories of medical errors and denied payments for their consequences, 
describing them as preventable hospital-acquired conditions (HACs), preventable 
medical errors (PMEs), or occurrences they called never events. These include pressure 
ulcers, falls, trauma, surgical site infections, vascular-catheter infections, urinary tract 
infections, administration of incompatible blood, air embolisms, and foreign objects 
remaining in the body after surgery. The CMS refuses to pay for correcting these 
conditions unless they are preconditions, which existed prior to hospital admission.  Two 
more conditions were added to the list in 2009 following the CMS final ruling, namely 
deep vein thrombosis associated with knee and hip replacements and manifestations of 
poor glycemic control.116  
One factor adding to the costs of medical errors is that patients in the ICU run up 
huge additional expenses any time a medical error must be corrected, extending their 
stays in the unit along with the added costs of new, corrective procedures and/or 
prolonged original treatment.117  According to Nilsson et al, a full 20% of patients in 
Swedish hospital ICUs typically suffer from adverse events (AEs); 50% of these were 
judged preventable and probably consisting of medical errors, despite being typically 
labeled procedural complications. These included bleeding after a tracheostomy, low 
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saturation during the tracheostomy, nosocomial infections, and adverse drug events 
(ADEs); each of these “complications” correlated with 6-8 unanticipated days of hospital 
stay.118  
Medication errors constitute a sizeable percentage of medical errors in U.S. 
hospitals in general, and likely the ICU specifically; according to Rothschild et al, such 
errors probably amount to two thirds of medical errors in these settings.119 Approaching 
this phenomenon from another perspective, Gorbach et al estimate that each patient in the 
U.S. is likely to experience at least one medication error per day of hospital stay. These 
researchers further estimated that each ADE increases patient time in the hospital by 1.74 
days that translating into approximately $2,000 for each ADE.  In total, the annual cost of 
preventable ADEs in the U. S. is estimated to amount to $3.5 billion in 2006 dollars.120  
One of the most striking findings of this study is that medication errors increased as a 
function of the number of orders verified by each pharmacist during any given shift; 
specifically, any excess of 400 orders per pharmacist per shift correlated closely with the 
highest risk of error. Since most hospital systems only employ a voluntary reporting 
system, these researchers caution that their findings need to corroboration from additional 
studies at various hospital facilities.   It is generally conceded that ICU patients are 
administered more drugs and have twice as many ADEs as non-ICU patients.  Risk 
factors are also elevated due to the high potency of these drugs, their complexity of 
administration, such as through gastric tubes and central venous catheters, not to mention 
the life-threatening context of the ICU itself.121 
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Chapter 2.B.2. Inpatient Injuries in the Hospital ICU 
While relevant literature includes research comparing inpatient and outpatient 
care,122 the subject of this dissertation’s focus is the cost of medical errors occurring 
during institutional inpatient care, specifically within the ICU, and therefore such 
comparative research is only addressed here to the extent that it can provide context or 
insights not available elsewhere in the literature. Unfortunately, research into the specific 
costs of medical errors occurring during stays in the ICU, even in the context of specific 
regions or hospitals, is virtually nonexistent, making accurate estimation for the entire 
U.S. woefully imprecise.123 Unquestionably, any patient admitted to the hospital for any 
purpose will incur an elevated risk of suffering from the effects of a medical error than 
would an individual entering the same institution on an outpatient basis.  Furthermore, 
among all those of the general hospital inpatient population, those in the ICU are at 
greatest risk. One known cost of medical errors is that for all hospital inpatient medical 
errors combined, including the ICU, which in recent years has reached and perhaps 
surpassed $2.7 billion annually.124 
Although the largest portion of the combined costs described above involve 
medical errors related to inpatient care, outpatient medical errors are also included in that 
statistic, albeit to a largely unknowable extent. Contribute a share of errors and costs, 
although they are mostly unknown.  On one hand, many of the underlying causes of or 
circumstances leading to medical errors, such as staff fatigue, the handling specimens and 
related laboratory work, misdiagnosis, and medication errors may all occur as easily in 
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the hospital’s process of providing care and treatment on an outpatient basis. Moreover, 
those receiving outpatient care are particularly susceptible to some of the same risks from 
discontinuity of care as do many elderly ICU patients when they are transferred from one 
care setting to another or when they transition from inpatient to outpatient status, both 
situations which are discussed in detail later in this section. Outpatient care inherently 
creates built dangers for patients with chronic conditions including diabetes, 
hypertension, lipid disorders, depression, and coronary heart disease.  
One risk factor in particularly with regard to a phenomenon known as clinical 
inertia.  While the statistical prevalence of this condition is difficult to ascertain, much 
less the extent to which it leads to medical errors in the ICU or elsewhere, its causes and 
mechanisms of operation have been the subject of some research. Clinical inertia has 
been defined the failure to intensify pharmacotherapy when evidence-based clinical goals 
for the patient are not achieved within a critical period of time. Clinical inertia always 
incurs preventable negative consequences, ranging from elevated treatment costs to 
disability and even death.  According to O’Conner et al, the causes of critical inertia can 
be comparatively quantified, with about 50% attributable to physician factors, 30% to 
patient factors and 20% to office system factors.125  
The category physician factors refers to behaviors and attitudes on the part of 
medical professionals that would tend to increase the likelihood or exacerbate the extent 
of clinical inertia or its consequences.  These factors would include: 1) a mindset or 
habits of reactive rather than proactive care, 2) not allotting enough time with patients for 
effective communication, 3) neglecting to investigate and deal with comorbid conditions, 
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4) setting inappropriate or unattainable goals, and 5) delays in beginning treatment as 
promptly as warranted.  Several attitudes or presumptions common among physicians can 
increase the tendency towards clinical inertia. For example, many physicians may 
exaggerate the quality of their own patient care, at least in their own perceptions, and in 
the process miscalculate the number of patients who actually need intensified 
pharmacotherapy.126 Some doctors rationalize the avoidance of intensifying care, 
invoking such pseudo-justifications as faulting the patient for supposedly not following 
previous directions or prescriptions, not being able to raise the issue at office visits due to 
time constraints, or by presuming that the patient will resist any proposal to intensify 
care.127 Moreover, other physicians will offer as defense the lack of everything from 
training to tools to time to office infrastructure in order to assert that they are ill prepared 
to cope with the changing needs of patients with chronic diseases.128 Besides standard 
treatment, effective chronic disease management requires attention to various other 
inherent considerations which explains and supports the idea that many physicians are not 
well prepared to resist clinical inertia and are thus more frequently prone to errors.129 The 
changing circumstances of any chronic disease in a given patient over time necessitate 
more intensive record keeping via distinct procedures in order to accurately chart and 
track both the condition, along with decisions concerning how to management it.  Such 
decisions include: 1) target identification and goal setting, 2) organized attempts to 
discover optimal treatment, and 3) the titration of treatment in order to achieve the initial 
goals, as the disease or condition changes.  Medical errors can occur either in the context 
of making these decisions or in implementing them. For instance, goal setting is a 
dynamic process needing continual reevaluation change over time, yet this may be 
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handled in such a way as lacks consistency to the point that the overall goal is never 
achieved; there exists a name for this phenomenon, thematic vagabonding.130 Treatment 
goals may themselves be inappropriate based on a physician’s familiarity with the 
medical condition as opposed to the particular patient’s needs. In such cases and in terms 
of the patient, the goals of rehabilitation and restoration of health have not been reached 
due to goal fixation.131 Without adequate monitoring on the part of the physician, 
treatment trials may fail to provide critical information or feedback in a time-sensitive 
manner, distorting the results as they relate to the reality of the situation, stripping away 
the physician’s understanding of or control over the circumstances as the patient is 
experiencing them.132 At minimum, there are three kinds of errors that can occur in the 
context of titration of treatment: 1) adhering to incorrect or non-existent timing,133 2) 
choosing an ineffective treatment or inefficiently coordinating multiple actions over the 
course of their implementation,134 and 3) pursuing action despite a poor understanding of 
its potential side effects.135 Medical errors occurring for any or all of these reasons can 
result in the deterioration of the patient’s health or other unforeseen negative 
consequences.136  
The second source of clinical inertia, patient factors, consists of attitudes and 
circumstances that while residing within the patient should not be interpreted as making 
the patient culpable for medical errors; these include: 1) denial of disease or affliction, 2) 
illiteracy concerning health or medicine, 3) taking too many or poorly coordinated 
medications, 4) lack of effective communication with the physician, 5) mistrust of the 
physician, 6) depression, and 7) substance abuse. A patient’s mental model of various 
aspects of healthcare, such a disease, medication and treatment, the role of a physician, 
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can create obstacles to effective treatment that amount to clinical inertia. Refusing to 
accept that a disease or condition exists, is happening to oneself, or is causing poor health 
can lead to not making a decision or taking appropriate, timely action.  Motivations aside, 
pharmaceutical companies understand, to their credit, the power of their marketing 
pitches in persuading people of the reality of certain diseases and of potentially effective 
remedies and therapies. Thus, despite their potential for fostering unwarranted concern, 
such marketing does promote the right mental model for combatting clinical inertia.137  
The third significant source of clinical inertia lies with deficiencies in office 
systems, namely; 1) an absence of outreach efforts, 2) incomplete or ineffective 
communication among staff or between staff members and physicians or others involved, 
3) the absence of leadership or coordination required for a team approach, and an absence 
of clinical guidance.138Furthermore,  physicians who do not individualize their practices 
to match the diversity of their patients, not to mention the numerous ways in which 
various chronic diseases present at different stages and in different may well compound 
the problems of clinical inertia.139   
As mentioned above, while it is difficult to quantify medical errors related to the 
discontinuity of care that occurs when as inpatients are discharged and continue to 
receive care in another setting, even possibly as outpatients of the same institution, the 
risk is undeniably heightened.  The Institute of Medicine defines this discontinuity as 
medical error whenever it leads to non-completion of planned and intended care or 
treatment.140  Typically, hospital physicians prepare discharge plans for patients leaving 
their direct care; such plans will specify medications, test procedures, and designated 
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recipients for test results, normally the patient’s primary care provider (PCPs).  
Unfortunately, Moore et al. have documented a rate of receipt that is less than 50% on the 
part of the PCP, thus corroborating earlier research contentions. The primary result is an 
increased likelihood of rehospitalization, along with the attendant increased costs. 
Obviously, had the primary care physician also been the attending hospital physician, 
there would have been continuity of care, with less chance of rehospitalization and a 
better patient outcome.141  However, such a situation is growing more infrequent as 
healthcare becomes more complex and specialized, and moreover, is especially unlikely 
in the ICU of a hospital. 
Further contributing to the difficulty in accurately assessing the extent of medical 
errors in the ICU is that the predominant group making up the patient population in this 
part of the hospital are senior citizens, who are typically receiving medical care in various 
settings under the auspices of multiple facilities or institutions, for example between or 
among any of the following: the ICU unit of a hospital, rehabilitation centers or nursing 
homes, clinics, or at home. The involvement of multiple administrations and staffs 
greatly increases the need for coordination and efficient, timely, and thorough 
communication. To achieve all this cooperation requires significant outlay of time and 
resources while the lack of any part leads to a high likelihood of discontinuity resulting in 
less than optimal health care at best and the severest of medical errors at worst.  The 
period of transition from being under the care of one facility and staff to that of another 
constitutes the period of highest risk of errors, arising from the following:  1) physician-
patient breakdowns in communication, 2) issues concerning preparation for transfer, 3) 
unmet health care needs not communicated to the receiving caregivers, 4) dosing and 
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administration errors with regard to medications, 5) misplaced diagnostic results and 
updates, and unanticipated needs for treatment or care.142  The role of clinicians during 
these hazardous periods are undefined or poorly defined as Critical to the potential for 
problems and the increased risk of medical errors going unnoticed or escalating in 
severity of consequences is that no one physician is given responsibility and the authority 
necessary to coordinate and ensure continuity of care.143 One study delineated time 
constraints, high staff turnover, the absence of communication protocols, a scarcity of 
staff performance feedback, and the lack of patient access to appropriate clinicians, as 
being among the most significant obstacles to effective care and treatment, while at the 
same time contributing to the occurrence of medical errors.144 
Chapter 2.B.3. Percent Occurrences by Error in the Hospital ICU 
A variety of studies have documented the varying frequency of different types of 
medical errors, in relation to the origin and type of the error, as well as other 
interconnected factors.145 For example, in the context of medical errors arising from 
human mistakes, either overburdening individuals or the staff in general with excessive 
responsibility or understaffing, which precipitates the same situation, tends to increase 
both the rate and frequency of errors. In contrast, equipment failure is not influenced by 
the same forces.146  According to Blot et al, a positive correlation exists between the 
length of shifts that ICU nurses are required to work and the rate of medical errors in that 
particular ICU. The stress and tension of managing critically ill patients on a daily basis 
dealing with death, suffering, and grief can be wearing, distracting and lead to 
psychological impacts such as depression, burnout, and PTSD.147 Camiré et al. report that 
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interns working 77-81 hours per week on a critical care clinical rotation made 17.3% 
more errors than a similar group of interns following a 60-63 hour workweek.148 
Supporting these findings, Landrigan et al. concluded that sleep deprivation on the part of 
interns led to 35.9% more identified serious medical errors, and 56.6% more non-
intercepted serious errors; this depravation was defined by their working frequent 24 hour 
shifts, as opposed to working shorter shifts in the ICU.149  
Despite the apparent complexity in the interaction of contributing factors, the 
research reveals undeniable common trends, which go a long way toward explaining the 
relative frequency of specific kinds of medical errors.150 Despite the complexity of 
analyzing rates of individual types of errors, one overarching factor in determining the 
types and frequency of those errors that occur in the ICU is the healthcare system that is 
in place in the specific institution in question. Procedures for drug storage at one facility 
may contribute to a tendency to experience medication errors, while another institution 
might be vulnerable to other types of errors owing to flaws in its communication 
systems.151  
One factor which extensively impedes efforts to accurately and thoroughly 
document the occurrence of adverse events in the ICU, events that are directly related to 
medical error, is that reporting at all levels is voluntary. This leads typically to an 
underestimate of the incidence, frequency, and magnitude of any phenomenon where 
negative consequences, in this case patient harm, can be anticipated, along with 
culpability and blame.  In terms of attempting to document medical errors in the general 
setting of a hospital, alternatives such as direct observation and comprehensive chart 
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reviews are much too labor intensive and thus not cost effective. In the ICU, such 
methods could even conceivably interfere with the appropriate and necessary care and 
monitoring of patients. Australian researchers have a procedure they named a trigger tool, 
a form of systematic randomized screening of medical records for pre-defined event 
markers, to detect detected 25 times more adverse events than voluntary reporting in a 
pediatric ICU, where they tested the method. This tool was able to detect 90.1% of all 
adverse events, using both the trigger tool and voluntary reporting. Because of its 
success, this tool is considered reliable for use with the general adult hospital 
populations.152   
Medical errors differ extensively in terms of the severity of their impact. Among 
those with the greatest potential for causing serious consequences to ICU patients in the 
ICU are errors related to the labeling and handling of specimens. These can occur even 
prior to admission to the Unit, in fact anytime specimens are collected, labeled, 
transported from the ICU to the hospital laboratory, handled there by clinicians, or the 
results are recorded and disseminated. Particularly vulnerable to mistakes are samples of 
blood, urine, sputum, stool, and issues of fluid or viscous substances.153 Given that 
laboratory testing has a 60-70% stake in ensuring that each ICU patient is accurately 
diagnosed and receives the proper treatment,154 errors with the labeling of specimens can 
have among the most severe of consequences.155 Even the minority of these errors which 
appear to only delay, impede, or misdirect options can have ramifications leading to 
irreparable injury or death.156 Furthermore, when the consequences are catastrophic, both 
the ICU and the laboratory, the ICU, as well as the hospital, suffer financially and in 
terms of the reputation. Unfortunately, in spite of the many sophisticated procedures and 
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technology that are already in place to prevent or minimize specimen errors, such as 
barcode matching of patients to specimens with wristband and bedside readers and 
scanners, electronic health records, and computerized entry for doctors’ orders, far too 
many specimen errors still occur.157  
Studies by Bhat et al; Green; and Kaushik and Green found that errors happen 
more frequently during the preanalytic phase of a patient’s stay in the ICU than they do in 
all the subsequent phases combined.158 Specifically, Green found that preanalytic errors 
may amount to as much as three-quarters of all medical errors in this category.159 Beyond 
that statistic, this researcher calculated incorrect patient identification to be among the top 
four most frequent forms of pre-analytic error.160 Similarly, Dunn and Moga found in a 
root cause study of the Veterans Health Administration, that 182 of 227 (or 80%) of error 
involved misidentifying the patient, and that 132 out of 182 (or 79%) of these 
misidentifications happened during the pre-analytic phase.161 Prominently occurring 
mistakes included putting the wrong wristband on a given patient, removing specimens 
from the bedside or from their place in the lab and then mislabeling them, and making 
typographical errors in a patient’s identifier code.162 Ultimately, these types of human 
error proved the most recalcitrant to eliminate or even reduce. According to Martin, 
Metcalfe, and Whichello, one of the more surprising finding was the unexpectedly large 
number of errors resulting from the nurses deliberately overriding the barcoding.163  
Undoubtedly, reliance on technology in terms of automating infrastructure and 
support system functions in the ICU has the potential to reduce both the frequency and 
the severity serious errors in the ICU medical errors, not to mention those occurring in 
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other parts of hospital or clinical facility.  Nonetheless, some of this automation may 
simply trade the risk of one type of error for another.  For instance, Idemoto et al., report 
that in applying a computerized systems for dispensing medication according to an order 
entry system provided several benefits, namely reducing patient disruptions, fostering 
task efficiency, increasing safety, and cutting down on prescription errors.164 At the same 
time, other researchers have documented unforeseen problems created by this reliance on 
automation.165  For example, dependence on the automated system has led to errors in 
relation to the timing in administering medication, resulting in doses administered too 
close together. Infrequently as such errors have so far been documented, they can be 
extremely dangerous for weak and vulnerable ICU patients, who may thus receive double 
doses of medications the likes of antithrombotic agents, narcotics, opioids, or insulin.  
 Control systems are in place in some institutions designed to alert medical staff to 
such potential problems, yet these systems are themselves dependent upon human 
monitoring, which has its own propensity for error.  In the ICU, as elsewhere in the 
hospital, the technology for maintaining and accessing computerized health records has 
the potential to improve the timing, safety, efficiency and accuracy of patient 
interventions.166 On the other hand, according to Carayon et al, the implementation of 
electronic health records (EHR) in the ICU increased the time that doctors had to spend 
on review and documentation by 40% or 50%. These researchers also found that the use 
of the EHR system led to increases in alternating among multiple tasks from 117 to 154 
per hour (an increase of 32%) for residents although for attending physicians the same 
statistic decreased from 138 to 106 (a decline of 23%).  While the frequency of 
conversations between physicians and patients in their care did not change, the limited 
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ability of many ICU patients to communicate extensively may have been a factor.  While 
the study could not answer questions about possible improvement in patient care or 
possible reduction in the rate of medical errors, it did document increased attention to and 
prioritization of clinical review and documentation. This increase of switching between 
tasks was significantly disruptive and distracting although not so much as to be atypical 
of hospital intensive care units in general. Given that to date many hospital ICUs have 
only short term experience with the system, more research will significantly into the 
future will be needed to assess the ultimate benefits and impacts of electronic health 
records.167 
Chapter 2. C. Risk Factors for Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU 
Researchers have sought to highlight risk factors for medical errors in the intensive 
care unit. It emerges that several factors can be categorized as potential risk factors that 
increase the occurrence of medical errors.168  This section of the chapter presents an in-
depth analysis of the different risk factors elaborating how they prove to be triggers for 
medical errors.  These risk factors may be categorized as relating to:  1) the patient, him 
or herself, 2) the medications involved in treating the patient, 3) the ICU equipment used 
in treatment, and 4) the multiplicity of providers involves in the care and treatment of the 
patient. 
Chapter 2.C.1. Patients 
Several factors surrounding the patient have been grouped as risk factors for 
medical errors in the intensive care unit as highlighted below. This sub-section of the 
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Chapter discusses:  1) the severity of the patient’s primary illness or injury, 2) any age 
related seeds the patient may have for special care, 3) whether the patient is in the 
hospital or ICU for an extended stay, and 4) whether, as is likely, the patient is under 
sedation. 
(a) Severity of the Primary Illness  
Admission into the intensive care unit can be triggered by a considerable range of 
life threatening conditions. Despite this classification, the severity of these conditions 
differs.169 Health care providers may find themselves confused by the atypical 
characteristics of some of these most severe illnesses. In addition to the severity of their 
conditions, patients may be suffering from multiple complications, each of which medical 
professionals must disentangle and isolate, in order to treat simultaneously. Many 
patients admitted to the ICU are experience dysfunction with multiple physiological 
systems; thus, the level of complications and severity of the condition in general is, for 
any given patient, a primary risk factor for medical error. In handling and treating 
patients with severe or urgent cases, healthcare professionals are markedly more prone to 
committing errors. In a bid to save the life of a patient, these professionals may feel 
pressured into making hasty decisions or executing the wrong treatment strategy.170 
Moreover, given their greater vulnerability, patients with complicated medical conditions 
are significantly more likely to suffer negative consequences from medical errors. These 
propensities have been documented in the work of numerous researchers who have 
analyzed differing aspects of this issue.171 For example, Tourgeman-Bashkin and Zmora 
have found that medical errors occur more readily in situations in which a patient’s 
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condition represents a complex medical case. This tendency explains why the recorded 
number of medical errors is highest in the hospital’s ICU; patients admitted to this 
department require critical, often emergency care.172 Marik asserts that whenever the 
severity of illness necessitates hospitalization, the likelihood of medical errors occurring 
increases significantly. Patients with the most complicated medical conditions or those 
who require the most complicated regimens of treatment are susceptible to the greatest 
burden in terms of the consequences of medical errors simply to the extent that their 
conditions demand critical care and treatment. Ultimately, healthcare providers are bound 
to commit mistakes as they strive to offer highly complex and demanding regimens of 
care and treatment.173 
(b) Age Related Need for Special Care 
According to Taib et al, the age of patients correlates closely with their 
susceptibility to medical errors. Patients admitted to the intensive care unit are of 
different ages and present a variety of life threatening conditions.174 However, research 
has revealed that patients at the two extremes of the human life cycle are in need of more 
delicate handling as patients in the ICU, namely very young children,175 and seniors of 
advanced age. Compared to patients of school age, adolescence, and adulthood, young 
children require special medical care because of the lack of development of the biological 
systems, with the need for special medical care increasing exponentially when a life 
threatening condition is involved. Given the immaturity of physiological processes in 
children, healthcare professional face additional challenges when handling young 
children.176 Children require dosages of medication and treatment procedures, which are 
 107 
different from those commonly administered to adults, and which moreover, involve 
much narrower margins of tolerance for over or under administration. Furthermore, 
making wise decisions on the type of care for to children in the ICU represents an 
experiential gap in the knowledge of many health care providers, causing them to be 
more prone to error. As with patients of all ages, some errors may cost the life of children 
while others may be rectified with effective intervention strategies; however, with young 
children the former category is proportionally greater. In order to minimize the potential 
severity of the consequences of medical errors, healthcare professionals need to be much 
more assiduous in monitoring and administering care to young children in the intensive 
care unit, tasks already under-performed with regard to ICU patients as an entire 
group.177 
Within the context of voluntary reporting, health care workers tend to report an 
increased number of medical errors while treating and caring for children, a situation to 
be anticipated given the developmental stages children are progressing through both 
physically and mentally. Rathert et al note that it is easy to confuse the types of 
healthcare a child requires and the ways in which they are distinct from those of an adult 
leading to a variety of medical errors.178 Moreover, children become highly depend on 
caregivers when ill or injured, particularly when hospitalized. Since children are unable 
to be proactive in taking care of their needs, caregivers must operate with special skill in 
order to elicit the relevant information needed to provide the required care. According to 
Nguyen et al, this dependency itself constitutes an additional risk in that it increases the 
likelihood of medical error.179  Moreover, certain diseases exhibit distinct 
epidemiological symptoms in juvenile patients from those which are typical in adults, 
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placing children, especially the very young, in need of special care and increasing their 
risk for suffering adverse effects from any medical errors. Furthermore, children from 
various demographic groups, especially those already hampered by poverty and racial 
disparities in health care, may be at increased risk of suffering negative consequences 
from medical errors. Naylor contends that their reliance solely on public insurance and 
need to seek services in government hospitals should be deemed a risk factor for medical 
errors by itself.180 
Toward the other end of the life cycle are the elderly, who also require specialized 
care compared with adults in general. The aging process coincides with numerous health 
conditions; moreover, various biological systems tend to deteriorate toward 
dysfunctionality with age. This makes the elderly as a group more vulnerable to life 
threatening conditions such as dementia. The physiological challenges that come with age 
intensify the challenge of delivering appropriate and efficacious medical care that senior 
citizens need when in the ICU. Statistics from various studies have documented the 
increased tendency that healthcare professionals have for making errors with this age 
groups, particularly in terms of administering medications or implementing treatment 
procedures.181 Individuals within this age group may be highly responsive to some 
medical procedures yet far less sensitive to others. Such circumstances constitute 
dilemmas for the healthcare providers who handle their cases. These dilemmas and the 
confusion they engender only function to trigger medical errors.182   
Valiee et al have noted that diseases associated with older adults, such as diabetes, 
dementia, and heart attacks require critical care, which may compound other injury or 
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illness that has caused their admission to the ICU. As healthcare providers strive to 
provide such care, they are more likely to incur medical errors.183 According to Mattox, 
the risk is higher among hospitalized elders, relying on nursing care to manage their 
conditions.184  
(c) Extended Stays in the Hospital or ICU 
The length of time an individual spends in the ICU may constitute a risk factor for 
medical errors. Some patients with complicated illnesses spend months or years in the 
unit. During these prolonged periods, medical care providers try to intervene using 
different strategies to save the individual’s life and stimulate his or her recuperation. If a 
patient does not respond to the various strategies used, the case only becomes more 
complicated.185  Healthcare providers face the dilemma of whether to search for different, 
and potentially more efficacious, treatment procedures at the risk of causing setbacks or 
even harm. Such confusion may lead to potential errors that may compromise the safety 
of the patient.186 Sometimes, the situation of patients only worsens with time, prompting 
doctors to alter the treatment procedures with other alternatives, leading to a heightened 
probability of medical errors. The occurrence of any error will almost certainly prolong 
the patient’s stay in the intensive care unit, as medical professional must now work to 
correct the situation using relevant intervention strategies. For example, patients who 
spent a long time in the ICU are highly prone to serious of infections resulting from 
medical errors. A clear illustration is the development of sepsis in long term ICU 
patients.187  
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(d) Patients under sedation 
According to Church and MacKinnon, sedation comprises the administration of 
different drugs to reduce the patient’s responsiveness to stimuli, along with awareness of 
surroundings.188 ICU patients usually need some degree of sedation, although the need 
varies from patient to patient. Prior to the development of modern treatment procedures 
and equipment, patients in the ICU relied on different tubes inserted into the body in 
order to ensure the proper functioning of their biological systems, usually causing some 
degree of irritability and agitation.189 This circumstance necessitated heavy sedation. By 
contrast, modern ICU ventilators more efficiently and painlessly guarantee that the 
patient has access to ventilation; thus, tubes are becoming less useful in many critical 
care units. However, for other reasons, sedation is still fairly common depending on the 
diverse needs of each patient. One of the reasons why critical care patients require 
sedation is because of the pain associated with many life-threatening conditions.190 
Regulations exist as to how much sedation is necessary, given the patient’s condition. 
Regardless of level, sedation incurs certain consequences, and various researchers have 
identified it as a potential risk factor for medical errors. Since the sedated patient displays 
limited and subdued physical response, if any, to different treatment procedures, it 
becomes easier for healthcare providers to implement some procedures.191 Yet at the 
same time, it becomes easier to commit errors in the diagnostic, the treatment, or the 
medication phases, and to do so without immediate feedback in terms of negative 
response in the patient. Therefore, the probability of a medical error arising is much 
greater in dealing with highly sedated patients.192  
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Chapter 2. C.2. Medications 
Medications forms yet another classification of risk factors for medical errors. 
Different factors associated with medication serve to present health care providers with 
potential challenges, hence triggering the occurrences of medical errors. Three of these 
factors, as described below, are:  1) special types of medication, 2) the number of 
medications a patient is taking, and 3) the number of intervention that a patient is 
undergoing.  
(a) Special Types of Medication 
Accodering to Bucknall, certain types of medication demand a degree of 
stringency as to the specific conditions and procedures by which they are administered. 
While these medications are recommended only for particular patients with specific 
physiologies or conditions, presently numerous brand names exist for pharmacologically 
identical drugs or compounds, circumstances that may serve to confuse the healthcare 
provider.193 This may occur in the process of prescribing, ordering, or even administering 
medication; even a doctor may confuse the different types of medications during his 
prescription for a patient in the ICU. In other cases, the nurse responsible for 
administering the medication or the pharmacist may confuse the different types of 
medications available. Such confusion happens because of the different types of 
medications and often leads to a medical error.194 
Dodek has documented that with the emergence of new technologies, various 
different types of medications, many of which health care providers are not familiar with, 
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have become available within recent years. Sometimes, the availability of different types 
of medication may bring confusion as to side effects and dosages. For example, two 
different types of medication may be used to treat a similar illness but in different 
recommended dosages. Health care providers may easily confuse the two types and 
administer the safe and efficacious dosage of one in place of that of the other.195  
(b) Miscellaneous Medications 
The norm for patients in the ICU is a combination of medications to address the 
different symptoms that they are experiencing, as well as to enhance the capacity of their 
internal systems to recuperate. This combination demands professional competency in its 
coordinated administration. For example, some pairs or triads of medication may cause 
counter-effects in conjunction with each other; therefore, they cannot be given at the 
same time.196 On the other hand, some medications need to work concomitantly in order 
to create an efficacious potency. Healthcare providers can easily become confused when 
a patient in a critical condition requires many medications within the same time frame. 
Thus, it becomes quite easy inadvertently to trigger an error by administering a drug in 
the wrong way or in the wrong dosage. The chance for error involving a patient requiring 
only one medication is significantly lower than for one who requires a number of 
different medications.197 The reality that healthcare providers work in shifts, inhibiting 
their opportunity for adequate communication may engender further confusion as to the 
number of medications to be administered to a particular patient in the ICU. Although 
doctors and pharmacists try to be clear with respect to the dosage, timing, procedures, 
and caveats in administering medication to a given patient, errors still occur. These are 
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the reasons why the number of medications constitutes a significant risk factor for 
medical errors.198  
(c) The Number of Interventions  
Given the life-threatening conditions that send patients to the intensive care unit 
for admission, it is unsurprising that multiple, simultaneous interventions are often 
required in order to save a life.199 When a patient needs a variety of interventions, extra 
vigilance crucial to their successful execution, in order to ensure that their interaction 
poses no threat.200 The developers of different therapies have described the order in 
which they need to be executed, which may vary with different patients. In contrast to the 
hospital general population patient, who requires only a single intervention, the ICU 
patient requiring multiple interventions is considerably more likely to be the victim of 
medical error. The challenging environment of the ICU and the level of expertise needed 
to deliver high quality care, when multiple interventions are a necessity, may spur an 
increase in the rate of error if the health care provider is not superbly competent.201  
Chapter 2.C.3. Environment and Equipments in the ICU 
Moyen and his colleagues have asserted that since some medical errors are 
attributable to faulty equipment, different types of intensive care equipment should be an 
identified category of risk factors for medical errors. The following risk factors relate 
specifically to ICU equipment.202 
(a) The Complexity of the Environment  
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The rapid advancement of technology serving the healthcare field as a whole has, 
especially the ICU, facilitated an increasing dependence on sophisticated equipment and 
systems, which those medical professionals who must use them to deliver vital care, 
monitoring, and treatment in the ICU do not adequately understand.  Furthermore, from 
the level of patient contact to the upper most level of administration, the safety risks and 
consequences associated with medical equipment failure are at best poorly understood. In 
this context it is impossible to overstate the complexity of the ICU environment. 
Compared to other hospital units, the intensive care unit proves to be very complex; 
working in it demands an extremely high level of vigilance.203 Researchers have labeled 
this complexity in the ICU as a potential risk factor for medical errors in and of itself. 
This characterization is because the various equipment providing life support to ICU 
patients needs to operate properly in order to yield maximal functionality. There are 
different modes of ventilation that support patients in normal physiological functioning. 
Healthcare professional working in the ICU must be fully competent in operating 
different systems of equipment.204 By themselves, these systems, whether fully 
automated or manually controlled, may develop technical issues triggering the occurrence 
of technical errors. In other cases, the errors arising involving the use of such equipment 
and systems may be attributable to human deficiencies, such as the lack of competency in 
handling the system. Concerning the ICU environment, one research noted that, 
“Intensive care units (ICU) are specifically prone to having a greater incidence of MEs 
caused by the treatment of extremely ill patients, with polymedication prescriptions and 
frequent stressful situations for the staff, commonly occurring in conjunction with work 
overload in a busy area.”205 
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(b) The Need to Handle Emergency Admissions  
 In a significant proportion of healthcare institutions and facilities, the ICU is the   
 only unit equipped and staffed to handle emergency cases in which patients require 
urgent care and attention. Consequently, at times the typical ICU will receive multiple 
emergency admissions at once or in short order, necessitating a high degree of 
competence and responsiveness on the part of ICU staff.206 Emergency admissions into 
the ICU test of their expertise and critical judgment in offering healthcare that is, at once, 
both immediate and of the highest quality. Such cases normally require urgent 
interventions and solutions to pressing medical problems; thus, the probability of error is 
higher, compared to other situations affording time for thorough diagnosis and 
deliberation. Typically, the urgent need to preserve life runs concurrent with the need for 
doctors or other healthcare providers to brainstorm the most efficient treatment 
procedures for the patient, who presents with a case is far from ‘textbook’ in nature. Such 
critical decisions may precipitate higher than usual rates of medical errors.207 
Considering the society, its demography, and advances in medical science, it is 
unsurprising that the demand for critical care is rising, partly due to an aging population 
prone to critical diseases and more complex ailments, which in the past few would have 
lived long enough to experience. This trend runs concurrent with the development of 
higher-risk medical treatments and therapies. Apart from steep rise in the numbers of ICU 
beds, the roles played by critical care specialists extend beyond the ICU.208 They act not 
only as members of emergency teams, but also as staff at acute care hospitals. Therefore, 
the gap between the appeal for critical care as well as the specialists available to offer it 
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continues to widen, placing increased demands on those medical professionals.209 Given 
the current financial constraints on healthcare besides the cost associated with hiring 
more specialists, many ICUs cannot adopt the high-intensity intensive staffing model 
needed to adequately handle the increasing number of critically ill or injured patients. As 
a result of this growing gap, many errors are made in handling ICU admissions. For 
instance, an ICU staff may be forced to admit patients without running the recommended 
checks on the operating functionality of the equipment prior to putting into use in the 
course of urgently needed treatment. Any rapid succession of emergency admissions to 
the ICU further challenges its staff since they are required to operate simultaneously with 
heighten competency and responsiveness in the face of this increase in numbers of 
critical care seekers.210 Such conditions are among the factors contributing to unsafe 
behaviors in the care of patients, which invariably lead to human medical errors. 
Impossible as it may seem in the face of these circumstances, these errors can be reduced 
in order to enhance the provision of quality patient care;211 thus, they are legitimately 
classified as medical errors. Some scholars might contend that advances in medicine, 
together with the equipment and techniques they have engendered, promise to relieve 
much of the current pressure experienced in the ICU. However, it must be acknowledged 
that the applicability of these advances in the provision of care goes along with 
challenges such as start-up costs and the lack of staff trained and knowledgeable about 
their use, factors which create a propensity for various other types of medical errors.212  
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(c) The multiplicity of care providers 
Given that health care providers in the ICU typically work in shifts while ICU 
patients need round the clock care, various staff members attend to each patient. With 
varying qualifications and competencies and a diverse range of experience, these 
healthcare professionals may have conflicting convictions about the most appropriate 
diagnostic or treatment procedure for the patient.213 For this as well as many others 
reasons, the likelihood of a medical error is higher when the patient is under the care of 
different individuals who are this diverse in their backgrounds. If the health care system 
neglects to ensure effective communication and sharing of ideas among the multiple 
health care providers, the chances of errors occurring are greatly increased. Furthermore, 
different health care providers may observe different factors in the patient’s condition or 
response to treatment, leading to a confusion concerning the most appropriate next step in 
the prescribed treatment or procedure.214 
Adequate physician staffing is indispensable to the effective and appropriate 
delivery of healthcare services.215 Research has documented, however, that currently 
physicians’ shortages exist in both specialties and geographic areas. An inadequate 
number of physicians inevitably means delayed care and the medical errors that go along 
with it, as well as a propensity for various other forms of human error. In the ICU, this 
shortage can lead to further deterioration in the conditions of patients and even cause 
premature death.216 An over-abundance of physicians can also impair the quality of 
healthcare for patients because, as described above, an increase in the number of 
professionals may exacerbate the risk of medical errors. The make-up of the physician 
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population also affects the health of patients, in the ICU, as well as elsewhere. Numerous 
number of studies have demonstrated that areas in which a significant number of primary 
care physicians are active realize better health outcomes than do those areas with an 
imbalance.217  
Unfortunately, medical professionals trained for specialized units such as the ICU, 
 surgery, or dialysis are often need or are required to make themselves available and 
continue working even after their regular shifts are finished. Consequently, the majority 
of them are prone to making errors because of the fatigue associated with working 
overtime.218 Compounding the effects of fatigue, the increased work intensity may also 
affect the accuracy of the healthcare provider’s care. 
Chapter 2. D. Conclusion 
This chapter of the dissertation has categorized the broad range of medical errors, 
which are typical occurrence within the Intensive Care Unit of the average hospital. 
These errors consist of unintentional failures to provide proper care and treatment, known 
either as errors of commission or as errors of omission. The former include errors carried 
out in terms of execution, planning, diagnosis, delay, in correct administration of 
medication, complex equipment failure, and miscommunication. The latter type of error 
normally involves either the lack of prophylactic treatment or the absence or poor 
implementation of medical management.  One common characteristic of medical errors is 
that they and their consequences are not the direct result of the disease, injury, or the 
condition for which the patient is undergoing treatment. The possible consequences of 
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error in the ICU can be as varied as their causes, ranging from little to no effect to the 
extremes of serious injury or death. Within this broad spectrum of errors, those involving 
medication predominate. The costs of preventable medical errors in the ICU are 
staggering, including 44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths, compounded by 17 to 29 
billion dollars in economic losses. Moreover, the ICU has the dubious distinction of 
accounting for over one third of all the medical errors in a given hospital, both in terms of 
number of incidents and in the percentage of the hospital’s annual budget, which must be 
spent on the ICU when the costs of errors are factored in. It is not surprising in the least 
that the ICU is a high-risk area experiencing frequent negative outcomes. After all, the 
patients cared for in this part of the hospital are in life threatening situations, possess little 
physical stamina or resiliency, have been sedated, and need complicated regimens of 
medication. 
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Chapter 3. Ethical Problems Concerning Medical Error in the ICU 
Introduction 
This chapter places medical errors in the ICU within the framework of major 
principles biomedical ethics, namely beneficence, non-maleficence, distributive justice, 
and autonomy and informed consent, each of which are analyzed in detail. Ensuring the 
last two of these principles in the context of the potential for medical errors hindering 
patient care and treatment will constitute a significant focus of discussion in the Chapter.  
Included in the analysis will be the daily ethical dilemmas faced by ICU staff in the 
course of decision-making and its consequences in the context of providing optimal care 
and treatment while maintaining ethical standards. 
As in every other health-care environment, medical professionals at all levels in 
the ICU are typically committed to the ideals of bioethics, ideals that physicians and 
medical teams strive to achieve in the ICU. However, particularly in this context, various 
of these ethical principles and standards can easily come into conflict, given the critical, 
immediate response demanded by the medical realities of the environment. For instance, 
ethics dictates that each patient be provided with complete information about his or her 
affliction, along with the options for care and treatment by means of thorough elucidation 
leading to informed consent.  Moreover, autonomy demands that the patient have 
unimpinged-upon-freedom of autonomy in choosing or avoiding any and all care and 
treatment options, whatever the disease, injury or medical emergency.  On the other hand, 
informed consent requires competency in terms of background knowledge and 
 137 
understanding of causes, related factors, possible consequences of potential courses of 
treatment, and above the mental alertness and acuity to deliberate over options and make 
rational choices. The pace needed to guarantee this ideal inherently conflicts with the 
high pressure and urgency and rapid response demanded by the nature of medical 
emergencies the ICU. Furthermore, the circumstances that bring patients to this unit of 
the hospital guarantee that physicians and clinical staff will have limited knowledge 
about the patient, and therefore much uncertainty about the individual’s response to 
treatments or procedures, exacerbating staff stress and pressure. Given the fact that health 
care professionals are human and fallible, all these factors combine to create an elevated 
risk of medical error under the best of circumstances. 
At times, the very nature of the tension between the ethical principles of patient 
autonomy, distributive justice, beneficence, and/or non-malfeasance on the abstract, 
philosophical level and the limited options of practical reality force medical professionals 
to pursue the least detrimental alternative.  A case in point is the patient whose disease, 
injury, or condition is such as to make restorative treatment futile even in the near term, 
and yet the patient’s family is insistent on every conceivable heroic effort being made. 
Compounding the issue are the typically exorbitant costs of such measures, the doctors’ 
consciences, and the internal conflicts between saving life, preventing suffering, fairly 
allocating resources. 
Two fundamental goals, which cannot normally both be maximized in the ICU 
are equity in access to care and treatment, related to distributive justice and efficiency in 
distributing resources, related to what is least costly, is most cost-effective, or saves the 
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most lives. What must always emerge from the tension between these two motivations is 
an optimal compromise. In terms of prioritization, given the limits of ICU time, facilities, 
and staffing, many conflicting principles exists, such as: 1) first-come, first-served versus 
some form of lottery; 2) the most gravely ill or injured first versus the greatest number 
who can be treated with limited resources; 3) those with the most urgent need versus 
those with the best chance of recovery; and 4) those whose lives most depend on care 
versus those who will likely have the longest and potentially most productive futures 
ahead of them.  Beyond these choices, there are issues of racial, cultural, and gender 
equality, as well as age, quality of life and ability to contribute to society following 
successful treatment. 
 All of these questions are nearly identical to those that arise in the context of 
disaster relief, the distribution of prophylactics or treatment during epidemics, access to 
hemodialysis, the prioritization of organ transplant recipients, and the general rationing of 
scarce medical personnel, among patients in any crisis. Relative to these choices, a 
number of while some healthcare institutions see the most ethical method of equitably 
rationing as being a balanced combination of priorities, others have made clear choices in 
their prioritization of one consideration over its alternatives, such as for example, 
choosing quality of life outcome along with maximizing the number of added years of 
life the patient is likely to gain. 
Ultimately, rationing choices in the ICU take the form of decisions over if and 
when to withhold or withdraw life support systems, as well as when not to escalate 
treatment. Modern technological advances in life-support systems, including mechanical 
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ventilators, artificial nutrition or hydration, mechanical circulatory technology, 
chemotherapy, vasopressors, renal dialysis, and antibiotics have greatly increased the 
stakes in making these decisions, particularly in the ICU.   The withholding and 
withdrawing of life-support are not the only forms of rationing care or treatment. 
Sedatives and pain medication also fall under this category of possibilities; nor is this 
possible allotting of ICU services always passive in nature.  Transfer from the ICU to 
palliative or hospice care is an active step, which may become necessary.  Decisions 
about whether to withhold, withdraw, or not escalate treatment can be ethically justified 
by extraordinary situations involving costs or levels maintenance care, either of which 
become unsustainable; extremely grim prognoses or even futility of treatment; or 
substantial and irreversible, uncompensatable disability.  There are other ethical factors in 
such situations that have been proven to be impossible to fulfill – in particular the 
equivalence thesis that medical treatment is permissible to be withdrawn if it is also 
permissible to withhold the same treatment and vice versa.  Even while philosophers, 
bioethics researchers, and professional societies officially support the judgment that 
withdrawal and withholding of treatment are morally equivalent, clinicians in practice 
normally find withdrawal of treatment to be significantly more difficult than withholding 
or refraining from escalation, in part because of their feelings of duty to the patient and 
the profession.  
Chapter 3.A. Relevant Ethical Principles in the Hospital ICU 
This section of Chapter 3 of the dissertation examines several inherent conflicts 
within the ICU as a medical environment which lead to both ethical dilemmas and the 
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propensity for medical errors in this context.  In order to provide a framework for 
discussion, the section traces the development of codes of ethical behavior from 1847 to 
the present, and examines numerous relevant theories of ethics, including 
consequentialist, utilitarian, and the deontological theory of principlism. Beyond this 
analysis of theories of ethics, this section of the chapter will examine the principle of 
autonomy and its limitations, distributive justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, as 
principles in the field of bioethics together with the historical antecedents of each. 
Chapter 3.A.1. Ethical Conflicts 
The entire field of medicine and all endeavors of healthcare come under the 
purview of bioethics and the issues which arise from balancing the goals of satisfying 
patient preferences, following advanced directives, fulfilling the duties of the physician, 
and equitably handling social concerns such allocating limited resources for care and 
treatment, that contribute to ethical conflicts. It goes without saying that every 
professional in the field of medicine needs to have a working understanding of the 
fundamental principles that constitute bioethics, as well as their practical application in 
the healthcare facilities where the professional working.1 
Such working knowledge must be deeply internalized in settings like the ICU, 
where rapid, yet appropriate decisions are routinely called for. The dependency of most 
ICU patients on the physicians and unit staff creates a situation necessitating constant 
vigilance in protecting autonomy and self-determination of patients, while ensuring 
beneficence and justice in the equitable distribution of resources, and the absence of 
maleficence.2  Obviously however, giving in to a patient in every instance is not the 
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solution, as illustrated by San Francisco General Hospital study in which 22 out of 24 
patients’ families concurred with neurosurgeons against the patients themselves in terms 
of prognosis and treatment plans.3 For this reason, various ethicists have promulgated 
guidelines for doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals to follow in providing 
optimal healthcare to patients. Internationally, bioethicists have collaborated to create 
protocols and guidelines with the goal of formalizing ethical standards globally.4 In 
circumstances in which these standards of bioethics are not in place due to cultural or 
legal conflict, it is the society at large that is disadvantages in suffering both the financial 
and physicians and other medical professionals are considered in violation of professional 
conduct if they fail to disclose medical errors. The AMA itself is the most explicit in this 
regard with its obligatory ethical intangible loss from medical errors.5 Research findings 
indicate that as many as 5 percent of ICU deaths involved patients lacking advanced 
directives, in situations in which healthcare alone had to make most decisions about the 
patient’s care and treatment in the absence of ethics committee review.6 In the wake of a 
patient’s death, a ethic committee has little function or input.7 
Chapter 3.A.2. The 1847 Code of Ethics and Subsequent Developments 
The 1847 Code of Ethics put forth by the American Medical Association (AMA) 
represented a revolution in the approach to medical practice. Five subsequent versions 
from 1903, 1957, 1980, and 2001, as well as the AMA’s latest revision of 2004,8 have 
attempted to keep pace with the changing nature of society, technology, and medical 
practice. Moreover, the AMA code is merely the best known of numerous declarations of 
ethical principles that have had a powerful effect on medical ethics in this country.9 
 142 
Along with these others, the AMA code stipulates that a doctor has an ethical obligation 
to apprise a patient about any mistake which causes even minor medical complications 
for that patient.10 This responsibility extends to informing the patient concerning all 
relevant details regarding the causes, circumstances, damages or harms, steps to rectify 
and prognosis for recovery from the consequences of the error. Errors which do not result 
in any material consequences for the patient’s health are the only mistakes not covered by 
this ethical standard, which mandates official reporting.11 Despite the clarity and renown 
of this standard, it is likely that not every physician is aware of the extend of his or her 
ethical responsibility in the matter. 
Unfortunately, to date his ethical standards of responsibility for disclosure has yet 
to be legally codified at federal, state, or any other level.12 Nonetheless, precedent has 
been established in the courts as to a fiduciary relationship between the patient and the 
healthcare provider, so if a surgeon’s negligence leads to an accident, the at fault doctor 
may not hide behind non-disclosure.13 For many years, the hospitals and similar facilities 
were considered culpable for the errors of physicians and medical professionals they had 
work for them. More recently in addition, the hospitals have be been able to hold 
physicians legally responsible to the institution, as well as to the patient. As a whole, 
healthcare facilities and institutions have carried on a tradition of responsibility for 
disclosure of mistakes apart from any errors to their patients. Thus, even in the absence of 
statutes or legislation, the judicial system has created a clear presumption that the duty to 
disclose medical errors does indeed exist.14 Furthermore, it is part of the explicit position 
of professional medical societies that ethics renders their members duty-bound to disclose 
medical errors to any patient experiencing their effects; consequently, disclosure 
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guidelines for both practicing doctors and medical trainees.15 Such candor in physician-
patient communication is essential to the discovery of the circumstances surrounding the 
error so as to mitigate its effects and prevent its recurrence. In the same manner, the 6th 
edition of American College of Physicians’ (ACP) Ethics Manual, asserts that doctors are 
expected reveal any and all information concerning errors whether of judgment or in 
administering a procedure errors at any time during care and treatment.16 This disclosure 
should include all facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the patients’ wellbeing. 
Unintentional medical errors do not automatically fall into the category of improper, 
negligent or unethical behavior, but a failure to disclose anything to the patient is, in fact, 
all three of these things. Although objectively speaking, physicians should have no cause 
to worry about an honestly admitted mistake having negative effects on their reputation 
for integrity and candor, concerns possibly over reputation for competence, legal liability, 
or similar matters has significantly affected their willing to acknowledge mistakes, as 
well as the promptness and extent of their disclosures.17 
Chapter 3.A.3. Theories of Ethics 
Teleological, also known as consequentialist, theory focuses primarily on the 
outcome of an action rather than on the action itself.18 An outgrowth of this theory, 
utilitarianism, has optimization as its cornerstone principle with the goal of achieving the 
greatest good for the most people, considering all the consequences under a given set of 
circumstances, resting on the assumption of basic benevolence in human nature.19 In 
terms of bioethics, the consequentialist would judge the investment in resource draining, 
expensive surgery for a single patient ethically unjustifiable when the same resources 
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could possibly have helped hundreds of others.20 Along these theoretical lines of thought, 
ethics in the ICU is fundamentally about the outcomes of the care that a patient receives 
while there. The environment of the ICU clearly involves urgent, yet complex decisions 
be made, particularly with regard to patients in critical condition, thus placing significant 
stress on the ICU staff, who must simultaneously handle concerned family members, as 
well as ethical dilemmas in the ICU, all the while using their best professional training on 
the patient.21 The human dimension of this aspect of medical practice is sadly too often 
neglected in one’s medical education.22 
Utilitarian theory becomes problematic in that it places a duty on medical 
professionals to individualize their care and treatment for each patient. The large majority 
of professional codes of medical ethics call for respecting patient privacy and 
confidentiality.23 The principle of autonomy compounds this situation by declaring the 
patient’s right of choice with regard to the treatment options available. On the other hand, 
utilitarianism would overrule this right whenever ‘the greater good’ would conflict with 
it. Moreover, theorists raise questions as to how a theory such as consequentialism that is 
first and foremost outcome-based ever incorporate respect for the attitudes, feelings, and 
wishes of the patient. John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville both labeled this 
presupposition shared by consequentialism and utilitarianism as “the tyranny of the 
majority,” noting its occurrence in any circumstance in which the greatest good for the 
group as a whole is not in the best interests of certain individuals.24 In contrast, 
deontology as asserted by Immanuel Kant and John Rawls advocated the fundamental 
moral and ethical principle they referred to as deontology, promoting the concept of a 
moral duty, rather than results or outcomes, as the moral foundation for ethical behavior. 
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This contrast of founding assumptions and values places deontology, in many practical 
medical situations, as the antithesis of consequentialism and utilitarianism. At the same 
time, however, this preoccupation in deontology with the moral correctness of decisions 
with little consideration for their effects impinges on the autonomy of the individual, 
unique patient.25  
The concept of principlism promises a resolution to such dilemmas in the practice 
of medicine by asserting that in the circumstance of multiple moral principles claiming 
applicability, one must be honored while the other is justifiably suspended in the 
particular situation.26  While this sounds good in theory, in practice it gives no means of 
deciding between conflicting principles in various real-life circumstances. One such 
circumstance would be that of the healthcare professional who is caught between 
respecting the autonomy of the patient who wants to pursue options or courses of action 
that the medical professional considers morally untenable. Deontology and its corollaries 
allow no flexibility for compromise despite the individuality of each patient. Refusal by 
the physician to recommend any form of treatment may be the only option in such 
difficult cases, but even this choice runs into conflict with beneficence at some point. 
Furthermore, even a refusal recommended treatment can also be characterized as 
tantamount to negative autonomy.27 
The concept of a guiding moral framework for dealing with the day to day 
dilemmas of healthcare in practice has so far been neglected in the literature of research 
in bioethics, which has concentrated on how medical professionals arrive at the moral 
basis for their behavior. The linkage between the ethics of abstract philosophical 
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principles and ethics as it plays out in the routine difficulties of medical practice remains 
to be worked out.28 Various moral and ethical questions came into clear focus following 
World War II with revelations about lying to or failing to disclose information to patients, 
as well as active euthanasia to relieve suffering.29 What came of all this examination was 
the unanimous understanding that some human rights are sacrosanct, and thus beyond 
impingement, even for the good of everyone else in society. As an extreme example, if a 
surgeon cannot sacrifice the life of a healthy individual, making him or her an organ 
donor, no matter how many other lives might be saved and even if the healthy individual 
agreed to do so. Today, both public opinion and the laws of almost all societies would 
prevent such atrocity.30 
Chapter 3.A.4. Principle of Ethics and their Historical Antecedents 
(i) Autonomy 
Among the most fundamental of ethical principles in biomedicine is patient 
autonomy, which ensures that is a primary concern -enabling patient has the ultimate say 
in deciding his or her care and course of treatment. Autonomy has be advocated in two 
distinct forms: 1) the optional model, which affirms the active decision making role that 
the patient needs to be given, but allows the patient to defer to others, as opposed to 2) 
the mandatory model, which asserts that the patient must, in all case, exert his or her 
autonomy, or nothing may be done.31 Choosing to undergo or refuse any particular care 
or treatment is an integral component of both models; nevertheless, in practice and 
especially in the ICU, the inability of patients to make informed decisions frequently 
becomes a critical stumbling block to providing essential treatment interventions in a 
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prompt enough manner. While abstract principles are context for discussion of 
biomedical ethics, patients in the ICU patients may be unable to exercise their autonomy, 
yet the lives may depend on immediate decision-making.32  
In more practical terms, as a hypothetical example of the dilemmas that crop up in 
the ICU, suppose a patient goes into cardiac arrest after receiving incorrect medication. 
When a family member asks for an update on the patient’s condition, should the nurse 
reveal the error of neglecting to check the patient’s medical record for any history of 
allergies?  Ethical guidelines exist to assist medical professionals in making such 
decisions; in this case, the overriding ethical principle would be justice.33 
Patient autonomy has limitations, which may be classified into three categories, 
namely contextual, existential, and conceptual.  When a patient is incapable of making 
informed decisions due to delirium, depression, senility, or similar circumstance, the 
limitations are considered contextual and is a common occurrence in the ICU. The 
necessity of prompt action, possibly to save the patient’s life overrides even previously 
and competently stated wishes; the assumption is that were the patient competent at the 
time, he or she would agree with the physician’s actions. On the other hand, if the 
outlook is more certain and the need less urgent, the autonomous choices of the rational 
patient would govern the course of treatment.34  
The second category, existential limitations, applies when the results of the illness 
or injury interfere with the patient exercising unfettered, leading to the commonly 
reported situation in which a patient tries to yield decision making to the physician.35 The 
third category, conceptual limitations, describes an inherently restricted circumstance in 
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which it becomes necessary to sidestep a patient’s autonomy in the name of the patient’s 
best interests, with the goal of preventing harm or enabling healing. Obviously, these 
three sets of circumstances do in theory, and can easily in practice come into direct 
opposition with the concept of totally unconstrained patient autonomy.36 
(ii) Beneficence 
Beneficence represents the duty of medical professionals to always work toward 
the betterment of the patients’ health and well-being. While there are those who focus on 
and advocate for either autonomy or beneficence as the preeminent principle to the 
exclusion of the other, in reality the two concepts are most often compatible and 
frequently mutually reinforcing. Seen in this light, the patient’s exercising his or her 
autonomy and informed consent is by definition in that patient’s best interest, and 
therefore beneficence includes preserving and promoting autonomy.37 
Beneficence, synonymous with kindness, mercy, and charity takes two forms: 
positive beneficence and utility. Positive beneficence refers to the act of securing or 
providing tangible benefits to patients. Utility or optimal usefulness calls upon the 
medical professional to weigh the benefits against the risks and costs in among given 
proposed courses of action in order to find and select the optimum. Altruism, love, and 
humanity are other concepts closely linked to beneficence. As it is typically used in 
bioethics, this term denotes broadest scope of actions undertaken for the patient’s good.38 
In totality, beneficence is the moral obligation to act for the good or welfare of others, 
even though the actions taken in furtherance of this goal may not be obligations in and of 
themselves. According to Beauchamp and Childress, positive beneficence consists of a 
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foundation for various more concrete obligations on the part of medical professionals, 
such as directly preventing harm to the patient, eliminating or restructuring conditions 
that would present danger or the risk of harm, defending the patient’s rights, helping the 
patient to surmount barriers caused by disability.39 Beauchamp and Childress conceive of 
this obligation to beneficence as morally coming into play anywhere and anytime the 
medical professional becomes aware of another person’s need or danger, is able to help 
without personal sacrifice or imperilment, and is in an advantaged position to assist. In 
the language used by these two scholars, it becomes clear that they allow for conflicting 
obligations in certain circumstances to take precedence over beneficence.40  
Within the context of beneficence as an abstract concept, Beyond these 
considerations, both general and specific forms exist, with the former applying to all who 
make up humanity as individuals while the latter relates to designated groups, such as 
family and friends, children and the elderly as classes of individuals, and patients as a 
group for the medical professional.41 In this regard, certain groups, such as children or 
friends, inherently command beneficence from anyone. According to W. D. Ross, a full 
definition of general beneficence encompasses the broader scope in the issue of how one 
can actively improve the lives of his or her fellow human beings. Shelly Kagan expands 
the concept even further to include sacrifice in the absence of limits or constraints for the 
ultimate welfare and improvement of humanity.42 In contrast, other scholars contend that 
in practice, the duty of beneficence is limited to removing and generally preventing while 
promoting good. Even as restricted, this position compels an individual, such as a doctor 
or healthcare worker to act so as to prevent negative occurrences whenever it can be 
accomplished without personal loss.43 Despite their frequent convergence, in biomedical 
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ethics the autonomy of patient and beneficence always have the potential to conflict 
under specific circumstances, raising the issue of which should take precedence. 
(iii) Justice 
Insofar as healthcare is inherently related to the society as a whole, social justice 
is inextricably linked to medicine and healthcare, including all the controversial aspects 
of providing healthcare, such as inequalities in terms of its access, affordability, and 
quality. In fact, significant number of scholars have asserted that access to the highest 
quality care at affordable prices is a human right that society is required to make 
available to all.44   
Definitions of the term justice have focused on three closely related perspectives 
with scholars and philosophers thinking in terms of the individual receiving what is fair, 
what he or she deserves, or what he or she can rightly expect. A key axiom in the study of 
human society is that all individuals, by virtue of their existence, are entitled to certain 
benefits, as well as redress and/or compensation should they endure certain misfortune or 
injustice.   This assumption leads directly to the necessity of agreed upon societal 
standards to ensure that such entitlements, whatever the society defines them as 
including, are available to every one of its members. According to Beauchamp and 
Childress, asserted that this concept of fairness, equity, and suitability is known as 
distributive justice and that its ultimate origin and delineating characteristics are rooted in 
the cooperative social structure of the society in question. The concept of justice 
described here must be considered distinct and discussed apart from forms of justice such 
as punitive, rectifying, or compensatory justice, in that these latter types begin when there 
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has been a transgression of justice and harm done to victims. In the sense asserted by 
these two scholars, justice arises from something like a social contract, with breaches 
such as malpractice occurring either as incidents or as an ongoing unethical state of 
affairs.45 
Two rather abstract principles apply to making judgments about what is ethically 
considered just in any given situation, in healthcare as in all fields, namely the principle 
of formal justice and the material principle of justice. The principle of formal justice or 
formal equality states the individuals with equal status or standing must receive the same 
treatment. However, being stated in the abstract this principle neglects to specify what 
constitutes equality, either in terms of the individuals or the circumstances. The material 
principle of justice focuses more on considerations outside the individuals themselves, 
characteristics either physical or qualitative in the environment that must be taken into 
account in any fair distribution of benefits or burdens.46 
(iv) Non-maleficence 
For the healthcare professional, as a principle of ethics non-maleficence means 
avoiding any behavior that would or could foreseeably cause harm to a patient, which in 
practice becomes much more complicated than it sounds. For example, healthcare 
professionals do not even need to be physically with a patient in order to cause injury 
through maleficence; it can occur as easily as by not returning a phone call to a patient 
with a reputation for malingering or being a hypochondriac. Something as simple as 
neglecting return could cause a patient harm in the form of unneeded stress, making 
communication failures a type of medical error that causes harm. Whether or not the 
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failure involves any intent or is attributable to an electronic or human error, or whether 
messages are inaccurate, delivered to the wrong recipients, or involve damage to 
equipment, any breach in the flow of correct, timely, communication to all relevant 
parties constitutes a medical error of potential, possibly even life-threatening harm.47   
While the occurrence of a medical error undeniably violates the principle of non-
maleficence to the extent that the error has caused any harm, it is not clear when and how 
the principle applies in the aftermath of an error, particularly if the physician is not 
responsible for the error or if the patient’s knowledge of the error or certain aspects about 
it, would cause harm through worry, possibly even more harm that the error itself. Given 
the present day status of the physician-patient relationship, it is difficult to hold a tenable 
position against disclosing medical errors, yet at the same time, non-maleficence dictates 
avoid anything that will cause harm to the patient, whether that damage is physical, 
mental, or psychological.48 
Two factors give physicians a unique status and position in the community and 
society at large. First, their patients are, by definition, in a singularly vulnerable position, 
and with this dependence normally comes a unique level of trust. Second, a doctor is 
presumed to have an almost inexhaustible array of knowledge, skills, and expertise- 
seemingly even to the point of infallibility.  This admittedly exaggerated perception 
makes it all the easier for health professionals or physicians avoid disclosing medical 
errors, the consequences of which the patient may simply attribute to unexpected 
complications of the injury or illness. Given the ease of and natural impulse to conceal 
medical errors, the frequency of non-disclosure is to be expected; what is difficult to 
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fathom, given the clarity of professional obligations and the strong stance of bioethicists 
for disclosing any and all medical errors, is that there are those in the professionals in the 
field who openly argue against doing so.  Regardless of the controversy, according to 
numerous research finding patients want to know about medical errors when they occur 
and specifically, in terminology they can understand, the answers to two questions, 
namely why the error happened and what can and is being done to prevent it from 
happening again.49  
While accurate statistics are inherently difficult to obtain, the available findings 
reveal physicians themselves admitting that large majority of medical errors go 
unreported to patients who must endure their consequences, despite the doctor’s ethical 
obligation to the contrary.  Approximately 76% of the doctors interviewed in one study 
confessed that, at one point or another, they had failed to disclose a serious error to 
patients.50 The reason they offered was disclosure becomes complicated when different 
various hospital departments had been involved in the error, making disclosure to the 
patient a complicated and controversial affair. Although other research findings point to a 
somewhat higher rate of disclosure, one study reported as many as 22% of the surveyed 
doctors saying that they would not disclose certain medical errors, even if potentially 
fatal, given the inherent emotionally disturbing discussions and conversation that would 
inevitably ensue.51 Considering all these factors working against disclosure, it is 
predictable that an inverse correlation exists between the severity of harm from a medical 
error and the likelihood of disclosure to patients and family. On top of every other 
disincentive to disclosure is the sense of personal failure it engenders in the mind of the 
medical professional.52 
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Unfortunately, no manual exists with concrete procedures for disclosing medical 
errors. “Physicians must offer professional and compassionate concern toward patients 
who have been harmed… An expression of concern need not be an admission of 
responsibility. When patient harm has been caused by an error, physicians should offer a 
general explanation regarding the nature of the error and the measures being taken to 
prevent similar occurrences in the future. Such communication is fundamental to the trust 
that underlies the patient-physician relationship, and may help in reducing the risk of 
liability”.53  
Chapter 3. B. Ethics in the Hospital ICU 
This section of Chapter 3 relates the roughly 50 years history of ICUs in United 
States hospital in relation to their implementation of biomedical ethics and the principles 
it advocates. Over this period, adherence to such principles has greatly benefited many 
critically ill patients, and yet such principles of ethics have not been universally adopted 
in hospital ICU. A variety of factors work against uniform and full implementation of 
bioethics in the ICU, with some factors being inherent in the setting and its mission and 
others the results of factors that can be altered.54 
According to one study, as many as one-fifth of all Americans die while in the 
hospital ICU in pain and suffering due to a terminal illness or injury.55 According to 
Multz, ICU costs in the U.S. accounted for approximately a third of hospital budgets, 
translating into roughly $62 billion in healthcare costs, which was about one percent of 
the nation’s GDP that year. While ICU benefits can be great, so are their costs, making 
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them emblematic of the miraculous possibilities and tremendous burdens of modern 
medical care.56 
One of the cornerstones of bioethics in the broader field of medicine are Childress 
and Beauchamp’s four principles elaborating on the ethics of beneficence: 1) non-
maleficence, the avoidance of whatever might harm the patient, 2) a respect for patient 
autonomy, 3) the patient’s right to self-determination, and 4) the equitable distribution of 
medical resources.57 These principles are too abstract to serve as a manual of ethical 
practice,; however, they are useful in recognizing situations and defining issues in which 
goals of ethical practice are coming into conflict, such as when the goals of respecting 
patient autonomy and justice may lead to contradictory courses of action if a patients 
demands access to limited medical resources that should go to other patients who have 
priority for other reasons or might derive greater benefit from them.58  
Although Johnson asserts that beneficence and non-maleficence have long existed 
as principles of bioethics, until more recently these principles did not imply any need for 
proper disclosure to the patient. Given the norms of the physician’s role of near 
omniscience in society, not to mention widespread acceptance of the concept of one 
human owning another, i.e, slavery, the absence of expectations of disclosure is not 
surprising. In concord with the thinking of that era, Percival’s 1803 medical text, while 
incorporating medical ethics, provided no statement that could be used to support the idea 
of patient making medical choices for themselves. Even the AMA Code of Ethics from 
1847 and based on Percival’s does not appear to even foresee rise of autonomy as 
fundamental concept of biomedical ethics. In fact, it was the mid of 20th century before 
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informed consent was clearly established in the literature as a principle of ethics. One 
reason for this breakthrough was a growing legal acceptance of the right of every to give 
or withhold informed consent.59 
In some form or another, the rights of patients to accept or reject medical care has 
been acknowledged for several centuries, in part through common law in England and the 
U.S.  In the last 70 years or so, the principle of informed consent while a subject of 
debate has been elevated to the status of legal right through the response to revelations of 
World War II atrocities committed under the guise of medicine, not just in Axis Europe 
but also in studies such as the Tuskegee syphilis case, as well as in response to the 
movement for greater equality and civil rights for minorities. From the outset, the 
physician’s duty to practice beneficence has been construed to protect patients from 
suffering any harm not the direct result of the injury or illness. This precedent is 
particularly relevant to the frequent issues of withholding ICU care from patients ICU 
given the more cost effectiveness of home care, a situation that has occurred repeatedly 
with patients suffering from cancer or AIDS.60 Until the 20th century, neither English nor 
American courts had deemed informed consent a prerequisite to intervention for 
treatment or research. Court records of this period document a few instances of healthcare 
professionals supporting the notion of informed consent through their testimony, but none 
in which they advocated patient autonomy.61 
Beginning in the early 20th century, various U.S. court case rulings created and 
expanded the precedent for legally mandating informed consent. In Schloendorff v. 
Society, 1914, the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York ruled against a hospital, stating 
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explicitly that every adult person had the right to decide what could or would be done 
with his or her body. Some four decades later, in 1957 the U. S. Court of Appeals of 
California ruled that clinicians must disclose all relevant facts affecting a patient’s rights 
and interests. By 1970, the Supreme Court of California had further defined the scope of 
the physician’s legal duty, in terms of disclosure to the patient, as being measured by the 
patient’s need to know any and all relevant information material to decisions concerning 
care and treatment, with Cobbs v. Grant serving as the basis for their ruling.62 
An examination of the transcripts of these cases leads to the conclusion that 
informed consent in this country was motivated by a growing resistance to the 
paternalistic model of medicine, based on an ethics which permitted doctors to define the 
best interest of a patient without concern for his or her wishes or opinion. What has 
emerged from this historical shift has been participatory clinical decision-making, 
eschewing rigid medical paternalism, but concurrently ushering in greater complexity in 
doctor-patient communication and relationships.63  
Chapter 3.C. Ethical Issues in the Intensive Care Unit 
This section of the Chapter 3 describes the concept of futile medical care, issues 
involving the ethics of allocating limited resources, and the controversies and realities 
surrounding the withholding and withdrawal of life support in the ICU. In order to frame 
the discussion of these topics, all of which have engendered considerable debate, it is first 
necessary to briefly examine the special circumstances of ICU patients with regard to 
autonomy and their informed consent, as well as the special responsibilities that these 
circumstances place on the ICU staff. 
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Presenting fundamental challenges to ethical principles such as autonomy, ICU 
patients frequently have diminished ability to make informed decisions due to any or 
several of various hindrances, such as confusion, disorientation, psychosis from organic 
illness, metabolic upheavals, pain, sleep deprivation, or medications such as sedatives. 
These consideration make it imperative that ICU staff be vigilant about their 
responsibility to ensure that patient is given every opportunity to exercise what capacity 
he or she possesses at the moment when critical decisions need to be made. The goals of 
preserving patient autonomy and informed consent must be balanced with avoiding life-
threatening delays in decision making, while allowing for a patient’s possible ability to 
make some, but not all, decisions about his or her care. The medical staff of the ICU team 
needs to be vigilant and constantly prepared to reassess a patient’s capacity for decision 
making, knowing when to bring in outside experts for a formal cognitive or psychiatric 
assessment.64  
Chapter 3.C.1. Futile Medical Care 
The term futile medical care implies that used to describe medical treatment that 
has little or no, or at most meager hope of achieving the goals set for it, such as regaining 
function the patient has lost through injury or illness, or improving the patient’s quality of 
life.65 This phrase is loaded with connotative meaning for almost all parties involved, 
including medical staff, families, surrogates, and stakeholders have interpreted the 
meaning of ‘futile medical care’ differently and sometimes contentiously from each; thus, 
predictably it has frequently thwarted attempts to communicate among attending 
physicians, other ICU staff, patients themselves, their family members and/or surrogates. 
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From an exclusively rational perspective, the ICU is the setting where the end-of-life is a 
very real consideration and the idea of futility is likely to become a possibility under 
certain circumstances. However, these same circumstances do not tend to promote 
rational thinking on the part anyone with emotional concern for the patient.  Probably 
precisely because of medical and technological advances, leading to heroic life saving 
through such measures as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), mechanical ventilation, 
pacemakers, and dialysis, life may be sustained for a potentially indefinite period even in 
the face of an incurable condition.66  
The rise in prioritization of patient autonomy has had a profound effect on the 
nature of physician-patient relationships.67 The power which the growing emphasis on 
autonomy as a pillar of biomedical ethics provides to patients and their surrogates, along 
with relatives in some cases, can encourage them to put a medical professional in position 
of going against the latter’s conscience and conflicting ethical principles in providing 
care that goes against professional evaluation.  In such cases, doctors, nurses, or other 
ICU staff may find it impossible to deal with stress of the moral and ethical conflict and 
will consequently withhold or withdraw treatment, either by conscious or subconscious 
action, rationalizing the effort as futile and interpreting beneficence according to their 
professional ethics as requiring them to treat only patients who can truly benefit from the 
care.68 
In an attempt to settle some of the disquiet surrounding the term, certain scholars 
have posited a distinction between physiological and qualitative futility. A hypothetical 
situation involving chemotherapy serves to illustrate the difference; a doctor rejecting the 
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treatment judging that it will not arrest the progress of a cancer is assessing it to be 
physiologically futile, whereas the same doctor upon deciding that the same patient could 
not endure the negative side effects of the chemotherapy, that would be assessing the 
identical regimen to be qualitatively futile. The value in distinguishing these notions of 
futility is that it allows specifying the motivations for making the determination in ways 
that are possible to more easily communicate and accept.69   
Yet another attempt at circumventing the immediate emotional responses to the 
term futility in medicine has been to speak in terms of low survival or success rates of 
what are sometimes called futile therapies.  In this light, Peberdy et al. note that among 
patients receiving CPR in European hospitals, at most 6% are successfully resuscitated, 
and of those CPR, and merely 17% eventually left the hospital alive.70  By it very nature, 
CPR, especially in the ICU, does violence to the human body, insofar as it involves 
procedures such as the administration of electric shocks, the intubation of airways, the 
injection of heart medication, or the direct massaging of the heart in an open chest.71 
However, in spite of the exceedingly slim odds of its success, many palliative patients 
and family members continually push for it, even when they are aware of the odds, 
because of the social and cultural ritual that has become rather than because of its 
functionality or prospect for success.72  
According to Mohammed and Peter, one the important aspects and functions of 
CPR is its symbolism in affirming that the medical staff pursued every conceivable 
avenue in the effort to sustain the life of a patient, despite any apparent futility.73 Thus, 
the staff removes any logical possibility of attributing death, should it be the outcome, to 
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a failure of human effort. Furthermore, these researchers contend that the typical ICU 
protocol of withdrawing technological life support technology at a slow, deliberate pace 
is aimed at replicating the natural process of dying, permitting the family of the patient to 
prepare themselves psychologically through the gradual shift from medical intervention 
to nonintervention.74 To this end, some ICUs have proposed encouraging the members of 
a patient’s family to witness CPR or other resuscitation efforts so that they may be a part 
of the process leading to the patient’s in a way that is more open and meaningful.75 
When disputes arise over whether a given course of intervention or treatment is 
futile and the existing physician-patient or surrogate relationship is incapable of dealing 
with the issue, mechanisms, protocols, and procedures, either formal or informal have 
been emerged for resolving the issue.76 One such formal procedure, known as the 
Houston Policy for Medical Futility was developed in that city and was in operation until 
the Texas Advanced Directives Act with its broader scope involving patients, surrogates, 
and physicians replaced the policy and incorporated an interdisciplinary committee from 
the facility and a procedure to resolve disputes.77 On a national scale, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) published recommendations for a multi-phase resolution 
procedure, notable for providing a mechanism for patients or their surrogates to have a 
different attending physician, or even move to another medical institution if agreement 
cannot be reached.78  
Taking into account the three aspects of patient treatment, namely its 
effectiveness, its benefits, and its drawbacks and cost, financial and otherwise, Edmund 
Pellegrino created a guideline system for determining the best course for a given patient 
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in his or her individual circumstances.79  According to Pellegrino, while the effectiveness 
would be best evaluated by the medical professional, the patient would be the best judge 
of benefits in the subjective terms of his or her lifestyle, with the assessment of burdens 
and cost arrived at through a collaborative effort of the physician and the patient. In this 
model, each person would be responsible for deciding upon the best approach.  In this 
context, the person or group responsible for their segment of through this process, 
Pellegrino envisions a balanced consensus emerging as to whether any course of medical 
care or treatment should be considered futile.80  
Advocating distinctly against Pellegrino’s model, Grossman and Angelos warn 
that it is likely to cause a communications breakdown, especially when it comes to the 
concept of futility.81 Moreover, these authors contend that the very notion of futility 
inherently puts the physician back into the authoritarian role of the past while it 
undermines patient autonomy.  Grossman and Angelos posit the use of the term “goals of 
care” instead of “futility” so as to foster physician-patient dialogue and discourage 
contentiousness, especially given that patient’s surrogates and family members may also 
be involved. According to these scholars, the idea of establishing goals, clear 
expectations, and advanced directives with such features as “do not resuscitate orders” 
and “required reconsideration” go a long way to forestalling conflict when critical 
decisions of this nature confront those involved.82  
Insofar as they command the trust of all those directly involved with the patient’s 
care, third parties such as ethics consultants or palliative care teams,83 social workers, 
chaplains, patient advocates, or medical committees are in a position facilitate consensus 
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on questions of futility of care. Such ‘external’ groups or individual bring broader 
perspectives, help diffuse the emotional ramifications of potential decisions, sideline 
ethical issues such as cost and rationing of resources and thus reduce their potential for 
conflict, and alert the other parties to additional or unconsidered options for care and 
treatment.84 
According to Bradley and Brasel, surgical ICUs in particular could benefit by 
establishing the following five circumstances as automatic thresholds for calling on the 
services of palliative care specialists, which these authors distinguish from hospice care 
and which they arrest will avoid futility becoming an independent point of contention: 1) 
by request of the family, 2) by the medical team’s determination of futility, 3) by 
contentious family disagreement, 4) by an assessment that the end-of-life is imminent, or 
5) simply by one month having elapsed with the patient in continuous ICU care.85  
Chapter 3. C.2. Ethics of Allocating Limited Resources 
Through history and in all societies, medical services and resources have been 
almost always insufficient to meet the community’s needs causing ethical dilemmas in 
terms of equitable allocation.86 There have been those who, on the basis of moral 
imperative, are against any limiting of medical care even for the terminally ill, resulting 
in the cost of care and treatment rising far beyond either the willingness or the ability of 
individuals or society to pay.87  Lest this position seem an exaggeration, 2013 statistics 
for health care spending in the U.S. reveal a total of spent $9,255 for each individual, 
healthy as well as ill or injured. This adds up to a total of $2.9 trillion dollars, in excess of 
a four-fold increase from the $714 billion spent in 1990 and totals 17.4% of the nation’s 
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2013 gross domestic product (GDP); furthermore, it amounted to two to three times as 
any other industrialized nation for that year.88 Of even greater concern, forecasts 
anticipate additional growth to average 5.8% yearly through 2024 reaching 19.6% of 
GDP.89    
The fraction of this staggering amount which is being directed towards end-of-life 
care is far greater than proportional under any system of categorization.90 Evidence 
shows this disproportionate spending to be stable over the long term, as annually from 
1978 to 2006 approximately 5% of Medicare patients accounted for between 25.1 to 
28.3% of the program’s payments during the final year of life, typical of these patients 
was repeated hospitalization and greater use of ICU services, especially during the final 
few months.91 Statistics confirm that for any given patient, approximately one-third of 
their lifetimes Medicare bills are for care and treatment during the last month of life.92 
Numerous scholars and policy advocate contend that such imbalances make the rationing 
of limited medical resources economically inevitable and even morally justified, no 
matter how unpalatable.93 End-of-life care is the most visible, yet not the only, intensive 
consumer of medical resource; for instance, premature neonatal care can encompass 
many months of hospitalization and expensive care at times exceeding $1 million per 
child.  Such situations, as with other disproportionately expensive care, occurs within 
some sector of the ICU.94 
Possibly due in part to the inherent nature of the medical care it provides, the 
hospital ICU has not been able to find an optimum balance of efficiency, effectiveness, 
and ethical acceptability, which has avoided spirited controversy. Difficult situations, 
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which are likely to involve the ICU, include emergency or disaster triage, priority for 
organ transplantation, access to vaccines during epidemics, priority for ICU admission in 
general and its forms of critical care in particular, and the decision of when to suspend 
futile end-of-life care.95 Beyond any denial is the assessment that the equitable allocation 
of resources and the life and death decisions involved constitute one of society’s most 
morally and ethically difficult challenges.96 Any given procedural proposal can be 
challenged on the ground that it sacrifices fairness to efficiency or vice versa, too 
complex to be implementable or else too efficient to be applicable to enough specific 
situations, or otherwise too controversial in one respect or another.97 In theory, the ethical 
principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice should provide 
guidance in any medical situation; however, in practice they may easily come into 
conflict with each other, leaving no clear guidance for the specific decision. The 
following examples from research illustrate concrete situations and quandaries that has 
raised difficult ethical issues.98 
In terms of prioritizing kidney transplant recipients, the first-come, first-served is 
relatively straightforward to comprehend, defend as being equitable, and administer 
efficiently, yet it shuts out consideration of the realities of medical need and the quality of 
the outcome. Well documented in research literature are cases of hospitals being forced to 
significantly amend or even abandon this guideline in the face of heated controversy. In 
some instances, critics contended that the first-come, first-served rule discriminates 
against those with a lower standard of living who are disadvantaged in terms of 
communication and transportation technology.  In such an example, favoring efficiency 
may prevent tragic outcomes should something go wrong in the system, while insisting 
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on equity may lessen contention. However, in most cases both goals cannot be fully 
satisfied.99   
While lotteries for access to limited medical resources, such as in the ICU enjoy 
the precedent of proven use in the military draft, immigration and receiving green card 
status, as well as the distribution of vaccines, these systems themselves have not occurred 
without challenges to their fairness. On the positive side, selection by chance can be 
quickly, simply, and efficiently administered; moreover, they ostensibly ignore the 
obvious and egregious form of inequity. This blindness to individual considerations, 
however, is the very source of objection to lotteries precisely because many scholars, 
medical professionals, and members of the general public feel strongly that without 
taking into account these ignored differences, no lottery type system can claim to be 
ethical.100 
In the United States, according to established guidelines, priority in admission 
into the ICU goes to patients being readmitted over first time admissions despite the 
relative urgency of their conditions. Thus, given limited bed space in the ICU, even a new 
patient in need of immediate life-saving procedures cannot supercede a patient needing to 
return to the unit, creating an ethical dilemma. In these circumstances, resource 
limitations prevent medical professionals from acting in each patient’s best interest. From 
a different perspective, this guideline unfairly prioritizes existing doctor-patient-ICU 
relationships over similar relationships that as yet do not involve the ICU even when 
those other patients may derive greater benefit from ICU care. Needless to say, such a 
rule while ethical in the sense of being clearly set down beforehand and administered 
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consistently, has been highly controversial, with many scholars and practitioners 
advocating revision with the goal of maximizing the number of lives that can saved 
through ICU treatment and care.101 
The prioritization of patient admissions for hemodialysis is an example of the 
dilemmas faced by the ICU in dealing with inadequate resources.  If the chances of 
successful treatment are calculated from a medical perspective and prioritized, patients 
with the best prognosis would be treated first, which could in the process consign sicker 
patients to pain and fatality.102   
Treatment of those who are the sickest first prioritizes those with the worst future 
prognosis ahead of all others. This rule follows the moral principle of the rescue rule in 
the face of imminent death.  By contrast, prioritizing those patients whose need is most 
critical, as is done with vital organ transplant and disaster triage typically maximizes the 
saving of lives.103 However, opponents argue that requiring those who appear healthier to 
wait allows their progressive conditions to worsen, ultimately costing more, and possible 
causing them to miss a window of opportunity for being cured or stabilized with much 
less impairment. Opportunities lost in delaying treatment of those with the best chances 
can even end up as a lost opportunity to save a life.104  
The pros and cons of prioritizing the youngest patients tend to mirror the 
arguments for and against prioritizing the worst off. The reasoning is that those who had 
the least opportunity to live should, in fairness, be given a more equal chance at a 
normally long life.  The often heard counter argument would point to a hypothetical 
young adult who has been the recipient of much more family and societal investment of 
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time, energy, and resources than an infant, and yet has had no more opportunity to live so 
as to represent a return on that investment.105 
Two example of prioritizing the goal saving the most lives has been the allocation 
of influenza vaccine106 and responses to bioterrorism,107 predicated on the assumption 
that the opportunity to save ten lives trumps the chance to save just one.  Nevertheless, 
relying on numbers is too simplistic for concrete, critical situations in healthcare, such as 
can be common in the ICU where among other things the numbers tend to be not so 
heavily lopsided. Ethically laden judgments often must be made over whether to 
prioritize women and children over men, whether to prioritize educational attainment or 
other greater potential to benefit society, whether to prioritize those with potentially 
longer to live and thus contribute more, or whether to prioritize those with the greatest 
prospect for survival. These questions must be dealt with when performing triage in the 
wake of disasters, when distributing limited supplies of penicillin, or when creating 
priority lists for receiving organ transplants.108 Saving the most lives will not aid in 
allocating resources it these questions of who and how many are to be selected first have 
not been determined authoritatively prior to the emergency or other urgent situation.109 
As implied in several of the questions above, social usefulness has at times been 
utilized as ethical criteria for who will be prioritized.110 The justification in this case 
resides within specific individual rather than a particular value applied equally to all.111 
One form of this criterion is known as instrumental value allocation, characterized by the 
hypothetical situation in which a government agency such as the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), would endorsed individuals such as key political leaders 
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as being indispensable and therefore prioritized above the otherwise first-come, first-
served basis for the rest of the community, This would be justified by the rationale that 
certain leadership functions would be necessary for the society to cope with whatever 
prompted calamity. Yet another possible prioritizing scheme based on social usefulness is 
Reciprocity value allocation, which would in a sense reward individuals who may have, 
for example, put their lives at risk for their nation or community, donated organs to save 
lives, or volunteered in an important, critical capacity for the public good.112   
It becomes clear that, first, no individual guideline for allotment can satisfy all 
relevant moral principles in the attempt to ethically allocate insufficient resources, and 
that, second, the basic principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence 
are almost certain to come into conflict with one another.113 Regardless of the allocation 
system, whether on a single method of selection or a combination, objections can and 
have been made that its disadvantages are significantly great as to render the system 
unworkable, unethical, or both. A number of organizations have promulgated hybrid 
allocation systems although they have typically ended up with some degree of complexity 
issues.114  
Persad et al. have analyzed the hybridized principle systems put forth by the 
following four groups: 1) the United Network for Organ Sharing point system, 2) the 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years allocation system, 3) the Disability Adjusted Life Years 
allocation system, and 4) the Complete Lives system.115 
Merging three prioritization options, The United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) utilizes a combination of the first-come, first-served and sickest-first principles 
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with the prognosis principle, adapted for antigen, antibody, and blood type matching of 
donors to recipients. In practice, weighting of the principles depends on the type of organ 
that is donated, creating flexibility. Criticisms have focused on the lesser weighting 
prognosis, the susceptibility to fraud or bias by those misrepresenting their urgency of 
their need, the use of multiple transplantation lists, and of permitting multiple organ 
transplants per individual instead of possibly saving more lives.116  
The procedure developed as the Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALY) allocation 
hybridizing the priorities of quality of life-years and prognosis with the former being 
dominant and others disregarded.  This method has been criticized as inherently biased 
against the disabled, disregarding fundamental human equality, and ignoring the other 
principles.117 
The Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) allocation, like the QALY, avoids 
distribution based on factors, while attempting to create some equity in terms of 
disability, ultimately ranking a person’s life-year with his or her age as a weighting 
modification. Although it carries the endorsement of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the DALY system has been criticized for inherently favoring patients who are 
younger and for justifying selection on the basis of instrumental value.118 
As its name suggests, five distinct principles are incorporated into the Complete 
Lives system: 1) youngest-first; 2) prognosis; 3) save the most lives; 4) lottery; and 5) 
instrumental value, only in terms of public health emergencies.119 The use of youngest-
first in this system actually emphasizes adolescents over infants, given that they represent 
a greater investment by parents and society, as well as greater personality development. 
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The Complete Lives system also weights prognosis for living a full life span. In this 
respect, one criticism is that it works against those with a poor prognosis who are in poor 
condition or are less likely to fully recover.  The principle of saving the most lives is 
interpreted in terms of more people having more complete lives.  Those between the ages 
of 15 and 40 are prioritized because they have the best prospect for doing so.  Advocates 
claim various advantages for the system, namely that it 1) prioritizes younger people, 
improving data tracking and leading to greater protection from abuse of the system, 2) 
motivates attending physicians to endeavor to improve each patient’s condition as much 
as possible, and 3) achieves the optimal degree of distributive justice by weighting human 
lives as opposed personal qualities experiences, in spite of its bias against those of 
advanced years. While the Complete lives system is undeniably complicated, and in some 
circumstances unwieldy, many researchers consider it the best available.120 
Unfortunately, none of these systems directly addresses one of the most important 
causes behind the need for an ICU to make resource allocation decisions.  In the hospital 
ICU, the lack of capable personnel may prove to be the most widespread trigger for the 
need to prioritize patients, either because the needed specialists are not geographically 
accessible or are preoccupied with other medical commitments, or have scheduling 
conflicts preventing timely attention to a patient’s medical needs.121 
Chapter 3.C.3. Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support 
 Forgoing life-sustaining medical care can take any of three forms, namely 
withholding life support, withdrawing life support, or not escalating the level of treatment 
when otherwise called for. As the names imply, withholding must be chosen before 
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treatment commences; afterward, it is withdrawing life support. Deciding not to escalate 
treatment implies continuing treatment at its current level either because it would give no 
additional benefit or would not be needed at the time of the decision.122 Life sustaining 
technologies and treatment regimens likely to be involved in such decisions include: 1) 
mechanical ventilation, 2) artificial nutrition and/or hydration, 3) mechanical circulation, 
4) chemotherapy, 5) vasopressors, 6) renal dialysis, and 7) courses of antibiotic treatment.  
A decision to withholding or withdraw care should not be construed to involve all care 
and treatment of a particular patient, nor should it be interpreted as passive; for instance, 
withdrawal or withholding often coincides with the administration of sedatives and 
opioids for relief from pain.123 
Withholding and withdrawing life support is The ethical justification for 
withholding or withdrawing life support from a patient rest in circumstances such as a 
course of treatment so extremely difficult to maintain as to be burdensome, a great 
probability the end of life is imminent, or a substantial likelihood of severe disability 
even if the treatment is non-fatal and non-futile. Further criteria are employed but 
individual institutions and espoused by some ethicists; for instance, the University of 
Utah and Intermountain Medical Center make it part of stated policy to withdraw life 
support regardless of other considerations when: 1) a surrogate asked to have it done it, 2) 
an external standard of reasonability is fulfilled, 3) a minimal time period, allowing for 
the patient to make requests has elapsed, and 4) certain psychiatric morbidity thresholds 
have been crossed.124 
As many as a quarter of all patients admitted to the ICU die there;125 most 
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 frequently in the wake of a decision to withhold, withdraw or not escalate life-sustaining 
treatment.126 It is common that medical staff in the ICU make decisions to withhold, 
withdraw or not escalate life support.127 The Equivalence Thesis (ET) is a principle of 
ethics avowing that withholding, withdrawing, and not escalating life support treatment 
are all legally and ethically equivalent. The ET holds that it is permissible to withdraw 
medical treatment if it is also permissible to withhold the same treatment and vice versa.  
In contrast, Non-Equivalence (NE) considers it acceptable to withhold treatment while it 
would not be permissible to withdraw the same treatment once started.128 While ET has 
the endorsement of many scholars, philosophers, bioethicists, and professional 
guidelines,129 it is nonetheless controversial with numerous opponents,130 and is far from 
being the consistent practice of the medical profession.131  
One group that has resisted the Equivalence Thesis are physicians in the ICU, in 
part due to concerns over the possible legal interpretations of withdrawing something 
previously acquired and in part because it feels like a violation of non-maleficence.132 
Furthermore, some religious authorities such as Orthodox Judaism consider any 
prohibition of treatment even at the end of life as potentially causing premature death. 
The dominant position among medical professionals is based on NE even though that 
position has resulted in both absurd and unacceptable situations.133  Medical staffs have 
an inherent bias, both psychologically as human beings and as professionals towards not 
actively stopping even questionable treatment once it has begun.134 Moreover, in many 
concrete case with particular patients, specifics of the case would weigh in favor of 
NE.135  Thus, it is understandable that many medical professional are not persuaded by 
the Equivalence Thesis despite guidelines, scholarly recommendations, or even some 
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court ruling. Ironically, even resource limitations that force allocation decisions in the 
ICU often favor the NE position given the prioritization principles they follow. In the 
context of this controversy, several compromise solutions have been tried, including short 
term trial therapy with an ICU patient for whom the efficacy is questionable before 
committing to the intervention as treatment, and pre-establishing a lower mortality 
threshold for withdrawal.136  
Chapter 3.D. Maintenance of Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent 
This section of Chapter 3 describes ethical principle and issues involving respect 
for patient autonomy, and in particular for informed consent in the ICU.  At the heart of 
these considerations is the determination of a patient’s capacity, as distinguished from the 
legal concept of competence, a determination which is critical in upholding autonomy 
and informed consent in the ICU. 
Chapter 3.D.1. Respect for Patient Autonomy 
Typically, the source of ethical dilemmas concerning ICU patients lie with 
conflicts, which grow out of interpretations the four fundamental principles of bioethics: 
1) patient autonomy, 2) distributed justice, 3) beneficence, and 4) non-malfeasance as 
they apply to a given case.  For instance, a hospital’s ethics committee might have to 
weigh conflicts among these principles over whether healthcare professionals should give 
to employ lifesaving medicine and heroic treatment with its prognosis in doubt, when the 
medical staff pushes for it in spite of either contradictory expert opinion or the patient’s 
unwillingness to give consent.137 
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The policy on patient autonomy of the American Medicine Association illustrates 
how ethical issues can arise concerning principles such as full disclosure and informed 
consent.  Legally established precedent and biomedical ethics concur in the absolute right 
of a patient to refuse any form of medical care or treatment, even if is the only way to 
sustain life.  However, this position presumes the patient to be fully capable of analyzing 
the options and understanding the ramifications of any decision. In considering the issue 
from a medical perspective the concept of capacity must be distinguished from 
competency since legally all adult are presumed competent unless a court has formally 
ruled otherwise,138 while any individual under the legal age of adulthood, legally 
competency, regardless of their intelligence or maturity, except in formal court ruling of 
emancipation. On the other hand, capacity is more fluid and functionally determined, 
meaning that a given patient, due to his or her condition, may migrate in and out of 
capacity or be capable in terms of some decisions but not others. Criteria for initially 
determining a patient’s capacity include:  1) the ability to comprehend information about 
his or her condition, 2) an understanding his or her right to choose from the possible 
treatment options, as well as the right of complete refusal, and 3) an understanding of the 
risks and consequences of the available options. Beyond these fundamentals of 
comprehension, in order to have capacity, a patient must be able to assess all this medical 
information in relation to personal values, morals, and goals, so as to weigh alternative 
choices.  Ultimately, the patient must be able to communicate the decisions made, 
consistently and meaningfully.139  
Children and minors constitute a unique situation within the field of Biomedical 
ethics needs to give special consideration to issues of informed consent when children or 
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minors are the patients. A cornerstone of the ethical approach known as principlism is 
that all competent individuals have the right to choose the option that accords with their 
best interest. Obviously, in medicine, as in other fields, many children lack in the 
cognitive development to understand various aspects of their situation and, thus, cannot 
give informed consent.140 By strict definition, informed consent can only be given by the 
individual directly experiencing the consequences of the decision.  According to abstract 
ethical standards, what even a parent or guardian decides is not informed consent if it on 
behalf of a child, despite the adult having legal custody.  Thus, some scholars and 
clinicians have coined the term informed permission for such cases.  Although not 
instinctively obvious to the physician, With minor such as older adolescents, the 
physician must determine whether the patient exhibits sufficient maturity to qualify and 
be treated as an adult with respect to that minor’s capacity for making informed choices, 
and therefore needs to be treated, for bioethics purposes, as an adult.141   
From the standpoint of bioethics, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that a 
minor’s well being and best interests are carried out rests with the physician, regardless 
of parental or surrogate’s objections.  If resolution between parties looking out for the 
child cannot resolve the issue, Legal avenues exist for situations that cannot be resolved, 
for example, if a medical determination of needed treatment conflicts with a guardian’s 
religious beliefs.142  The child patient should be brought into the discussions as far as 
feasible even though his or her consent may not needed nor his or her wishes respected; 
in all cases, the child has the right to be informed to the extent of his or her ability to 
comprehend, ask questions, and to communicate his or her desires, concerns, or fears. 
Should parents insist on prohibiting a proposed treatment, the case becomes a legal 
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matter and increasingly complicated; the physician needs to look for mutually acceptable 
alternative options suitable to the child’s medical needs.143 In the absence of these, the 
physician must look to ethical or legal avenues in order to obtain permission for 
treatment.144  
Chapter 3.D.2. Respect for Informed Consent 
While the abstract principle of informed consent principle makes straightforward 
sense, in practice the concept of providing the patient with options for treatment pushes 
the medical professional towards a model of care reminiscent of a store clerk offering a 
customer models or brands of a type of product.  This model tends to neglect the role of 
the clinician’s expertise and appears to expect the doctor to stand back and follow 
whatever the patient chooses.145 Nonetheless, the patient’s having and being informed of 
all options, whenever feasible alternatives exist, as well as being free to select or reject in 
fundamental and critical to protecting the patient from unwanted interventions and 
inappropriate paternalism. While healthcare professionals are responsible for explaining 
all nursing procedures to the patient it is the patient must be the one to decide whether a 
treatment option would be more burdensome than beneficial and ultimately whether to 
reject anything as simple a pain reliever or as involved as a surgical procedure,146 
frequently the only context in which doctors habitually think about informed consent as 
an inherent part of the process.147 
Both Autonomy and informed have the patient’s competence to deliberate and 
arrive at rational decisions.148 In practice, ensuring these principles in ICU treatment is a 
complex process, rich in nuance, and inseparably linked to the conditions which have 
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brought patients to this unit of the hospital, inhibiting their cognitive recognition and 
comprehension and thus limiting what autonomy some patients can exercise. An 
additional layer of complicating the process of ensuring autonomy and informed consent 
is the narrow scope of the nursing perspective, which is restricted to ascertaining whether 
the patient actually signed the appropriate informed consent documents, and had received 
all required-to-be transmitted information prior to signing it?149 
Patients themselves may hesitate to exercise their autonomy in making choices 
out of a lack of confidence in having received or understood the medical information that 
they have indeed been given. Consequently, such a patient may view the efforts to 
preserve his or her autonomy as abandonment by those whose expertise and wisdom the 
patient has put faith in. this feeling is especially likely when healthcare professional limit 
themselves describing the various possible treatments without explaining the rationale for 
specific choices, and most important if nothing is recommended. Regardless of the 
complexity or difficulties involved, informed consent is a requirement in all medical 
circumstances, not just the ICU, and must include information about procedures and 
protocols in the event of fatality, should there be even the remotest possibility. The 
information required for legally provided informed consent include: 1) the name of the 
patient, 2) the hospital, 3) the medical procedure to be performed, 4) the names of 
medical professionals directly involved, 5) the risks of any alternative procedures and 
treatments, 6) signature of patient or guardian, 7) a statement averring that the procedures 
were explained to the patient, the signature of the patient or surrogate, and 9) the 
signature of a witness. In the ICU, as well as in any other setting, assuming the timing of 
circumstance permits having a friend or someone from whom the patient can derive 
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psychological support present during the explanations is desirable. Showing respect for 
autonomy means conveying complete and accurate information to the patient concerning 
his or her condition to the extent that the patient fully understands the medical risks, 
either consenting to the procedure and its timing, or refusing it; regardless, the patient’s 
confidentiality and privacy must be guaranteed.150  
Chapter 3.E. Conclusion 
All the previous descriptions of ethical principles in practice relate directly to 
cases of medical error, these ethical principles as affirmed explicitly by both the 
American Medical Association and the American College of Physicians require all 
medical professionals, organizations, and facilities involved to provide complete 
disclosure, including every relevant detail of errors, and to share them with all those 
involved (patients, surrogate family members, hospital, regulators, insurers). To this 
extent, both medical institutions and professionals are to hold themselves accountable for 
their actions. 
 The guidelines mentioned above are grounded in consequentialist or teleological 
theory with their concern for the outcomes of medical care, as well as by utilitarianism 
which advocates such accountability for medical errors through its concern with use of 
resources and prioritizing of delivery of the greatest good for the greatest number of 
individuals. Even though the antithesis of consequentialism, deontology and principlism 
are no less silent or adamant that autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence 
must be preserved in the face of medical errors, whatever the cause.   
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Although these ethical principles concur in terms of the need for full disclosure of 
medical errors, they remain stand in contradiction concerning their implications for 
handling many biomedical ethical dilemmas that are routine to the ICU environment, 
with the issue discussed at length above about questions concerning patient capacity for 
giving informed consent being a frequent example. Yet another of the areas in which 
ethical principles come into conflict, again as discussed at length in this chapter, is that of 
medically or psychologically futile situations such as end-of-life care, which are prone to 
arising more frequently in the ICU that in any other part of the hospital. In spite of the 
futile prognosis, a patient or family members will at times demand that every effort and 
expense be spent fighting the inevitable.  As the analysis in the chapter has revealed, 
forcing the medical staff to conduct procedures that cause them personal moral dilemmas 
about violating their consciences and professional ethical standards.  
Other ethical dilemmas discussed in this chapter include the equitable distribution 
of limited resources, particularly in the ICU, where terminal illness is a common 
situation.  In these circumstances, treating each patient in his or her best interest is just 
not possible. In the face of the impossibility of doing everything medically imaginable, 
painful decisions with fatal consequences must be made without time for extended 
consideration in terms of whom to admit to the ICU. The chapter has examined numerous 
allocation strategies such as treating everyone equally in order, favoring those in the most 
dire condition, maximizing the number helped and the extent of benefit (i.e, 
utilitarianism), or promoting and rewarding social usefulness. As the discussion has 
shown, no single principle was either predominantly acceptable or objectively fully 
ethical.  Thus, systems that integrate multiple principles go further toward satisfying 
 181 
more ethical principles, yet do so at the expense of greater complexity, which can itself 
cause frustration and dissatisfaction. Finally, the chapter has addressed the issues 
surrounding the withholding and withdrawing of life-saving treatment, actions typically 
the precursor to death in the ICU, and a source of conflict as to whether the two actions 
are ethically or legally the same. Choices such as those described in this Chapter 
constitute the daily required routine of the ICU. It is in this context that medical errors 
occur and is the context within in which they must be handled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
Endnotes
                                                        
1 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 10-12; Jeffery, Maren E., et al., “Ethical Issues in the 
Intensive Care Unit,” Pulmonary Disease 11, no. 3 (2004): 1-12. 
2 Irwin, Richard S, and James M Rippe, Irwin and Rippe's Intensive Care 
Medicine (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2008), 2339-2345. 
3 Bersten, Andrew, D., and Neil Soni, Oh’s intensive care manual (China: 
Elsevier Health Sciences. 2013), 55-57. 
4 Clark, Peter A., "Medication Errors in Family Practice, in Hospitals and after 
Discharge from the Hospital an Ethical Analysis" The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
32, no. 2 (2004): 349-57; Post, Linda Farber, et al., Handbook for Health Care Ethics 
Committees (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 192-195. 
5 Kohn, Linda T., et al., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy, 2000), 18-21. 
6 Houghton, Douglas, “End-of-life and Palliative Care” in Critical Care: 
Concepts, Role, and Practice for the Acute Care Nurse Practitioner, ed. Wychoff, Mary 
(New York, NY: Springer Pub., 2009), 459-480.  
7 Schwartz, Denise Baird, “Ethical Considerations in the Critically Ill Patient” in 
Nutrition Support for the Critically Ill Patient: A Guide to Practice, ed. Cresci, Gail 
(Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 635-652. 
8 Gohsman, Robyn, Law and Ethics (Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer Health/ 
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2009), 210-212. 
9 Dreeben, Olga, Patient Education in Rehabilitation (Sudbury, MA: Jones and 
Bartlett Publishers, 2010), 296-297. 
10 Youngberg, Barbara J., and Martin J. Hatlie, Patient Safety HandBook  
(Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning. 2004), 550-555. 
11 Joint Commission Resources, “Ethics and Disclosure Events” in Understanding 
and Preventing Sentinel and Adverse Events in Your Health Care Organization 
(Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources, 2008), 173-175; Jesus, John, et 
al., Ethical Problems in Emergency Medicine: A Discussion-based Review (Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley and Sons, 2012), 242. 
12 Youngberg, Barbara J., and Martin J. Hatlie, Patient Safety HandBook  
(Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning. 2004), 524-527. 
13 Tay, Catherine, and Sim Leng, Tien, Biomedical Ethics and Medical Law in 
Blood Transfusion Practice: Case Scenarios  (Singapore: Armour Pub., 2010),89-100. 
14 Youngberg, Barbara J., and Martin J. Hatlie, Patient Safety HandBook  
(Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning. 2004), 505-555. 
15 Lo, Bernard, Resolving Ethical Dilemmas: A Guide for Clinicians 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2012),199, 228. 
 183 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16 American College of Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics 
Manual, 6th ed. Annals of Internal Medicine, 156 no. 1 part 2 (2012): 73-104.  
17 Bernat, James L., Ethical Issues in Neurology (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 
Philadelphia, 2008), 67-69. 
18 Hendrick, Judith, Law and Ethics in Nursing and Health Care (Nelson Thornes, 
2000), 17-20; Taylor, Helen, Assessing the Nursing and Care Needs of Older Adults: A 
Patient-Centered Approach (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2005), 104-105; Holland, Stephen, 
Public Health Ethics (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), 7-10. 
19 Remington, Joseph Price, et al., Remington: The Science and Practice of 
Pharmacy (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2006), 24-26; Cronin, Brian, 
Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (Nairobi, Kenya: Consolata Institute of Philosophy 
Press, 2006), 43; Morrison, Eileen E., Health Care Ethics: Critical Issues for the 21st 
Century (Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2009), 43-45. 
20 Carlson, Erik, “Consequentialism Reconsidered” In Consequentialism 
Reconsidered (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1995), 5-10; Taylor, Helen, Assessing the 
Nursing and Care Needs of Older Adults: A Patient-Centered Approach (Radcliffe 
Medical Press, 2005), 104. 
21 Joint Commission Resources, Understanding and Preventing Sentinel and 
Adverse Events in Your Health Care Organization (Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint 
Commission Resources, 2008), 19-20; Rocker, Graeme, et al., End of Life Care in the 
ICU: From Advanced Disease to Bereavement (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), 208; Crippen, 
David, ICU resource allocation in the new millennium: Will we say “no”? (PA: Springer 
Science and Business Media, 2012), 23. 
22 Jonsen, Albert R., A Short History of Medical Ethics (Madrid: Oxford UP, 
2000), 5-8.   
23 Taylor, Helen, Assessing the Nursing and Care Needs of Older Adults: A 
Patient-Centered Approach (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2005), 105; Butts, Janie B., and 
Karen L. Rich, Nursing Ethics: Across the Curriculum and into Practice (Sudbury, MA: 
Jones and Bartlett, 2005), 93. 
24 Wilber, Charles K., Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 127-133; Taylor, Helen, Assessing the Nursing and Care 
Needs of Older Adults: A Patient-Centered Approach (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2005), 
105. 
25 Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, Deontology, Responsibility, and Equality 
(Copenhagen: Dept. of Media, Cognition and Communication, U of Copenhagen, 2005), 
15-18; Johnstone, Megan-Jane, Bioethics: A Nursing Perspective (Elsevier Health 
Sciences, 2011), 63-69. 
26 Wong, JD., and J Rabin, Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public 
Policy (Taylor & Francis, 2003), 339-340; Basford, Lynn, and Oliver Slevin, Theory and 
Practice of Nursing: An Integrated Approach to Caring Practice (Cheltenham: Nelson 
Thornes, 2003), 223-224. 
 184 
                                                                                                                                                                     
27 Johnstone, Megan-Jane, Bioethics: A Nursing Perspective (Elsevier Health 
Sciences, 2011), 63-69. Taylor, Helen, Assessing the Nursing and Care Needs of Older 
Adults: A Patient-Centered Approach (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2005), 105. 
28 Cooper, Mary Carolyn, "Principle-oriented Ethics and the Ethic of Care: A 
Creative Tension" ANS Adv Nurs Sci 14, no. 2 (1991): 22-31.  
29 Baker, Robert, The American Medical Ethics Revolution: How the AMA's Code 
of Ethics Has Transformed Physicians' Relationships to Patients, Professionals, and 
Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 115-120. 
30 Giersson, Heimir, and Margaret R. Holmgren, Ethical Theory: A Concise 
Anthology (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000), 147-150. 
31 Entwistle, Vikki A., et al., "Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of 
Clinician-patient Relationships" Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (2010): 
741-45; Schneider, Carl, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical 
Decisions (New York: Oxford University, 1998), 3-5. 
32 Bersten, Andrew, D., and Neil Soni, Oh’s intensive care manual (China: 
Elsevier Health Sciences, 2013), 55-60; Jeremias, Allen, and David L. Brown, Cardiac 
Intensive Care (Philadelphia, PA: Saunders/Elsevier, 2010), 9. 
33 Bosek, Marcia Sue DeWolf, and Teresa A. Savage, The Ethical Component of 
Nursing Education: Integrating Ethics into Clinical Experience (Philadelphia: Lippincott 
Williams and Wilkins, 2007), 21-24.  
34 Pellegrino Edmund D., and David C. Thomasma, “Limitations of Autonomy 
and Paternalism: Towards a model of beneficence” in For Patient’s Good (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 11-16. 
35 Pellegrino Edmund D., and David C. Thomasma, “Limitations of Autonomy 
and Paternalism: Towards a model of beneficence” in For Patient’s Good (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 17. 
36 Pellegrino Edmund D., and David C. Thomasma, “Limitations of Autonomy 
and Paternalism: Towards a model of beneficence” in For Patient’s Good (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 18. 
37 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 207. 
38 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 197. 
39 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 198-199. 
40 Gert, Bernard, et al., Bioethics. A Systematic Approach (New York: Oxford 
university Press, 2006), 118. 
41 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 199. 
 185 
                                                                                                                                                                     
42 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 200; Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1930), 21. 
43 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 200-201; Gill, Robin, Health Care Ethics and Christian 
Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 102-104. 
44 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 240. 
45 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 241. 
46 Beauchamp, Tom L, and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(Oxford university press, 2001), 242. 
47 Silva, Mary Cipriano, and Ruth Ludwick, "Interstate Nursing Practice and 
Regulation: Ethical Issues for the 21st Century" Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 4, 
no. 2 (1999): 
www.nursingworld.org//MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/
TableofContents/Volume41999/No2Sep1999/InterstateNursingPracticeandRegulation.as
px. Accessed December, 6, 2015. 
48 Waite, Michael, “To tell the truth: The ethical and legal implications of 
disclosure of medical errors” Health Law Journal 13,  (2005): 6-8. 
49 Silva, Mary Cipriano, and Ruth Ludwick, "Interstate Nursing Practice and 
Regulation: Ethical Issues for the 21st Century," Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 4, 
no. 2 (1999): 
www.nursingworld.org//MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/
TableofContents/Volume41999/No2Sep1999/InterstateNursingPracticeandRegulation.as
px. Accessed December, 6, 2015. 
50 Waite, Michael, “To tell the truth: The ethical and legal implications of 
disclosure of medical errors” Health Law Journal 13,  (2005): 7-9. 
51 Kalra, Jay, Medical Errors and Patient Safety: Strategies to Reduce and 
Disclose Medical Errors and Improve Patient Safety (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011),78-81; 
Waite, Michael, “To tell the truth: The ethical and legal implications of disclosure of 
medical errors,” Health Law Journal 13,  (2005): 7; Banja, John D., Medical Errors and 
Medical Narcissism (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2004), 173-176. 
52 Waite, Michael, “To tell the truth: The ethical and legal implications of 
disclosure of medical errors” Health Law Journal 13,  (2005): 7. 
53Association, American Medical, Ethical Responsibility to Study and Prevent 
Error and Harm, online: American Medical Association: http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion8121.page? Accessed December, 6, 2015. 
54 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
 186 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-223. 
55 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 223-225. 
56 Multz, Alan S., et al., "A “Closed” Medical Intensive Care Unit (Micu) 
Improves Resource Utilization When Compared with an “Open” Micu" American journal 
of respiratory and critical care medicine 157, no. 5 (1998): 1468-1473. 
57 Curtis, J. Randall, and Gordon D. Rubenfeld, Managing Death in the ICU: The 
Transition from Cure to Comfort (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 8. 
58 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-222. 
59 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-222. 
60 Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K., “A new Bioethics Framework for Facilitating better 
Decision- Making about Genetic Information” in Public Health Policy and Ethics, ed. 
Boylan, Michael (Springer Science & Business Media, 2006), 93-97. 
61 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-222. 
62 Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the 
Intensive Care Unit" Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-222. 
63 Brendel, David H., "Healing Psychiatry: A Pragmatic Approach to Bridging the 
Science/Humanism Divide" Harvard review of psychiatry 12, no. 3 (2004): 150-157; 
Luce, John M, and Douglas B White, "A History of Ethics and Law in the Intensive Care 
Unit," Critical care clinics 25, no. 1 (2009): 221-222. 
64 Fink, M. P., et al., Intensive Care Medicine in 10 Years (Berlin: Springer, 
2006), 345. 
65 Grant, Scott B., et al., “Futility and the Care of Surgical Patients: Ethical 
Dilemmas” World Journal of Surgery 38, no. 7 (2014): 1631-1637. 
66 Mohammed, Shan, and Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice 
of Medical Futility” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 292-302. 
67 Grant, Scott B., et al., “Futility and the Care of Surgical Patients: Ethical 
Dilemmas” World Journal of Surgery 38, no. 7 (2014): 1631; Mohammed, Shan, and 
Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice of Medical Futility” Nursing 
Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 292. 
68 Grant, Scott B., et al., “Futility and the Care of Surgical Patients: Ethical 
Dilemmas” World Journal of Surgery 38, no. 7 (2014): 1632. 
69 Mohammed, Shan, and Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice 
of Medical Futility” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 294. 
 187 
                                                                                                                                                                     
70 Peberdy, Mary Ann, et al., “Cardiopulmonary resuscitation of adults in the 
hospital: A report of 14,720 cardiac arrests of Cariopulmonary Resuscitation” 
Resuscitation 58, no. 3 (2003): 297-308. 
71 Mohammed, Shan, and Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice 
of Medical Futility” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 294. 
72 Ackroyd, Rajeena, et al., “Views of oncology patients, their relatives and 
oncologists on cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR): questionnaire-based study” 
Palliative Medicine 21, no. 2 (2007): 139-144. 
73 Mohammed, Shan, and Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice 
of Medical Futility” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 294-299. 
74 Harvey, Janet, “The Technological Regulation of Death: With reference to the 
technological regulation of birth” Sociology 31, no. 4 (1997): 719-735. 
75 Mohammed, Shan, and Elizabeth Peter, “Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice 
of Medical Futility” Nursing Ethics 16, no. 3 (2009): 299. 
76 Halevy, Amir, and Baruch A. Brody, “A Multi-Institution Collaborative Policy 
on Medical Futility” JAMA 276, no. 7 (1996): 571-574. 
77 Fine, Robert L. "The Texas advance directives act of 1999: politics and reality" 
In HEC Forum 13, no. 1 (2001): 59-81. 
78 Plows, C. W., et al., "Medical futility in end-of-life care-Report of the Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs." JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 281, no. 10 (1999): 937-941. 
79 Pellegrino, Edmund D., “Decision at the End-of-Life: Use and Abuse of the 
Concept of Futility,” In The Dignity of the Dying Person: Proceedings of the Fifth 
Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life, edited by Juan De Dios Vial Correa and Elio 
Sgreccia, (Vaticano: Italy: Libreria Editrice Vaticanoz, 2000), 219-241. 
80 Pellegrino, Edmund D., “Decision at the End-of-Life: Use and Abuse of the 
Concept of Futility,” In The Dignity of the Dying Person: Proceedings of the Fifth 
Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life, edited by Juan De Dios Vial Correa and Elio 
Sgreccia, (Vaticano: Italy: Libreria Editrice Vaticanoz, 2000), 219-241. 
81 Grossman, Eric, and Peter Angelos, “Futility: What Cool Hand Luke Can 
Teach the Surgical Community” World Journal of Surgery 33, no. 7 (2009): 1338-1340. 
82 Grossman, Eric, and Peter Angelos, “Futility: What Cool Hand Luke Can 
Teach the Surgical Community” World Journal of Surgery 33, no. 7 (2009): 1335. 
83 Dunn, Geoffrey P., et al., "Surgical palliative care: a resident’s 
guide" American college of surgeons. Chicago: Cuniff-Dixon Foundation (2009): 107-
132. 
84 Halevy, Amir, and Baruch A. Brody, “A multi-institution collaborative policy 
on medical futility,” JAMA 276, no. 7 (1996): 571-574. 
 188 
                                                                                                                                                                     
85 Bradley, Ciarán T., and Karen J. Brasel, “Developing guidelines that identify 
patients who would benefit from palliative care services in the surgical intensive care 
unit” Critical Care Medicine 37, no. 3 (2009): 946-950. 
86 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet, 373, no. 9661 (2009): 423-431. 
87 Fleck, Leonard M, “Just Caring: Health Care Rationing, Terminal Illness, and 
Medically Least Well Off,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 39, no. 2  (2011): 156-
171. 
88 Greene, Jan, “Who Will Get Care” Trustee 61, no 9 (2008): 8-11. 
89 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures 
2014 Highlights (2014): 1-3. Retrieved from: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf. Accessed December 14, 
2015. 
90 Zhang, Baohui, et al., “Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: 
Associations with End of Life Conversations” Archives of Internal Medicine 169, no. 5 
(2009): 480-488. 
91 Riley, Gerald F., and James D. Lubitz, “Long-Term Trends in Medicare 
Payments in the Last Year of Life,” National Institutes of Health Journal 45, no. 2 
(2010): 565-576. 
92 Emanuel, Ezekiel J., et al., “Managed Care, Hospice Use, Site of Death, and 
Medical Expenditures in the Last Year of Life” Archives of Internal Medicine 162, no. 15 
(2002): 1722-1728. 
93 Fleck, Leonard M., “Just Caring: Health Care Rationing, Terminal Illness, and 
Medically Least Well Off” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 39, no. 2  (2011): 156- 
171. 
94 Rosner, Fred, “Allocation or Misallocation of Limited Medical Resources” 
Cancer Investigation, 22, no. 5 (2004): 810-812. 
95 Gruenewald, David A., “Can Health Care Rationing Ever be Rational?” The 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 40, no. 1 (2012): 17-25; Hope, Tony John Mcmillan, 
and Elaine Hill, “Intensive Care Triage: Priority Should Be Independent of Whether 
Patients Are Already Receiving Intensive Care” Bioethics, 26, no. 5 (2012): 259-266; 
Huesch, Marco D., “One and done? Equality of opportunity and repeated access to 
scarce, indivisible medical resources” BMC Medical Ethics, 13, no. 1 (2012): 1-12; 
Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical interventions” Lancet 
373, no. 9661 (2009): 423-431. 
96 Huesch, Marco D., “One and done? Equality of opportunity and repeated access 
to scarce, indivisible medical resources” BMC Medical Ethics 13, no. 11 (2012): 1-12. 
97 Rosner, Fred, “Allocation or Misallocation of Limited Medical Resources” 
Cancer Investigation 22, no. 5 (2004): 810-812. 
 189 
                                                                                                                                                                     
98 Vawter, Dorothy, J. et al., “Dueling Ethical Frameworks for Allocating Health 
Resources” American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 4 (2010): 54-56; Kerstein, Samuel J., 
and Greg Bognar, “Complete Lives in the Balance” American Journal of Bioethics 10, 
no. 4 (2010): 37-45; Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions,” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 423-431. 
99 Hoffmaster, Barry, and Cliff Hooker, “Tragic Choices and Moral Compromise: 
The Ethics of Allocating Kidneys for Transplantation” The Milbank Quarterly 91, no. 3 
(2013): 528-557; Rosner, Fred, “Allocation or Misallocation of Limited Medical 
Resources,” Cancer Investigation 22, no. 5 (2004): 811. 
100 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 423. 
101 Hope, Tony John Mcmillan, and Elaine Hill, “Intensive Care Triage: Priority 
Should Be Independent of Whether Patients Are Already Receiving Intensive Care” 
Bioethics 26, no. 5 (2012): 259-266. 
102 Rosner, Fred, “Allocation or Misallocation of Limited Medical Resources” 
Cancer Investigation 22, no. 5 (2004): 811. 
103 Jonsen, Albert R., “Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and Health 
Care Allocation” Law, Medicine & Health Care 14, no. 3-4 (1986): 172-174. 
104 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 426-427. 
105 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 426. 
106 Emanuel, Ezekiel J., and Alan Wertheimer. "Who should get influenza vaccine 
when not all can" Public Health Ethik 1, (2010): 191. 
107 Phillips, Sally, “Current status of surge research” Academic Emergency 
Medicine 13, no. 11 (2006): 1103-1108. 
108 McGough, L  J., et al., “Which patients first? Setting priorities for 
antiretroviral therapy where resources are limited,” American Journal of Public Health 
95, no. 7 (2005): 1173-1180. 
109 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 426-427. 
110 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 425-426. 
111 Harris, John, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London, 
UK: Routledge, 2006), 90-94. 
112 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 425-426.  
113 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 426. 
 190 
                                                                                                                                                                     
114 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 425-426. 
115 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 427. 
116 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 427.  
117 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 428. 
118 Persad, Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical 
interventions” Lancet 373, no. 9661 (2009): 429. 
119 Emanuel, Ezekiel J., and Alan Wertheimer. "Who should get influenza vaccine 
when not all can" Public Health Ethik 1, (2010): 191. 
120 Rawls, John, A theory of justice (Harvard university press, 2009), 242-247; 
Nagel, Thomas, Mortal questions (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 107-113; Persad, 
Govind, et al., “Principles for allocation of scarce medical interventions” Lancet 373, no. 
9661 (2009): 430. 
121 Rosner, Fred, “Allocation or Misallocation of Limited Medical Resources” 
Cancer Investigation 22, no. 5 (2004): 811. 
122 Lautrette, Alexandre, et al., “Respective impact of no escalation of treatment, 
withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on ICU patients’ prognosis: a 
multicenter study of the Outcomerea Research Group” Intensive Care Medicine 41, no. 
10 (2015): 1763-1772. 
123 Bibler, Trevor M., “Why I No Longer Say “Withdrawal of Care” or “Life 
Sustaining Technology”” Journal of Palliative Medicine 16, no. 9 (2013): 1146-1147. 
124 Brown, Samuel M., et al., “Withdrawal of Nonfutile Life Support After 
Attempted Suicide,” The American Journal of Bioethics 13, no. 3 (2013): 3-12. 
125 Metcalfe, M. Alison, et al., “Mortality among Approximately Referred Patients 
Refused Admission to Intensive-care Units The Lancet 350, no. 9070 (1997): 7-11. 
126 Brieva, Jorge L., et al.,  “Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-sustaining 
Therapies in Intensive Care: An Australian Experience” Critical Care and Resuscitation 
11, no. 4 (2009): 266-268; Eidelman, Leonid A., et al., “Foregoing life-sustaining 
treatment in an Israeli ICU” Intensive Care Medicine 24, no. 2 (1998): 162-166; 
Prendergast, Thomas J., et al., “A national survey of end-of-life care for critically ill 
patients” American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 158, no. 4 (1998): 
1163-1167. 
127 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
127-137. 
 191 
                                                                                                                                                                     
128 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
128.  
129 Snyder, Lois, and Cathy Leffler, “Ethics Manual: Fifth Edition” Annals of 
Internal Medicine 142, no. 7 (2005): 560-582; Vincent, Jean Louis, et al., "Withholding 
and withdrawing life prolonging treatment in the intensive care unit: a current European 
perspective" Chronic respiratory disease 1, no. 2 (2004): 115-120. 
130 Sulmasy, Daniel P., and Jeremy Sugarman, “Are Withholding and 
Withdrawing Therapy Always Morally Equivalent?” Journal of Medical Ethics 20, no. 4 
(1994): 218-224. 
131 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
128. 
132 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
129. 
133 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
128. 
134 Aberegg, Scott K., et al.,  “Omission Bias and Decision Making in Pulmonary 
and Critical Care Medicine” Chest Journal 128, no. 3 (2005): 1497-1505. 
135 Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation Between 
Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care” Bioethics 28, no. 3 (2014): 
131. 
136 Vincent, Jean-Louis, “Withdrawing may be Preferable to Withholding” 
Critical Care 9, no. 3 (2005): 226-229. 
137 Maglin, Nan Bauer, and Donna Marie Perry, Final Acts: Death, Dying, and the 
Choices We Make (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2010), 221-222. Walton, Douglas 
N., Ethical Argumentation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 46-47. 
138 Crippen, David, End-of-life Communication in the ICU: A Global Perspective 
(New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 82-85. 
139 Wyszynski, Antoinette Ambrosino, and Bernard Wyszynski, Manual of 
Psychiatric Care for the Medically Ill  (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, 2008), 233-236. 
140 Rossi, Michael J. et al., “Video Informed Consent Improves Knee Arthroscopy 
Patient Comprehension” The Journal of Arthrosopic and Related Surgery 21, no. 6 
(2005): 739-743. 
141 Rossi, Michael J. et al., “Video Informed Consent Improves Knee Arthroscopy 
Patient Comprehension” The Journal of Arthrosopic and Related Surgery 21, no. 6 
(2005): 742. 
 192 
                                                                                                                                                                     
142 Schroter, Sara, et al., “Reporting Ethics Committee Approval and Patient 
Consent by Study Design in Five General Medical Journals” Journal of Medical Ethics 
32, no. 12 (2006): 718-723. 
143 Slevin, M., et al., “Volunteers or Victims: Patients views of randomized cancer 
trials” British Journal of Cancer 71, no. 6 (1995): 1270-1274. 
144 Snowdon, Claire, et al., “Making Sense of Randomization: Responses of 
Parents of Critically Ill Babies to Random Allocation of Treatment in a Clinical Trial” 
Social Science and Medicine  45, no. 9 (1997): 1337-1355. 
145 Entwistle, Vikki A., et al., "Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of 
Clinician-patient Relationships" Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (2010): 
741-745. 
146 Perrin, Kathleen Ouimet, and James McGhee. Quick look nursing: Ethics and 
conflict (Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2008), 95-101. 
147 Iyer, Patricia W., Nursing Home Litigation: Investigation and Case 
Preparation (Tucson, AZ: Lawyers & Judges Publishing, 2006), 650-652. 
148 Fitzpatrick, Joyce J., and Meredith Wallace Kazer, Encyclopedia of Nursing 
Research (New York: Springer Publishing., 2006), 297-299. 
149 Garber, Jeannie Scruggs, et al., Avoiding Common Nursing Errors 
(Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2010), 324; 
Entwistle, Vikki A., et al., "Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of Clinician-
patient Relationships" Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (2010): 741. 
150 Tweedy, James. T., Healthcare hazard control and safety management (CRC 
Press, 2005), 316- 320. 
 
193 
Chapter 4. Ethical Obligations in Terms of Honesty to Patients 
Introduction 
In medicine, virtually complete and readily accessible information about the 
status of a patient’s health history and condition is considered a prerequisite for providing 
the best care and treatment. All these characteristics, however, are vulnerable to a variety 
of human errors.  To the extent that patients and family are aware of the possibility, they 
will have expectations of the hospitals and other institutions involved.  Not only will 
these healthcare providers be expected to be forthright in taking responsibility, thorough 
in explaining the causes and consequences, and diligent in pursuing corrective or 
mitigating actions, but also to be prepared for the eventuality by having pre-established 
procedures for preventing and for handling such events when they inevitably occur. 
Among the expectations society has of individual physicians are that they will 
prioritize the treatment and care of the patient over any other aspect of conducting their 
practice, which includes the way in which they deal with medical errors. One clear 
example of this idea is the importance of properly handling the emotional impact of 
communicating to a patient the circumstances, especially the consequences, known or 
potential, of such an error.1 
In accord with the trust inherent in any physician-patient relationship and the 
ethical principle of non-maleficence, it becomes paramount that the physician not cause 
additional harm in the form of anxiety or emotional trauma.2 Both the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) explicitly 
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require completely honesty in such matters as a standard of the profession.3 Moreover, 
consensus exists that the principle of beneficence dictates full truthful disclosure of 
medical errors even to the detriment of a physician’s finances or professional reputation.4 
It goes without saying that medical errors in the ICU necessitate the physician taking 
every step that is possible, non-harmful, and potentially efficacious to remedy the damage 
done. All of this depends on complete honesty; such is the ethical standard for the 
practice of medicine in the event of any medical error. 
While professional duty in terms of communication is thus broadly construed, it 
does not mean that every fact or detail must be provided, apart from all that is directly 
related to the patient’s medical condition and treatment.5 This limitation would rule out 
sharing information that: 1) is so technical as to be confusing or worrisome, 2) would be 
too psychologically traumatic if disclosed, 3) is irrelevant or insignificant, especially if 
confusing, or 4) would be in violation of another person’s privacy or confidentiality to 
communicate.6  Even these guidelines for what to communicate and what not to are 
sufficiently imprecise as to leave doctors unsure in dealing with errors in the ICU, 
assuming the best of intent to uphold ethical standards of honesty. 
Bioethics offers another tool for physicians’ to gage whether to disclose 
information about a medical error by invoking the principle of informed consent as a 
guide; in other words, asking whether the patient would need particular details in order to 
make an informed decision concerning treatment options. Just as a patient will need to 
know what could go wrong and the potential consequences before consenting to a 
procedure, in the aftermath of a medical error, he or she would need to know what did 
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happen and the need for any new or corrective treatment, risks, consequences, and so 
forth.  Conversely, extraneous information, especially if it would confuse or unduly 
worry the patient would be omitted in disclosing an error, just as equivalent details would 
be prior to obtaining consent. Furthermore, special procedures, such as those that involve 
written acknowledgement and consent, along with plans of action and understanding of 
any elevated risk of error, injury, or death, can be applied in the same manner when 
dealing with the consequences of medical error, in the ICU or elsewhere. Applying these 
same protocols for documentation can be seen as a minimum acceptable standard for 
handling a medical error.7  
Chapter 4.A. Western Cultural Expectations in Relation to Medical Errors in the Hospital 
ICU 
This section of the chapter commences by analyzing the attitudes derived from 
Western cultures and religious beliefs, which have led to expectations of how medical 
professional should deal with the occurrence and response to medical errors, with special 
consideration of anticipated patient expectations. As these expectations feature aspects of 
disclosure and apology, the section continues with an evaluation of the barriers to full 
disclosure and the ethical principles involved. The section stresses the necessity of a 
preset disclosure process that is specific in its details and examines the key characteristics 
of such a process. Thus, the section is divided into three subsections covering; 1) western 
cultural expectations, 2) cultural competence in medical errors, and 3) a justification for 
the obligation to disclose errors.  
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Chapter 4.A.1. Cultural Expectations 
In what are termed Western societies, many factors contribute to the increased 
likelihood that a patient, as well as his or her relatives and associates will become aware 
of a mistake or medical error should it occur and, in addition, will be more motivated and 
better empowered to be proactive in addressing the situation. Furthermore, Judeo-
Christian traditions, which have historically been dominant in these societies, form a 
conceptual foundation for responding to injury such as that cause through a medical error, 
specifically the concepts of confession, repentance and forgiveness. Berlinger and Wu 
assert that, “When one misses the mark in terms of another person, Jewish and Christian 
traditions prescribe a series of concrete, reciprocal practices: confession, which includes 
disclosure and apology; repentance, which includes the actions that the person who has 
harmed another undertakes to compensate for the error; and forgiveness, through which 
the person who has been harmed signals that he or she has been adequately compensated. 
These practices may serve as a lifelong reference point for ethical conduct”.8 
Cultural expectations are built upon these Judeo-Christian traditions and, in turn, 
become the framework for creating procedures to address the occurrence of medical 
errors.9 In particular, it is anticipated that, in terms of the physician-patient relationship, 
the process of resolution consists of confession or disclosure, an expression of repentance 
in the form of apology and, ultimately, forgiveness by the patient, as well as self-
forgiveness on the part of the physicians. More specifically, following Judeo-Christian 
tradition, confession entails disclosing all relevant information and judgments about the 
situation, while repentance entails apologizing in the form of accepting responsibility and 
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expressing regret for any harm done.10 Moreover, this second step inherently involves 
actions to reverse or, if not possible, mitigate damages and to compensate the injured 
individual.11 The final step in the process, in this case between doctor and patient, is 
forgiveness, involving the offering and accepting of compensation, along with a sincere 
commitment to prevent recurrence, which formalizes the restoration of the relationship 
with the acceptance by the patient and the absolution of guilt.12 
Thoroughly understanding the assumptions, emotional reactions, and 
expectations of the affected individual is a prerequisite for developing policies and 
procedures for the disclosure and apology in the wake of medical errors, all the 
more important in the ICU because as part of a medical institution, many 
complicating factors become involved, which may diminish the focus on the injured 
patient. For example, whereas an apology made be of paramount concern to a 
patient and his or her relatives, such an apology may be tantamount to admitting 
fault, and thereby legal liability, from the institution’s (and the court’s) point of 
view.  
While the term repentance is the most overtly theological of the three 
concepts, in the context of medical errors, it indicates actions and communication, 
which represent to the patient and relatives who have been harmed that the medical 
professionals involved understand, take seriously, and regret the injury caused by 
the error, along with accepting their culpability. According to the traditions 
described here, these forms of repentance and confession, place the injured party, 
the patient, under some measure of pressure in the expectation that he or she will 
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grant forgiveness; at the same time, the apology has already given the patient an 
elevated standing in the relationship, and forgiveness restores the original 
relationship. 
Robbennolt defines the act of apologizing by stating that, “An apology is a 
statement given by one who has injured another that includes recognition of the 
error that has occurred, admits fault and takes responsibility, and communicates a 
sincere sense of regret or remorse for having caused harm. At their most complete, 
apologies may also include promises to refrain from engaging in similar conduct in 
the future and compensation for the harm that has been done”.13 Continuing her 
analysis of the process, Robbenolt cites a number of effects that an apology 
predictably exerts on its recipients through its admission of fault, sincere expression 
of remorse, and at least the implied promise to prevent any recurrence; all these 
should stimulate the impulse to forgive, in line with Judeo-Christian traditions.14 
Chapter 4.A.2. Cultural Competence in Disclosing Medical Errors 
The U.S. is increasingly becoming a culturally diverse nation.  As evidence 
of increasing diversity in the United States, the 2000 Census calculated the nation’s 
population to consist of 30% racial and ethnic minorities.15 The following, 2010, 
enumeration reported 36.3% who claimed racial or ethnic minority status. 
population rose to 36.3%; moreover, in the Western region of the country, the figure 
was as high as 47% self-identified minorities. More specifically, the states of Texas, 
California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas, as well as the District of Columbia all 
reported that those identifying as minorities actually constituted a majority of their 
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population.16 The terms shattering culture, and cultural environments of 
hyperdiversity have been coined and used in the literature to describe this 
phenomenon. This rapidly increasing heterogeneity has prompted scholars and 
bioethicist to assert the need for medical professionals to develop greater cultural 
competence, on only in the interest of providing better healthcare, but specifically to 
counter the increased risk of medical errors stemming from cross-cultural and cross-
linguistic misunderstanding.17 This potential for miscommunication either owes its 
existence to patients not comprehending the nuances of medical language, 
understanding the “culture of medicine,” or misinterpreting medical directions, or 
alternatively to biases, stereotyping, or general insensitivity on the part of medical 
professionals, which only becomes evident in non-verbal communication.18 The 
ways in which culture influences doctor-patient relationships, as well as interactions 
with healthcare workers, has prompted the Department of Health and Human 
Services to promote cultural competency and education toward achieving this 
goal.19 In contrast to this endeavor, some researchers in anthropology and related 
fields note that the effect of such education has been to create a plethora of 
stereotypic cultural identities and their expected behaviors, ignoring the and 
dynamic overlapping components of race, ethnicity, national origin, language, 
educational background, cultural affiliation.20 Consequently, these scholarly argue 
against the use of culture as a vehicle for understanding and combating the 
problems of miscommunication between healthcare professionals and their patients 
or the disparities in the quality of treatment that some of the latter group 
experience.21 For this group of scholars, individual inquiry of each patient and they 
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aspects of culture he or she chooses to embrace is more effective in preventing 
inaccurate assumptions, stereotyping, and miscommunication,22 insofar as group 
internal cultural diversity is frequently more determinative how to effectively 
communicate than are cross-cultural differences. 
 As a result of these realities, the doctor-patient relationships is currently 
examined most often in terms of its dynamic qualities and effectiveness on the level 
of the individual encounter and interaction of each medical visit. This approach 
rests on the assumption has a far more decisive role in the relationship than does the 
overall understanding that either party has of general culture attributes.23 One factor 
which contributes to this state of affairs is the broadness and abstract nature of 
culture as a concept, which encompasses everything from first language to taste in 
food or music to religion to moral and ethical values to gender role expectations to 
concepts of politeness, such as turn taking in conversation.24 Communication 
barriers in any given physician-patient relationship could be rooted in any 
combination of the aforementioned aspects of culture, as well as in others too 
numerous to list here.25 Beyond all these group components of culture, the 
communication styles and assumptions related roles and anticipated patterns of 
interaction expectations are liable to diverge between medical professional and 
patient.26 Consequently, as is quite possible between any two individuals, the 
physician is likely take a different interpretation of what has just occurred in an 
encounter, including the issues, priorities, and feasible options for treatment, as well 
as patient understanding and concerns, from that with which the patient leaves the 
encounter.  In this interaction of the two parties, a satisfactory outcome depends on, 
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but only in part on, the norms and expectations of each person’s culture.27  
The most important factors in determining the degree of success in the 
results of any doctor-patient interaction are: 1) how comfortable the patient feels 
about the encounter immediately thereafter, 2) how well the patient follows the 
doctor’s counsel and prescription for treatment, and 3) how the patient’s health 
improves within the realistic prognosis for the patient’s illness, injury, or 
infirmity.28 Another set of cultural norms and expectations that influence the quality 
of communication between doctors and their patients: 1) how the patient handles the 
unequal power dynamic with the physician; 2) how the doctor and the patient adapt 
to their differences on a temporal basis, and 3) how the two handle their distinctive 
communication styles.29 A patient who is comfortable with relationships on a closer 
to equal footing may anticipate greater interaction and reciprocity than a physician 
is prepared to give;30 on the other hand, a patient who envisions the doctor as being 
on a much higher level of status in the situation may want a significantly more 
authoritarian stance from that physician. Differences in communication style are 
also responsive to differences in status; for example, patients who see themselves on 
a footing closer to equal will tend to expect more direct spoken, two-way interaction 
with far more questions for them to answer, in contrast with those who put the 
physician on more of a metaphoric pedestal and thus will high-power distance 
patients more indirect or one-way declarative communication and spend more time 
listening.31 One result of diverging communication style between doctor and 
patients may be a reluctance by the latter to fully disclose information needed for 
accurate diagnosis and treatment;32 another may be a disinclination by the former to 
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adapt either medical explanations or the diagnosis and treatment process to the 
patient’s needs and sensibilities, in other word to culturally tailor the message. Any 
obstacle to a full, trust-based candid exchange of information, ideas, concerns, and 
preferences may prove to be the ultimate cause of medical errors.33 
Putting cultural competence in perspective, while language and other 
cultural differences can be barriers that prevent clear patient-physician 
understanding, extant research has revealed that it is principally the quality of the 
patient-physician interaction - specifically high quality communication that 
ultimately determines successful patient outcomes including the avoidance of 
medical errors caused by miscommunication Even with the current emphasis on 
promoting cultural competency, research continues to show that achieving and 
maintaining a high level of quality in the nature of each individual physician-patient 
relationship is the greatest factor in avoiding miscommunication based medical 
errors.34 The hallmark of such quality in the doctor-patient communication is 
consistently effective clarity and reciprocal understanding of the content conveyed 
in both directions.35 The prerequisites to this type of communication are consistent 
effort to build an enduring relationship founded on mutual attentiveness; diligence 
in eliciting, interpreting, and fully conveying information; understanding and 
empathy with the other’s viewpoint; communication in terms of transparent and 
understandable information; patient participation and autonomy; and adroitly 
handled, collaborative decision-making.36 Indications that a given doctor-patient 
relationship is functioning optimally would include mutually understood directions 
for treatment plans, expectations that are adaptable and appropriate to the 
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circumstances, and self-management in terms of compliance and adherence by the 
patient as called for.37 Patients experiencing long enduring or chronic infirmities, 
comorbidities, or any serious illness that requires repeated physician-patient 
encounters will necessitate effective communication due to the inherently complex 
nature of the decision-making process.38  
While the characteristics of such a doctor-patient relationship may be ideal 
in a generalized sense, various studies have indicated that many individuals on both 
sides do not feel naturally at ease with such interpersonal interaction.39 Aside from 
the personalities of these individuals, factors that have the potential to create 
barriers include differences in cultural background, in the medical setting in which 
the interaction takes place, the nature of the patient’s medical or healthcare needs, 
and increasing in modern specialized medical practice the anticipated duration of 
the relationship. Regardless of factors that can inhibit the ideal physician-patient 
relationship as it is currently envisioned, the underlying dynamic is socially and 
psychologically interactive, in contrast to older models, which were dominated by 
the doctor as knowledgeable expert and paternalistic authority.40 Under this new 
model of the relationship, the ability of the medical professional to engage in active 
listening becomes crucial,41 and, furthermore, has come to be what patients 
expect.42 Key components of active listening involve asking open-ended rather than 
yes-no, multiple option, or “one-word answer” type questions, along with 
paraphrasing and summarizing received communication, and asking follow-up 
questions for clarification, all for the purpose of confirming mutual understanding in 
situations, such as negotiating treatment options or clarifying instruction for taking 
204 
medication. At its most fundamental level, this type of relationship leads to 
considerable empathy felt and expressed by the medical professional, which is 
evident in the ability to get the patient to be forthcoming about concerns and 
feelings, the time taken to process and reflect on comments, staying with the topic 
as the patient sees it, and being attuned to the patient’s, as well as the physician’s 
own, non-verbal communication.43 On the other hand, behavior such as neglecting 
to actively listen to the patient, providing a combination of glib advice and 
reassurance, and dealing in inquiry that is compartmentalized and close-ended, as 
with that which merely elicits yes-no or multiple choice answers, tends to squelch 
deeper communication, lead to misunderstanding, and make medical errors more 
likely.44  One of the regrettable trends in modern healthcare has been the transition 
from long-term, close, interpersonal dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship 
towards care managed through casual contact or even specialists unknown to the 
patient, supported by state-of-the-art technology, but which leaves the patient 
feeling in the hands of an impersonal, uncaring entity instead of a concerned fellow 
human being.45  
Chapter 4.A.3. The Ethical Justification for the Obligation to Disclose Medical Error 
In recent years, a slow migration away from a prevalent attitude among those 
working in the medicine that medical errors are best handled by denying whenever 
possible and when not defending against any culpability has been underway. The 
direction of this attitudinal shift has been towards full disclosure on the premise that 
patient safety is paramount and that being forthright reduces the likelihood of malpractice 
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litigation.46 This shift, however, proceeds in the face of numerous obstacles, including the 
basic dysfunctionality of the healthcare system, along with specific real or potential 
cultural, psychological, legal, and economic, deterrents, making it necessary to risk 
various ramifications in fully disclosing the circumstances of a medical error.47 One 
factor spurring on this attitudinal change is realization that numbers of medical errors and 
their resulting expenses are increasing exponentially, not to mention the attendant adverse 
impact on individuals and society. This growing understanding of the problem has led to 
a realization of the need to reexamine the ethical foundations of the relationship between 
patients and the healthcare system, as well as the understanding of medical errors from 
the level of a concept on down to the specific occurrence.48 
Pioneering in the history of medical ethics in the United States Dr. Richard Cabot 
drew upon the works and ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson, C. S. Peirce, William James, 
and Josiah Royce, as he brought together theories of medical ethics in his practice at 
Massachusetts General Hospital and his teaching at Harvard Medical School.49  Cabot’s 
approach was anchored in the axiom that medical practitioners, being human, were 
inherently fallible. What follows from this, Cabot asserted, is that ethical advancement 
depends on the doctor being aware of and acknowledging responsibility, thus providing 
the foundation of moral responsibility.  Cabot saw virtue as being grounded in 
accountability, with the latter being the only mechanism driving change and improvement 
through a process of real growth through trial and error, evaluation, and revision. 
Unfortunately, the clinical practices which Cabot pioneered are in present use, much 
more so than his ethical practices.50  
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The 1969 work by Beauchamp and Childress, entitled Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, has been instrumental in spurring the modern development of this branch of ethics 
as an independent field. However, it was not until 1994, when the authors added a chapter 
specifically arguing that, for medical professionals and institutions, fully disclosing 
medical errors constitutes a moral and ethical obligation, that the healthcare community 
began to prioritize the issue.51 The core foundation of these authors’ contention, building 
on Cabot’s position, is that particular components of character form a set of qualities 
every healthcare profession must possess in order to provide effective care and treatment. 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, these traits include: 1) compassion, 2) 
discernment, 3) integrity, 4) trustworthiness, and 5) conscientiousness; moreover, they 
must be so ingrained in the personality of the medical professional that implicitly guide 
all aspects of interaction with patients. Cabot learned from experience that simply 
dressing wounds and distributing antibiotics alone was insufficient in medical practice. 
Just as Cabot was convinced that to be efficacious all treatment and healthcare must be 
fundamentally humanistic and holistic, so too Beauchamp and Childress insist that for a 
patient to recuperate, he or she must be able to trust in his or her doctor’s compassion as 
much as in the doctor’s knowledge and skills, their need and want to be assured that their 
physician is trustworthy and compassionate rather than judgmental and condemning. The 
physician must have these characteristics so internalized that the patient senses them and 
responses with trust and a level of candor that reveals all the insignificant, yet relevant 
behavioral, psychological, and emotional aspects of the patient’s perspective, which will 
in turn guide the physician toward optimal treatment.52 It goes without saying that such 
levels of trust and such a doctor-patient relationship entails full and immediate disclosure 
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of any adverse turns of event, including in particular medical errors, along with corrective 
action as soon as possible given other circumstance of the patient’s condition.  
While the bioethical standards that these authors have propounded have been in 
circulation in the field for decades, these scholars’ ideas have been slow to gain 
traction.53 Even though as early as the 1970’s a significant study of medical errors in 
California hospital admissions found errors in 4.6% of cases, the concern generated by 
this rate was strong but limited in gaining public attention.54 It took another 20 years 
before a Harvard Medical Practice Study (1984) backed up the impact of its finding of a 
3.7% rate of medical errors by judging 58% of those to have been preventable, Moreover, 
this study involved 51 hospitals throughout the state of New York and included over 
30,000 patients selected at random, all features which bolstered the significance of the 
study.55 Subsequently, research into the occurrence of medical errors became more 
frequent, and included a 1992 study of facilities in Utah and Colorado,56 which found 
that, out of errors involving 3% of admitted of which 54% were preventable, a full 5.6% 
of these errors led to fatality, Furthermore, in this study medical errors related to surgery 
errors led to permanent disability or death in 15% of cases, while fatalities from surgery 
accounted for 12.2% of all hospital deaths.57 Projecting the finding from the Utah-
Colorado study to a nationwide scale gives an estimate of 44,000 deaths in-hospital 
annually due to the consequences of medical error; estimating from the Harvard study 
would suggest well over twice that number.58 Nor is this strictly a problem in the United 
States; all developed English nations including Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, along with others such as Denmark have reported equally serious problems with 
medical errors leading to significant rates of injury and death.59 Before the decade was 
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over, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a report, entitled To Err is Human: Building 
a Safer Health System, which not only confirmed the projections of the Harvard and 
Utah-Colorado studies concerning deaths due to medical errors, but also provided dollar 
estimates of the costs of dealing with these errors at between $17 and $29 billion 
annually.60 The report judged this state of affairs to constitute a major ongoing danger to 
society and to the fields of medicine and healthcare.  In making so bold a conclusion, the 
IOM report brought widespread public attention to the problem, while revealing it to be 
systemic in nature, and pervasive in U.S. healthcare.  
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, proposals to stem the tide of 
medical errors flooded the literature of the field and included establishing procedures for 
error disclosure, removing barriers to apology, legally mandating apologies, improving 
organizational team, dismantling the culture of infallibility in the profession, enhancing 
the transparency of medical information, increasing effective communication, enforcing 
full and timely disclosure, and developing measures to enhance patient safety.61  As the 
problem of medical errors persisted despite these efforts, scholars and practitioners in the 
field came to the realization that at the core of the problem lay the tremendous, systemic 
obstacles to full disclosure. Rather than any lack of recognition or understanding of either 
the error’s occurrence or the professional ethics and duties involved, the problem 
appeared to be the lack of will, spurred in part by the natural human tendencies of 
medical professional, to make full disclosure when medical error occur. The problem was 
in fact a lack of willpower or ability to empathize with the patient’s situation, enough to 
take the ethically mandated course of action in the face of any and all complex 
ramifications or negative consequences, which inevitable arise, in other words, to act in 
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the virtuous manner that Cabot advocates.62 Fulfilling the ethical obligation to disclose 
medical error depends on the personal commitment to do what is morally right, no matter 
what consequences it entails; this type of behavior demands being proactive, honest, 
candid, and transparent.63 
Before the University of Michigan Health System (UMHS)’s policy shift 
described above regarding disclosure of medical errors, they had followed a “deny and 
defend” strategy rooted in the fear that any admission of a mistake would open the 
figurative legal floodgates of negligence, malpractice, and the ruination of their 
professional reputation.64 So institutionalized was this policy that legal counsel for the 
system admonished all doctors and medical staff against any mention of errors to 
patients, relatives, or friends regardless of the severity of the error’s consequences or 
even the lack of any harm it had caused. Thus, the UMHS community was estimated to 
have disclosed merely one fourth of all the medical errors that had occurred there, 65 even 
though statistically fewer than 2% of all errors lead to malpractice litigation and even in 
those cases, compensation, beyond restoring the patient to his or her health status prior to 
the error, has been infrequent.66 It was in fact the 1999 Institute of Medicine report which 
prompted the UMHS policy reassessment, particularly the high frequency of medical 
errors leading, often indirectly and when not dealt with, to fatality. The chief of staff at 
the time, Darrel Campbell Jr, set a goal for the institution to become the safest hospital in 
the nation.67 Campbell made the deny and defend policy his primary target, in that it was 
inimical to any effort to anticipate and forestall errors by setting up fear of legal, 
economic (both on the part of the institution and of individual employees), and 
reputational ramifications as the dominant motivational force, in turn throttling 
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communication between stakeholders seen as potential adversaries in the aftermath of a 
medical error, and ultimately actually fostering litigation by creating a climate of 
misinformation, suspicion, and predisposition to hostility.  In 2001 according to its 
reversal of policy, UMHS ceased fighting the majority of its claims all the way through 
the courts, saving that as a final resort and opting instead to work through negotiation 
toward settlement whenever possible. Under a three principle policy, which came to be 
known as the Michigan Model,68 UMHS began a system of 1) rapid, equitable 
compensation for all injury to a patient resulting from medical error; 2) medical 
restitution whenever reasonable and did not non-disruptive to other patients by distracting 
clinical caregivers; and 3) proactive efforts to learn from every medical error so as to 
reduce patient injury and avoid recurrence.69 Boothman et al. note that, through 
subsequent implementation, the model has come to include seven principles:  1) 
capturing clinical issues – problems must be known and understood before they can be 
fixed; 2) identification of medical errors – distinctions must be made between medical 
errors that deserve compensation and adverse outcomes that did not result from medical 
errors; 3) communication – clear, exhaustive, careful and compassionate listening must 
take place among caregivers, patients and families; 4) compensation – sincere, willing, 
fair, and balanced compensation must be provided for medical errors; 5) learning from 
mistakes – the occurrence of medical errors are valuable opportunities to protect future 
patients from harm; 6) measurement – exhaustive data collection is an important tool in 
providing evidence of effective action; and 7) resources – deploy defense counsel and 
others in more appropriate roles than litigation and cover-up efforts.70 
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The Michigan Model lead to major improvements in University of Michigan’s 
health system over the following twelve years, significantly changing institutional 
culture, increasing patient safety, and reducing the financial burden of defending against 
malpractice claims.  As evidence, the average rate of new claims alleging medical error 
dropped from 7.03 claims monthly per 100,000 patient encounters to 4.52; meanwhile, 
the average rate of lawsuits filed fell from 2.13 per month to 0.75, again for every 
100,000 patient encounters. As part of this same shift, interval of time between reporting 
and resolving a claim fell significantly.71 By consensus, UMHS’s greatest 
accomplishment has been the progress toward its goal of becoming the safest medical 
institution in the U.S, which has been largely due to prioritizing patient safety without 
exception. In the process, the system has overcome obstacles to disclosure from fear of 
exposure to legal action on down to the worries and psychological barriers in the minds 
of staff members, living up to fundamental principles of medical ethics, namely patient 
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice.72 
Chapter 4.B. What Patients Desire in the Wake of Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU 
This section of the Chapter is divided into two subsections, the first of which 
focuses the motivations that prompt patients’ expectations and demands, including 
identifying who or what was at fault as the primary driving force and monetary 
compensation as a secondary motivator. The remaining subsection of the Chapter 
discusses the patients’ need for medical support and how it strengthen the necessity 
of full disclosure of all medical errors. 
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Chapter 4.B.1. Motivations on the Part of Patients 
The multiplicity of potential sources of any given medical error makes it quite 
difficult first to document and report and second to explain clearly as part of the 
disclosure process. The source may be an individual, a group, a technological component, 
a system, or a procedure, and moreover may be an error of omission, something needed 
but not done, or of commission, something done that should not have been. The error 
may have occurred as the result of any or any combination of the following components 
of treatment failing to perform as intended: 1) the diagnosis, 2) knowledge of any aspect 
of the case, 3) judgment on any part of the situation, 4) any protocols followed, 5) timing 
of any part of treatment, 6) medication, 7) labeling, 8) administration of treatment such as 
an injection, 9) record keeping, 10) any medical device or technology, or even 11) the 
electrical power.73 While disclosure and corrective measure need to occur promptly, 
uncovering the sequence of events that triggered a medical error is typically, and 
especially in the ICU, a time consuming drawn out process require in-depth 
reconstruction and analysis of actions and circumstances.  Furthermore, ultimately gaps 
in medical and scientific knowledge or in the sequence of events may render 
understanding incomplete and cause or causes of the error will be unknowable.74  
Having surveyed a variety of research in the literature, Robbenolt contends 
that the primary motivation between much of the legal action in response to medical 
errors is to authoritatively determine who or what was at fault and to prevent any 
recurrence. Obviously, monetary compensation for physical injury and emotional 
trauma may well be an important secondary motivation.75 Anticipating these 
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consequences, many hospitals have already adopted policies and procedures, 
attempting to forestall formal litigation in the court through negotiated settlement 
while maintaining goodwill in the form of a reputation for acting morally and 
ethically in the face of medical errors. Ultimately, the civil court system still exists 
to ensure that patients and families have their rights protected.76 
Chapter 4.B.2. The Patient’s Need for Medical Support 
Beyond and probably before the desire or need for financial compensation, 
injured patients and their relatives are normally concerned with knowing that they 
will have medical support and a clear plan for correcting, to the fullest extent 
possible, whatever harm the error inflicted. Even when future treatment is not 
affected by the occurrence of the error and no corrective measures are needed, full 
disclosure is still the duty of attending physicians and institutions involved. 
Disclosure then becomes necessary are a matter of maintaining trust within the 
doctor-patient relationship, a basic purpose behind the ethical standards of conduct 
espoused by the American Medical Association and similar professional medical 
organizations.  According to Wolf and Hughes, the ethical implications of reporting 
and disclosing medical errors and adverse events reveal respect for patient 
autonomy and enable healthcare professionals to do their best to prevent any harm 
being done to the patient to begin with. In the case of a medical error, the ethical 
principles of fidelity, beneficence and non-maleficence, if complied with, guarantee 
that any harmful consequences will be minimized.77 
As part of the starting foundation of any physician-patient relationship with 
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any medical institution or practitioners, one expectation is that the medical 
professional bears the responsibility for the well being of the one in his or her care. 
Such a relationship assumes trust, including accurate and honest disclosure should a 
medical error occur for any reason. Whether consciously or not, the public expects 
healthcare providers to put the interest of the patient, being the one in need of 
special care, before the medical professional’s own. Despite the obvious discomfort 
in reporting medical errors, along with the fear of legal consequences, Gallagher et 
al. assert a compelling rationale, which necessitates disclosure as a prerequisite to 
complying with the ethical mandate of gaining informed consent from patients and 
their families in the context of correcting the effects of a medical error. 
Alternatively, rules of medical governing bodies and state laws are available as 
unassailable arguments reporting medical errors.78 
Chapter 4.C. The Concepts of Disclosure and Apology 
This section of Chapter 4 will outline the definitions and characteristics of the 
concepts disclosure and apology, highlighting their differences and unique features from 
the standpoint of biomedical ethics in the context medical errors, though not exclusively 
in the hospital ICU. The discussion will set the stage for analysis of the effects of 
nondisclosure versus disclosure on both patients and physicians.  
Chapter 4.C.1. Disclosure 
At its simplest, full disclosure means providing all relevant details about the 
illness or injury quick the patient suffers from along with possible and recommended 
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treatment options, prognosis under their implementation, side effects, and so forth.  In the 
case of medical errors, the same concept applies with the error as injury. In all 
circumstances, however, full disclosure is a necessary prerequisite for the patient to give 
informed consent. Between bioethical standards calling for informed consent and full 
disclosure, only under very rare circumstances, equivalent to literally lifesaving 
emergency procedures, can medical professionals justify presuming that a patient unable 
to give consent would choose to accept a particular treatment.79 Far from simply being in 
a hospital intensive care unit, in order for such consent to an emergency intervention to 
be presumed, the patient would have to be unconscious or delirious and have no surrogate 
present or available.80 The only justifiable motive for doing so would have to be that the 
sole alternative would be disability or death. Thus, as will be discussed in depth in 
subsequent section, full disclosure in the case of medical errors is virtually an absolute 
according to bio-ethical and professional standards.81 
Chapter 4.C.2. Apology 
In the context of medical errors, the concept of apology goes beyond a statement 
of regret or remorse, depending on whether the medical professional conveying bears 
responsibility for causing the error.  Rather, in this context it includes an attempt to 
clearly present the nature and circumstances leading to the error, the proposal for 
correcting its consequences and how that will be paid for, along with steps being taken to 
prevent similar occurrences and answers any unresolved questions about the error.82 
Because of the many facets in the context of an apology for a medical error, the 
communication is neither easy to plan for nor to conduct.83  Many questions surround 
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who among the medical facility’s staff is most appropriate to convey the apology; 
depending on the patient’s circumstances, equally complicated is the question of who the 
apology should be made to. Also open to debate is the timing, with possibly conflicting 
argument for immediacy versus waiting for more complete information and the 
importance of timing the revelation to minimize psychologically disturbing the patient. 
The setting and manner of communication must also be decided, and even then issues of 
administrative policy, contractual obligations with insurance providers, and the advice of 
legal counsel must be taken into consideration. Consequently, conducting an apology is 
significantly more complex than is providing full disclosure.84 
Chapter 4.C.3. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Patients and Physicians 
The following sub-section of this chapter of the dissertation considers specifically 
the negative effects of either selectively withholding relevant information or avoiding 
disclosure altogether after the occurrence of a medical error in contrast with the duty and 
the positive consequences of full disclosure. 
Chapter 4.C.3.a. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Patients  
In terms of negative reactions to discovering a medical error, researcher have 
reported typical reactions of “anger, bitterness, betrayal, a sense of humiliation, loss of 
trust, and suspicion of a cover-up” on the part of patients who have discovered 
themselves to be victims of a medical error for which the attending physician offered 
neither apology nor explanation. Patients who react this way, clearly consider full, 
detailed, and candid disclosure receiving a detailed full and open disclosure as the 
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fiduciary, not to mention moral, duty of the medical professional heading up their care 
and treatment. The attending physician, whether personally responsible for the error or 
not, is ultimately in the best position to alleviate a patient’s anxiety over real or potential 
adverse consequences and the general unknown surrounding the aftermath of the error. 
Whereas, full disclosure is liberating in that it enables the doctor to focus on more 
pressing needs, withholding information and explanations compounds problems in terms 
of patient distrust and uncooperativeness, which might hinder efforts to undo the damage 
caused by the initial error.85 
Despite these findings and the concomitant reasoning, not all withheld 
information inevitably lead to negative consequences, nor do all those who feel the 
effects of the error want to know every detail. Even outside the scope of medical errors, 
“Not all patients want to know everything about their medical care”.86 The full 
circumstances surrounding many of the afflictions patients suffer are quite complicated; 
too much information can be confusing and stressful to many individuals, requiring a 
filtering of the facts and predictions tailored to the specific patient’s desire for and ability 
to deal with the information in a psychologically healthy manner.  The ethics manual of 
the American College of Physicians Ethics acknowledges the risk of harm from over-
disclosure. Manual has recognized this negative potential. The term “therapeutic 
privilege” refers to the concept that a physician should at times stop short of full 
disclosure to the extent that providing all information is reasonably likely to cause further 
injury to the patient.87 
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Chapter 4.C.3.b. Effects of Non-Disclosure on Physicians 
The psychological dynamics on the part of physicians in particular toward 
responsibility for medical errors, such as feeling of embarrassment, remorse, or guilt 
form a major barrier to disclosure as they show up in the form of denial, concealment, 
finger pointing at others, and general refusal to accept responsibility.88 Doctors, in 
particular, have an on-going duty to follow through in treating the patient, often in the 
context of a longer term relationship, all of which is jeopardized by the error.89 Under 
these circumstances, perceived consequences easily override the call to honest integrity in 
following standards of ethical conduct.90 
In addition, medical professional at all levels fear that any misstep in disclosing 
an error could create otherwise nonexistent problems like harmful added stress on the 
patient or avoidable malpractice litigation. If these disincentive are ignored or not 
challenged, the consequence is the development of a culture of concealing medical errors, 
which will obstruct any and all efforts to avoid or reduce the further occurrence of errors. 
Once such as culture is in place, the common impulse is mutual defense whereby medical 
professionals assist colleagues by concealment and will even actively impede any attempt 
to investigate and discipline anyone responsible for the error.91  
If the question is posed hypothetically, nearly everyone in the healthcare field will 
avow, despite the costs or consequences, the necessity for full disclosure of medical 
errors, not only in order to effectively correct problems created by the error, but also to 
prevent recurrence.92 Counter to the presuppositions of those in the field, research has 
established that full disclosure can often diminish the probability that a given error will 
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lead to civil litigation. Far less surprisingly, the chance that a given medical error is 
disclosed correlates well with the extent of negative consequences and their being 
attributed to the error. This latter point goes against the expressed fears of some 
healthcare professionals who think that knowledge of the error automatically creates 
additional suffering through stress to the patient. On one hand, the above “concern” can 
be an excuse for avoiding disclosure; on the other, there do exist rare circumstances in 
which not being informed would indeed be in the best interest of the patient.93 Although 
full disclosure is no definitive protection against litigation, the discovery of any attempt 
at concealment or distortion of the facts in the case will increase the probability of a 
lawsuit, strengthen its claims, and possibly raise the demanded compensation. More fully 
rebutting the argument for concealment is the finding of multiple research studies that 
what patients primarily want in such a situation is disclosure of the error and a sincere 
apology, along with a concerted effort to reverse or mitigate the harm caused.94 To most 
physicians’ credit, some research have concluded that aside from worries of ensuing 
problems with institutional administrators, health insurance providers, and legal 
professionals, these medical professional would overcome their internal psychological 
deterrents and opt for complete disclosure and an apology rather than concealing the 
occurrence.95 
Even though physicians and hospital continue to claim the danger of 
psychological damage or incapacitation of certain patients, such concerns lack research 
based support. Furthermore, according to Edwin, it is far more preferable for patients and 
their relatives to find out about medical errors from an admission by the physicians and 
hospitals than from any other source; the author cites various studies correlating honest 
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and timely disclosure with lower levels of disturbance and stress in patients.96 Hammami, 
Attalah and Al-Qadire, report similar evidence supporting the advisability of medical 
errors being revealed by culpable physicians.97  
If a patient learns of an error from anyone other those who are responsible, he or 
she will probably have to deal with feeling of humiliation, deception, and betrayal of trust 
in addition to the trauma and uncertainty of having incomplete information. Moreover, 
this element of mistrust can lead patients and their families to suspicions of even greater 
errors being covered up, motivating them toward legal advice from those all too ready to 
initiate litigation against hospitals and physicians. According to Mazor et al, “Full 
disclosure results in a more positive response on the part of the patient or family member 
in terms of satisfaction and trust, and reduces the likelihood of changing physicians. The 
impact of disclosure on seeking legal advice varied across the error conditions; full 
disclosure reduced the likelihood of seeking legal advice in the missed allergy error 
situation, but had no detectable impact in the inadequate monitoring error situation”.98 
While the rigor and thoroughness of medical school, internship, and residency is 
legendary, one of the neglected elements of training is communication with patients, 
relatives, and other stakeholders when the subject to be discussed is difficult, for example 
in the wake of a medical error. Not only is the situation emotionally charged, but the 
causes, the consequences, and the positions and interests of the various stakeholders, such 
as colleagues and staff, institution administrators, medical societies, insurance providers, 
legal counsel, and government regulators, are not aligned and potentially at odds with 
each other. This complexity is exacerbated by the varied contextual characteristics of the 
221 
situation that must be handled in terms of communicating so that the patient is not 
confused or left with unnecessary fears and uncertainties concerning the known or 
anticipated consequences of the medical error.  The absence of training or preparation for 
such a scenario adds to the tension and the chances for compounding the problem through 
miscommunicate, the consequences of which can include ruining a career or increasing 
financial costs exponentially.99 While the majority of doctors both in practice and in 
training understand the gravity of the potential ramifications and the need to know how to 
handle the aftermath of medical errors, few if any find time to get the help to be prepared 
ahead of time.100 
Depending on the consequences and how they are handled, one medical error has 
the potential wipe out a career based on years or decades of medical training; the 
anticipation of this eventually is motivation enough to propel many into avoiding 
disclosure.  While losing one’s medical license or being assessed a major malpractice 
judgment would be the most salient repercussions, losing the trust and respect of 
colleagues, patients, and others in the healthcare community could be equally 
devastating.101  
Nonetheless, the physician, as much as any other professional, is duty-bound to 
take responsibility for his or her mistakes, their patients to be held accountable for their 
mistakes; this stems from unparalleled level of trust patients place in them, creating a 
fiduciary duty that transcends other considerations. This duty includes doing everything 
possible to minimize the emotional and psychological trauma of the error revealed,102 
which follows from the ethical principle of non-maleficence, the duty to not harm the 
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patient in any way that is avoidable.103  Both the American Medical Association (AMA) 
and the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) make the physician’s 
responsibility to be truthful with patients an explicit part of their professional standards. 
The ethical principle of beneficence further admonishes doctors to invariably act in the 
best interests of their patients’ health even to the detriment of the their own financial or 
professional best interest. This ideal has already settled the question of whether and how 
much should to be disclosed after a medical error has occurred. It is the physician’s 
responsibility to mitigate or reverse the mistake to remedy in every respect possible the 
harm that was caused by the medical error.104 
The concern over possible legal ramification, especially civil litigation, more than 
any other single factor, may impede the fulfilling of professional expectation concerning 
disclosure of medical errors.105  That fear combined with the forces of medical insurance 
concerning doctors, patients themselves, and medical care institutions, create formidable 
barriers to achieving professional standards of behavior.106 
Chapter 4.C.4. Effects of Disclosure on Physicians and Patients  
From the dominant perspective in Biomedical ethics, the disclosing of medical 
errors, in the hospital ICU as in any other care setting, is a necessity, regardless of the 
consequences to medical personnel or the facility and with few possible exceptions, to the 
patient as well. 
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Chapter 4.C.4.a. Effects of Disclosure on Physicians 
While explicitly taking an oath to do nothing that would harm the patient, medical 
students and physicians are not typically instructed that this implicitly includes the duty 
to disclose any medical errors or missteps that could result in unintended harm or 
additional injury. While both doctors and patients, along with their relatives, would 
explicitly acknowledge this ideal as an obligation if directly prompted, the full disclosure 
called for is unfortunately uncommon.107   
Full disclosure is considered to a complete acknowledgement of the occurrence of 
an error, accounting of the chronology and contributing circumstances, along with a 
thorough explanation of definite and possible consequences.  Accomplishing this task 
requires full communication between the responsible medical professional, possibly 
along with a representative of the institution and the patient, relatives, and/or proxy. In 
the broader context of biomedical ethics, patients have the right to full explanations of 
their treatment, both proposed and ongoing. This includes understandably communicated 
assessments of potential adverse outcomes, regardless of cause, and prospects for 
preventing any negative occurrences.108 Nonetheless, in general, many studies indicate 
that far too many patients remain inadequately informed of their condition and overall 
health status, even in the absence of medical errors or stays in the ICU.109 Compounding 
this problem, close to 33 percent of interns and residents at teaching hospitals say they 
had not received information specifically concerning the institution’s policies and 
procedures for handling and disclosing medical errors. Understanding what to do was 
even less widespread, with only about half of the fully licensed doctors at these same 
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institutions claiming to know how to report an error and fewer that 40 percent feeling that 
they could determine whether a particular occurrence constituted a medical error that 
needed reporting.110 
Considering how varied human beings are in their character, personality, and 
reactions to stressful situations juxtaposed with the uncertainty concerning the long-term 
effects of many medical errors and the possible disparity between a seemingly 
insignificant contributing misstep and consequences as severe as fatality, reactions to 
errors can be extreme and dramatic. These factor are inherently amplified in the context 
of the hospital ICU, where as much as in any other setting, eventual reconciliation 
between patients and relatives on one hand physicians and the institution is far from 
guaranteed regardless of how handled. Dramatic emotional responses to learning of a 
medical error can go as far as widely circulating public accusations of incompetence and 
murder, which can in turn have the significant impact of inhibiting full disclosure of 
future errors.  
As referred to previously, in disclosing an error, the medical professional must 
communicate and inform the patient and family members in a way that is optimally 
conducive to minimizing their distress and maximizing their well being. According to 
Gallagher et al, an illustrative hypothetical example could consist of an error in the 
operating room, leading to a six month instead of one week in hospital recuperation for 
the patient who must work to support his or her family.111 A disclosure statement by the 
physician worded, “I'm sorry. We made a small mistake in your care, but don't worry, 
you'll be fine in 6 months,” can be expected to have a decidedly different impact as heard 
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by the patient than would the alternative, “I'm very sorry that we made this mistake. We 
are going to do what it takes to make you better and make sure the same thing does not 
happen again”.112 Such statement though probably factually similar highlight the care 
which must be taken in handling disclosure, in order to relieve rather than compound the 
mental or psychological stress of the patient and his or her relatives who may respond in 
any number of unforeseen ways, except possibly in the unusual case in which the 
physician has a long standing relationship of mutual understanding with the patient.113  
According to Edwin, the doctor-patient relationship is inherently fiduciary by 
nature, rather than transactional, and therefore, the good faith and trust involve rely on 
candor.114 Only through such a relationship can both parties to be autonomous, non-
maleficent, beneficent and just to each other at all times.115 In addition to fiduciary 
requirements, Among others, Finkelstein et al., assert that following the standards of 
biomedical ethics in and of itself requires disclosing all pertinent aspects of an error’s 
occurrence, and not just restoration (to the extent possible) and monetary compensation. 
The simple yet fundamental ethical premise behind informed consent, that patients are 
entitled to all relevant information in making decisions about their care and treatment, by 
clear implication extends to the decisions in the wake of being victim to a medical error, 
thus mandating full disclosure.116  
Consensus is universal as to the reality and significance of professionally and 
psychologically difficult internal ramifications on physicians personally involved in 
medical errors, every bit as much as for the patients experiencing the effects of the error. 
Given this reality, substantial therapeutic benefits exist, beyond the mandates of 
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professional ethics, for doctors to disclose and admit responsibility for medical errors. 
Relieving the emotional encumbrance of carrying around the knowledge of responsibility 
compounded by concealment frees the professional to forgive him or herself and perform 
professional tasks better. Furthermore, relief comes from healing the injured doctor-
patient relationship, which being a reciprocal process requires the doctor’s full 
participation, should lead to regaining his or her sense of self-identity as a healers.117 
Admitting mistakes, whether responsible or not, promotes an understanding of the 
patient’s perspective and enables the commencement of corrective measures. Despite a 
degree of risk and even when the error has resulted in little or no injury, prompt and 
adequate disclosure has positive consequences for both the physician and the patient, 
beyond reducing further liability. 
In order to prepare physicians to transcend the psychological obstacles to 
disclosing medical errors, the process of doing so and in the broader scope handling the 
occurrence of errors needs to become a standard part of medical school curriculum. One 
factor that could assist with the many cases in which the disclosing physician, normally 
the primary attending physician, is not individually culpable, is emphasizing the 
distinction between the ‘apology expressing sympathy’ and the ‘apology admitting 
responsibility.’ Unfortunately, just as was believed true at one point in the history of the 
UMH system, some jurisdictions do legally equate any formal apology with an admission 
of liability, prompting medical institutions and their legal counsel to steer physicians 
away from disclosing at all, or at least apologizing without institutional approval. 
Obviously, the remedy to this obstacle lies in changing the legal system, which is beyond 
the scope of this discussion. In the interim, the administration of hospitals and other 
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medical facilities must actively create and foster a culture for their respective institutions 
that encourage and promotes prompt, candid disclosure of errors by medical staff, 
regardless of culpability, along with the appropriate expression of apology. Ultimately, 
identification and formal investigation of the medical error, multidisciplinary team 
involvement, in addition to appropriate communication with patients and their families, 
are all prerequisites to formal disclosure, but must also be followed up by resolution of 
the specific situation and improvement in the standards of care so as to prevent future 
occurrences.118 Regardless of the situation, if an error is not covered up entirely or 
successfully, an option which would be totally unjustifiable ethically, any subsequent 
apology will appear devoid of candor, complete disclosure, and sincerity, leaving the 
patient suspicious or dissatisfied.119  
In terms of the positive consequences of full disclosure, research indicates that it 
helps the patient to recuperate both physically and psychologically, in part by reaffirming 
the efficacy of relationship with the physician and the medical facility. This form of 
disclosure including apology demonstrates that the error has been identified and 
acknowledged, that corrective measures including compensation and counseling services 
are underway, and that steps to prevent recurrence are in the works. According to 
Berlinger and Wu, “Providing fair compensation prevents malpractice suits not only 
because patients receive adequate financial settlements, but also because maintaining a 
caregiving relationship with patients and families ‘‘diminishes the anger and desire for 
revenge that often motivates patients’ litigation”.120 
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Chapter 4.C.4.b. Effects of Disclosure on Patients  
As will be explained in detail subsequently in this chapter, procedures for 
disclosing medical errors are involved, requiring preplanning to address the needs and 
positions of the numerous stakeholders who play either direct or indirect roles in the 
event. Beyond arrangements to counteract any negative effects of the error and 
reestablish the patient’s progress toward optimal health and well being, the next step is to 
ensure that the patient is protected from any possible recurrence of the error.121 Hence, it 
is essential that all staff involved with the patient’s care are promptly apprised of the 
circumstances of the error so as to insure that it is not repeated and that all are vigilant 
concerning any negative effects of the error which may appear after some delay.122 The 
patient and those close to him or her need to receive a sincere expression of regret for the 
error, ideally from the physician in charge of the patient’s care and anyone else directly 
responsible for the occurrence. In order for the patient and those others involved to feel as 
comfortable as possible in the situation, the healthcare staff need to be sensitive as to 
when and how much emotion to express, as well as when to keep quiet and wait for 
questions.123 The disclosure needs to avoid all but the most essential Medical professional 
need to avoid technical terminology, as it can convey superiority, or lack of concern or 
empathy. 
In medicine, there is often a fine line between simply unanticipated complications 
in treatment and the medical errors that are distinguished as preventable when all is 
working as intended; however, patients and relatives may not appreciate the difference, 
given that both lead to stressful situations. To avoid exacerbating emotional stakes in the 
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situation, health care provider should avoid apologizing for that which could not have 
been prevented. Medical professionals must always show empathy is a central to 
healthcare, but must also not be perceived as confessing their culpability, unless they 
were indeed at fault.124  Such misunderstanding when clarified will tend to leave patients 
and relatives suspicious, either by the medical professional or by the patient and his or 
her relatives. 
Furthermore, the patients and family assume with good reason that the hospital is 
ethically by committed to providing any auxiliary care required by the error, including 
chaplaincy, social work, or even palliative care.  In many cases, the disclosure requires a 
both a formal (written) and a verbal apology, the former of which needs to be presented 
by the patient safety officer.  At the heart of the disclosure process in the wake of a 
medical error is the goal of maintaining or rebuilding the medical provider-patient 
relationship, as far as is feasible, given what has occurred and, in particularly the case of 
errors in the hospital ICU, the fact that family and relatives are almost always an integral 
part of that relationship.125  
A clear disconnect in perceptions exists between physician and patients in terms 
of expectations in relation to revealing medical errors. Doctors and some other medical 
professional will see errors in a more narrow scope, which exclude ‘near misses’ and 
possibly any medical errors that do not have any significant negative impact, and 
therefore will neglect to inform the patient or couch the information in very innocuous 
language.126  For the patient, however, anything that was not intended or might have 
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caused problems is an assault on his or her peace of mind, calling for explanation and 
reassurance at minimum. 
If the consequences of the medical error are significant, additional or extended 
care and treatment may prove necessary; in these cases, full disclosure aids considerably 
in preserving the patient’s trust and gaining his or her consent to the proposed 
remediative care. In the large majority of situations, the continuity of care is best for 
recuperation from the patient’s initial injury or illness.127 Typically, as family members 
communicate among themselves, any suspicions of caregivers being less than forthright 
and completely candid can easily escalate into demands for a change of doctor any 
possibly legal action, even at times against the wishes of the patient him or herself. Thus, 
it is important that the physician communicate all the particulars of how the incident 
transpired with members of the patient’s family if they are involved in any way. 
Illustrating the factors which need to be explained, Sandars and Aneez, share the 
hypothetical example of a man who receives an appendectomy instead of the operation 
for a colon infection that he was scheduled for as the result of paperwork being misfiled 
by a resident, going unnoticed by the patient’s nurse in spite the name being incorrect on 
the charts. As to be anticipated, the patient’s family were unsatisfied with anything less 
than a full explanation of what had led up to the mistake.128  
Unless attending physicians are forthright in all regards. the patient or family will 
see their perspective as being trivialized or ignored and are likely to demand or pursue 
engaging a alternate doctor to corrected the effects of the error, as well as possibly seek 
legal redress. On the other hand, if the attending physician was not the cause through 
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inexperience or incompetence, he or she is the best situated to oversee corrective 
measures. Thus, the patient and his or her family need full details in order to be assured 
especially if the case was an honest mistake in spite of due diligence or if the medical 
professional involved was not negligent. In the regrettable circumstance in which 
consequences of the medical error leave the patient unable to give informed consent, the 
patient’s designated representative will need full details in order to give permission for 
(or deny) corrective treatment. These circumstances illustrate the importance of 
maintaining trust with the patient and family, which can only happen in the context of full 
disclosure of all medical errors. In accepting responsibility, the attending physician and 
the hospital affirm their trustworthiness as prepared to do everything required both to fix 
the situation and to repair the relationship.129 
Chapter 4.D. The Gap between the Acknowledged Need for and the Incidence of 
Disclosure and Apology 
This section of the Chapter explores reasons behind the disparity between 
duty to disclose medical errors as acknowledged in theory by almost all medical 
professionals and the reality, according to best estimates, that less than a third of all 
errors are reported and dealt with openly and candidly.  Three subsections focus on 
this gap in terms of: 1) the differing perspectives of physicians and patients, 2) 
additional impediments to disclosure in hospital ICUs, and 3) obstacles to 
disclosure grounded in sources other than physicians themselves.   
Being human, all physicians make mistakes, which in medical practice are 
asserted to be “common, expected, and understandable”.130 While the majority of 
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physicians claim that patients need to be informed of any medical errors, statistic indicate 
that no more than 30% are followed by disclosure and apology.131   Probably no group 
has found this circumstance to be more frustrating than the patients who have 
experienced the effects of these errors, having discovered the fact from someone other 
than their attending physician. While such distress is entirely understandable, 
circumstances surrounding a medical error and its consequences can be extremely 
complicated, beginning with the fact that some medical errors are in no way the result of 
either negligence or conduct that was improper or unethical.132 Beyond causes, many real 
and potential medical, ethical, social, interpersonal, business, and legal ramifications 
must be anticipated and dealt with. Beyond merely the patient and medical professional 
directly involved, are potentially numerous key stakeholders in any specific case, such as 
the medical facility, the insurance provider(s), professional medical associations, the 
medical technology manufacturer, the pharmaceutical industry, as well as government 
regulators, politicians, the press, religious institutions, universities, the legal system, and 
a predominantly well-educated public in terms of the broader issue of medical errors and 
the field of healthcare.133  Any of these stakeholders can wield significant influence over 
or impinge on decisions concerning disclosure in various ways, six of which are analyzed 
briefly in the next part of the discussion.   
Chapter 4.D.1. The Gap between Physician and Patient Perspectives 
Undoubtedly, discrepancy exists between the perspectives of medical 
professionals on one hand, and patients and their families, on the other with regard to 
disclosure. If physicians come the conclusion that the risks of disclosure are greater that 
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the benefits, they will suppress the occurrence or at least certain circumstances connected 
to it, a position obviously at odds with patients’ desire for full details in every instance.  
In spite of the needs and wishes of patients to be fully current with the status of 
their conditions, when medical errors occur, full disclosure with apologies appears to 
happen no more than 30% of the time.134 Scholars and researchers point to a disconnect 
between the perceptions of physicians and patients in terms of disclosure of medical 
errors in relation to the possibilities and consequences of various projected outcomes. 
From the medical professional’s perspective, revealing mistakes and apologizing for 
them is difficult in the face of expectations of superior knowledge, skills, and expertise. 
In contrast, medical errors frequently involve complicated, interacting contributing 
factors strongly suggesting mandatory disclosure. Such disclosure is all the more difficult 
to achieve when the errors in question lead to very limited or no injury to the patient’s 
short-terms recovery or long-term wellbeing. Fein et al. assert that, “Disclosure of errors 
that have not caused significant harm or about which patients are unaware pose even 
more complex targets for intervention. These are the errors likely to inform quality-
improvement interventions because they are more common and less frequently revealed. 
Disclosure of such errors requires provider knowledge of the patient’s desire for 
information and may require disclosure of information to the institution that is not 
revealed to the patient”.135 Yet another circumstance in which exceptions are made to the 
standards involves patients who are suffering with chronic conditions and the effects of 
the error will not alter their prognosis.  Beyond these reasons for not fully disclosing 
medical errors, medical staff and physicians are prone to shielding colleagues who are 
culpable, and may even offer a justification for avoiding disclosure by claiming a conflict 
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of interest, citing the possibility of harming the wellbeing of other healthcare 
professionals.136  
Chapter 4.D.2. Obstacles to Disclosure of Errors in the ICU 
In the ICU in particular, a variety of obstacles inhibit doctors and other the staff 
from disclosing medical errors, concern over potential malpractice litigation probably 
being the most formidable among them. More fundamentally, medical training creates an 
inherent barrier in that it dealing explicitly and extensively with the avoidance of making 
mistakes, yet pays little or no attention to how to handle medical errors when they occur. 
This imbalance in turn, instills a psychological predisposition to avoid acknowledging 
errors and to see them as a personal indictment of professional competence and character, 
all of which makes it discomforting to disclose errors in the first place. As a result of all 
these disincentives, those at fault even tangentially for a medical error are more likely to 
provide an implicit, statement deflecting of any culpability, or to avoid disclosure all 
together, attempting to hide the error as an unforeseen medical complication.137   
Chapter 4.D.3. Other Institutional Barriers to Disclosure 
Barriers to fully disclosure of medical errors are not limited to the choices of 
individual medical practitioners; medical facilities and institutions normally neither foster 
nor reward efforts to identify and disclose medical errors. Moskep et al, contend that 
various structural or institutional factors, such as the high levels of patient volume and 
‘turnover,’ due to the acute, episodic characteristics what prompts the need for hospital 
care have the effect of increasing the chance of medical errors occurring while at the 
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same time reducing the likelihood that they will be identified, reported, or disclosed to 
the patient.138 Due to system, physician-related, patients related and other legal barriers, 
the gap between patients’ expectation regarding disclosure of medical errors and actual 
disclosures continues to exist.139   
Chapter 4.E. The Process for Disclosure of Medical Error in the Hospital ICU 
This section of the Chapter outlines the process which needs to be followed 
in order to prepare for and properly disclose the occurrence of, anticipated 
consequences of, and plan for dealing with a medical error in the ICU.  The first 
subsection deals with the preparations which must be made in order to prevent or 
minimize any problems that might otherwise complicate the disclosure process. The 
second subsection addresses what needs to happen during the disclosure meeting 
itself.  
There are many elements to consider in establishing a process by which 
physicians and hospitals will fully disclose medical errors by compliance with all 
principles of bioethics while minimizing additional psychological trauma to the ICU 
patient whose health has been jeopardized. The process begins with the planning of a 
face-to-face meeting including the attending physician, other involved medical 
professionals, the patient and his or her ‘supporting’ individuals. The goals of this 
meeting are to disclose the medical error if not previously known to the patient, to 
apologize, and to lay out proposed corrective treatment and compensation plans, along 
with measure to be taken to prevent any recurrence of similar errors.140  
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Chapter 4.E.1. Preparations for the Disclosure Meeting 
The first phase of the process involves preparation for meeting with the patient 
and those relatives or others affected by the error, during which phase the doctors and 
hospital authorities must make sure that various actions have been complete and 
organized.  The following tasks need to be accomplished: 1) All the relevant facts need to 
be assembled and organized; 2) These facts need to be documented, with substantiating 
independent expert medical opinion; 3) All system related contributions to the error 
should be identified and acknowledged; 4) Corrective measures already underway need 
to be documented and available for presentation; 5) Information, documentation, and 
paperwork involving liability needs to be assembled and available at the meeting; 6) 
Patient and family questions and concerns should be anticipated with answers and 
explanations prepared; 7) The wording of potentially confusing or difficult explanations 
need to be worked out so as to avoid unintended or unnecessary misunderstanding, alarm, 
or provocation; 8) Acknowledgements, apologies, and explanations need to be reviewed 
to insure that they are comprehensible for the layperson, i.e, the patient and those 
connected to him or her; 9) The previous statements must also reviewed to insure that 
they and complete, conveying full candor absent of any dissembling, prevaricating, or 
concealing information; 10) The patient’s ethnic, religious, and cultural background must 
be considered so that medical professionals involved do not take any action that would 
inadvertently offend or cause additional distress; 11) A specific contingency plan needs 
to be created if not already in place, to assure the patient of the institution’s sincere 
commitment to preventing any recurrence; and 12) All connected parties need to be 
notified of the time and place of the meeting, whether attending on not.141   
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Beyond these steps in preparation, hospital administration must support any 
physicians who are or see themselves as at fault in dealing with their feelings of 
incompetence, failure and guilt, and self deprecation, so that they are ready to handle 
their responsibilities when time for the disclosure meeting arrives.142 Certain parties not 
directly involved in the occurrence of the error need to be included, such as risk 
management experts, and leaders of relevant departments should be consulted in planning 
for the disclosure meeting, but should not attend so as to protect the patient’s 
confidentiality and privacy, as well as not to create a meeting dynamic in which the 
patient or supporters feel outnumbered by medical professionals representing the ‘other 
side’.143 On the other hand, patients should be invited to have in attendance whomever 
they feel they need for psychological and/or legal support. 
Chapter 4.E.2. The Actual Disclosure Meeting 
The second phase of the process is the meeting itself. In setting up the meeting, 
having a convenient private location away from potential interruptions and scheduling 
well in advance to allow for adequate preparations are important considerations. For 
example, while the attending physician’s making hand-to-hand (or lower arm) physical 
contact with the patient prior to the meeting may be a reassuring gesture, it must be 
carefully judged in terms of the cultural backgrounds and the emotional states of all those 
present, as it could also do considerable harm to the process if not appropriate in the 
given situation. Throughout the interaction, various considerations need to be observed, 
including: 1) keeping descriptions and explanation in terms understandable to the 
layperson, 2) keeping things focused clearly and narrow in scope concerning what went 
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wrong, 3) adapting to what the patient does and doesn’t already know, as well as to how 
much detail or background the patient wants, 4) giving the listeners time to process 
information and not confusing by overloading with detail,144 5) giving time for questions, 
clarifications, and processing implications, 6) maintaining open, i.e, both non-threatening 
and non-defensive, body language, generally engaging in appropriate non-verbal 
communication. The apology itself must be explicit, completely truthful, and indicate 
explicitly any responsible parties without vagueness or shifting of blame, as dictated by 
principles of biomedical ethics. 
 The final steps in the disclosure should be a detailed explanation of a prepared, 
proposed course of secondary corrective treatment, including how it will integrate with 
ongoing care and treatment for the patient’s underlying condition. This proposal is to be 
accompanied by financial details, specifically how any additional expenses will be 
covered (presumably not by burdening the patient).145 Alternative options may also be 
presented, which might involve obtaining second opinions from specialists or transfer to 
the care of a facility or medical professional better equipped to handle to changed 
circumstances. Finally, the physician needs to be silent, giving the patient an opportunity 
to process the information, respond, and ask questions. The meeting needs to conclude 
not with any air of finality, but rather with the sincere encouragement by the attending 
physician and institution representatives to continue meeting as necessary until all is 
resolved.146 
Chapter 4.F. Proper Notification and Documentation Processes in the Hospital ICU 
This final major section of this Chapter focuses on procedures which need to 
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be in place and implemented prior to the occurrence of a medical error so as to 
facilitate the disclosure and apology process when the inevitable error happens. 
Chapter 4.F.1. Policies and Procedures 
The success of the disclosure process described above relies on the effectiveness 
of efforts to promptly and accurately identify medical errors as they occur, as well as to 
completely document all the relevant circumstances surrounding them.  The first step to 
ensuring that this occurs is to have strong hospital or institutional policies and procedures 
in place and to have all staff familiar with them. Furthermore, the mechanisms for 
gathering the information that will reveal the errors in the first place and then collect the 
relevant data essential to analyzing the circumstances is crucial. This is necessary in order 
to pinpoint the source or sources of what went wrong, only secondarily to affix 
culpability, but first and foremost to find ways to prevent its recurrence. Nevertheless, 
certain other obstacles have to be overcome in order for the disclosure process to achieve 
it goals, one of which is that the details needed for such reports to be complete and most 
useful must come from those who were closest the specific events, decisions, and actions 
that triggered the error. These may well be medical professionals or staff who bear “at-
fault” responsibility, and they may be well aware of the fact or psychological unable to 
handle the knowledge.147 These individuals may be unwilling or unable provide the 
information required to achieve full documentation. Given that at-fault doctors or other 
staff members are not ideal sources of information concerning adverse events, hospitals, 
facilities, and institutions need to develop multiple sourced methods of medical error 
detection to either corroborate, fill in gaps, or question the objectivity or spin or less 
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prone to be reliable sources of information. Rather than isolating those whose objectivity 
might be more open to doubt, these multi-source mechanisms should serve to bring 
doctors and staff together with risk management specialists, heads of related agencies, 
and patient safety specialists, in which all function as a team to investigate, document, 
and analyze the event with an eye to making sure that no similar medical error occurs in 
the future.148 Beyond the post hoc documentation of the serious repercussions of medical 
errors, hospital staff need to watch for and keep records of ‘near misses,’ as well as actual 
errors which do not appear to have had any ill effects. Given that such incidents are not 
subject to mandatory disclosure, reporting becomes voluntary and rarely is reported if the 
reporter has something to lose by doing so. On the other hand, documentation of ‘near 
misses’ and incidents with no harmful effects helps to identify vulnerabilities which may 
be in the system and, by being pinpointed, may lead to the prevention of a more serious 
and damaging error.  This is especially true in the hospital ICU, considering the enhanced 
vulnerability of its patients.  
Chapter 4.F.2. Other Factors and Issues to Consider 
While designing a disclosure mechanism, it is also important that hospitals 
consider impact of factors like provider issues, as well as patient, error, and 
organizational culture factors. Fein et al., define provider issues to constitute how 
medical professionals see their responsibility, their fears in the aftermath of a medical 
error, and their training in how to conduct themselves in such situations. By patient 
factors, the authors mean what the patient wants to see and understand based on his or 
her desire for information, degree of sophistication regarding medical and health care, 
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and rapport with his or her primary care provider and other medical staff. Error factors, 
for these researchers, designates the degree of injury sustained specifically as the result of 
the error and whether patients and others were cognizant of its having occurred or of the 
damage done. In the findings of these authors, institutional factors consisted of a 
perceived tolerance for error and in the presence of a supportive infrastructure fostered 
disclosure.149 
Chapter 4.G. Conclusion 
The values and morals of Western and possibly the majority, if not all, of the 
world’s cultures and religious belief systems dictate that any individual or group, whose 
actions cause injury to another person or his or her property, are morally obligated to take 
responsibility and in most cases make some form of restitution.  In the field of medicine, 
including the hospital intensive care unit, this translates into an ethical responsibility to 
make full disclosure of the circumstances leading up or contributing to any medical error, 
along with a full confession and apology (to borrow Western cultural/religious 
terminology), and both a proposal for corrective or ameliorative action including 
financial compensation and plans for adjustments in policies or procedures to prevent any 
further recurrence of the same or similar errors.  All these component of full disclosure 
and apology are expected by society at large, and agree with the priorities of patients and 
their relatives or family members (especially significant in the context of the ICU) upon 
finding themselves the victims of a medical error. This latter group of individuals are 
most primarily concerned with being informed of the detail of how the error occurred, 
what the consequences are or are likely to be, how these negative effects will be managed 
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and corrected, and what is being done to prevent this from happening again to themselves 
or to anybody else. Nevertheless, in spite of the pressure of cultural norms, moral 
imperatives, ethical standards, professional codes of conduct, institutional policies, and 
legal requirements, the disincentives medical professionals experience prompting them to 
hide all or critical parts or else distort the circumstances of errors is formidable. Aside 
from feeling of guilt and shame, not the least of these forces is the fear of damage to 
professional reputation, loss of employment and legal action in terms of civil litigation.  
Regardless of the motivators to denial and defense, the consequence of failure to fully 
disclose a medical error leave the victim, in this case the ICU patient, open to further 
psychological and physical trauma, especially when the error is revealed through sources 
other than those appropriately responsible for informing. Ironically, any effort to hide 
fault or responsibility can cause the very result, the fear of which had prompted the effort 
at concealment. Any action directed away from full disclosure as described in this chapter 
leads to patient dissatisfaction, which significantly increases the likelihood of lawsuits. 
 The disclosure process in hospitals and similar institutions involve significant 
preparation as a first step, including the gathering and analyzing of all relevant 
information; documenting the same; identifying any of those among the physicians and 
medical staff bear responsibility in terms of having taken actions that directly contributed 
to the error; preparing to present the facts of the case, the apology, the plan for correcting 
or at least mitigating the effects of the error, and the steps being taken to see that such 
errors do not occur again.  The meeting itself constitutes the second step in the disclosure 
process and includes many details concerning time, place, attendees, and who is speak, 
when, and how during the meeting; all of these are specifically thought in an attempt to 
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maximize communication and understanding while minimizing discomfort and stress for 
the patient and supporters at the meeting.  However, possibly because this thorough plan 
for disclosure is most often not fully or carefully implemented, estimates of patient 
satisfaction in the aftermath of a medical error suggest that, approximately 70% of the 
time, patients and family members leave with their expectations of what would be done 
in the wake of the error unmet. This finding call for a fundamental reexamination of 
restructuring of the institutional disclosure process in the wake of medical errors, 
beginning with upgrading the notification and documentation components. 
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Chapter 5. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols in the Hospital ICU 
Introduction  
This chapter of the dissertation discusses eight key issues involved in establishing 
and implementing protocols applicable to disclosing any type of medical error that may 
occur in the intensive care unit whenever it may occur.  These eight include: 1) the scope 
and scale of the error, 2) the ethical criteria for accepting responsibility, 3) measures to 
correct the impact of the error and the prognosis for the patient, 4) strategies to manage 
anticipated risks, 5) the timing of disclosure, 6) the various stakeholders and their 
interests in the case, 7) the informal and formal acknowledgement of the error and 
apologies for it, and 8) the compensation to be offered. Used together in the planning and 
implementation of policies and procedure for the disclosure of medical errors, the issues 
described in this listing comprise a comprehensive approach which satisfies all principles 
of biomedical ethics. Each one of these points represents an issue of substantial breadth 
and depth in its scope. 
As its name suggests, the first issue in this list, the scope and scale of the error, 
involves determining breadth and depth of the various impacts of the error, whether it 
involves just one or, less frequently, multiple patients and where the consequences fall in 
the range of severity from essentially minor inconveniences all the way to irreversible 
calamities such as extreme permanent disability or even fatality. Additionally, this 
category of issues covers determinations as to: 1) whether responsibility for the medical 
error rest fully with a single individual or is shared by multiple caregivers, such as any 
combination of doctors, nurses, aides, therapists, or technicians; 2) whether the nature of 
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the error is latent or systemic; 3) whether the error in question falls into one or several 
categories of medical errors and which types of error it represents; for example, a drug 
dosage error in the ICU can also be the result of an error in communication during the 
transfer of a palliative care patient from the emergency room to the ICU; and 4) whether 
the medical error under consideration was one of omission, commission, or some 
combination of both.1 
Numerous ethical criteria exist and form a foundation for accepting responsibility 
in accord with fiduciary expectations incumbent on all medical professionals and 
healthcare institutions, given the nature of the physician-patient relationship.  These 
expectations in turn rest on the foundations of the principles of bioethics, namely non-
maleficence, beneficence, patient autonomy, and justice. Protocols have been formulated 
to guide doctors and medical facilities as to when and to what extent medical errors must 
be disclosed, as well as how to handle potential conflicts between these different ethical 
principles when their prescriptions contradict each other.2 Nevertheless, evidence from 
multiple sources corroborates the notion that, faced with the situation of being the victim 
of a medical error, patients uniformly expect full disclosure of the details surrounding the 
occurrence, regardless of how major or minor.  
Determining the scope and scale of the medical error or errors in question 
functions as a prerequisite and cornerstone for developing measures to correct the impact 
of the error, as well as for assessing the prognosis for the patient in terms of recovering 
from any negative effects of the error and their impact on the patient’s original illness or 
injury. Because it will be based or a least strongly influenced by all of the previously 
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outlined considerations, determining the anticipated risk management strategy that 
involved doctors, hospital administrators, and other stakeholders will or should adopt 
becomes an equally complex issue, in particular because it will greatly affect the timing 
of disclosure, which in turn can potentially exert a major negative impact on the patient’s 
condition including his or her vulnerability to further harm from other sources. 
One factor complicating resolution of issues arising in the wake of a medical error 
is the nature of the complex, interrelated, and sometimes contradictory interests of the 
various stakeholders in the case. Besides the patient him or herself, who by virtue of 
being in the ICU may not be capable of autonomously exercising informed consent, 
stakeholders will typically include: 1) family members, 2) surrogates empowered to make 
legally binding decisions for the patient, 3) the medical professionals involved in the 
case, both those involved with the error and those otherwise involved in caring for the 
patient, 3) the hospital itself as an institution, 4) the medical insurance providers for the 
patient, which may extend to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 5) 
the insurers for the medical professionals, facilities, and institutions involved, and 6) any 
relevant government regulators.  
From the perspective of what the patient observes, the acknowledgement of the 
error and the apology for it, along with, whatever compensation is being offered are the 
most visible and critical issues in the wake of any medical error.  A virtually unassailable 
number of patient surveys concur that the respondents are deeply interested in learning 
and expect complete answers to what happened, who was responsible, how it came about, 
and why.  The answers to these questions are every bit as important to the patient as are 
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what the consequences will be, how they will be corrected, and how similar errors will be 
prevented going forward.3 
Chapter 5.A. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Scope and Scale of the 
Medical Error in the Hospital ICU 
The planning and implementation of disclosure protocols must take into account 
the full range of severity of the potential consequences from being undetectable or having 
no effect on the prognosis of the patient’s original illness or injury through a spectrum of 
severity to permanent disability or even death. Minor medical errors are defined as those 
that may go unnoticed, produce no ill-effects, are minimally disconcerting, or cause only 
minor discomfort.4 The continuum reaches its other end with major medical errors which 
leave the patient in far worse condition with additional infirmities or disabilities, with 
chronic ailments, with life threatening conditions, or which prove to be the cause of 
death. Throughout the spectrum of effects of the medical error, the causes may fall into 
either the category of those of commission or those of omission. Errors of commission 
signify actions that are unwarranted or executed either incorrectly or in the wrong 
manner, at the wrong time or to the wrong patient, which at least potentially have 
unwanted outcomes. Conversely, errors of omission refer to those warranted actions, 
which went unexecuted and thereby lead to unwanted outcomes, whether because of 
ignorance of the need in the situation, distraction, neglect, or deliberate choice to refrain 
from taking action.5 According to such a broad point of view, any medical error disrupts 
and potential inhibits the course of treatment for the patient’s original medical problem, 
requiring additional corrective measures or adaptations in the original treatment plan. 
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Despite the extremely disruptive sound of these characterizations, a wide latitude exists 
in the degree to which a particular level of response or action is called for.6 
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections covering: 1) The 
Severity, Disruption, and Cost of Medical Errors; 2) Handoffs and Black Swan, along 
with Postoperative Handovers; and 3) Errors of Commission. 
Chapter 5.A.1. The Severity, Disruption, and Cost of Medical Errors 
The process of developing disclosure procedures needs to take into account the 
level of severity, the degree and complexity of the disruption, and costs of medical errors, 
all of which could be measured in number of ways. However, the possibly most revealing 
of measurements, that of patient outcomes, has been neglected in what body of research 
exists on the subject. Instead, the literature tends to focus on costs in terms of the more 
easily quantifiable dollar figures as they relate to the hospitals as institutions or the health 
insurance providers, and to the costs of compensation or litigation. Errors of omission, by 
their nature more difficult to quantify or even unambiguously attribute, are often ignored 
in calculations.7 One notable exception to this trend is the Institute of Medicine’s report 
from 2000, entitled To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System; it projects 
approximately 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year among patients admitted to the hospital 
from both types of errors.8 Estimating the frequency of all severity levels of medical 
errors becomes even more difficult although research based on data from 2009 came up 
with a nationwide extrapolation that one out of 4 million visits to U.S. hospitals for 
treatment of injuries that year resulted in independent medical errors, costing over a 
billion dollars. At this average rate, including medical errors of the most minor 
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consequences, each would have an average cost of nearly a thousand dollars. Moreover, 
such a statistic fails to capture the most expensive of negative effects, such as disability 
and fatality, which are inherently almost impossible to quantify with any 
precision.  Other major limitations on this study’s findings include: 1) exclusion of levels 
of care other than inpatient and outpatient at hospitals, 2) exclusion of costs of dealing 
with medical errors outside the hospital setting, 3) deliberate underestimating in the 
interest of avoiding double counting, and 4) exclusion of any estimates of costs related to 
lost work or litigation.9  
Chapter 5.A.2. Handoffs, ‘Black Swan’ Errors, and Postoperative Handovers 
Beyond formulating procedures and protocols for disclosing medical errors based 
on the severity or type of error, specific protocols are needed for errors that happen in 
environments with unique features, populations of patients, or activities, such as errors 
involving medications, hospital ICU patients, or during the transfer of patients from one 
care setting to another, which is referred to as a handoff. In each of these cases, the risk of 
medical error is significantly elevated. Specific populations of patients fitting this 
categorization would include: 1) those isolated within or outside the health care system, 
2) those with limited English proficiency, 3) those with little health literacy, patients who 
are members of 4) members of racial and ethnic minorities, and patients 5) those nearing 
the end of their lives, including residents of long-term care facilities.10 Such patients will 
have difficulty communicating and interacting with medical staff and therefore are more 
likely to fail to notice and ask about any irregularities in their care, which might indicate 
a medical error.11 
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Yet another group of special cases, are labelled “Black swan” errors, referring to 
those that don’t fit into any classification scheme for typically occurring or foreseeable 
errors. For example, A new technique or procedure for addressing a subgroup within this 
category deals with medical errors, discovered and prevented at the last moment, also 
known as  near misses or recovered medical errors.  This procedure involves four steps, 
namely surveillance, identification, interruption, and correction.12 
Unlike the structure of individuals or small group practice, physicians working for 
hospitals in the ICU unit are serving private patients function semi-independently in their 
own private practices, responsibility for medical errors within the context of a hospital 
ICU principally resides with a healthcare delivery system that is governed and operated 
by a complex of rules, protocols, procedures, contracts, regulations, machinery and 
specialized subsystems. Even if a private or primary care physician has hospital standing 
and privileges, which allows him or her to provide some of the care of a patient in the 
ICU, the reality is that a large number of other specialist and medical support personnel 
will be involved in the overall care and treatment given the complexity and bureaucracy 
of the healthcare delivery system. Even that single physician must rely on a tremendous 
amount of communication with and among a wide range of medical practitioners, for 
example anesthesiologists, neurologists, osteopathic physicians, pathologists, 
pharmacists, nurses, aides, therapists, and technicians, who arguably provide a substantial 
part of patient services. These realities make the private physician in question one 
subsystem within a complex system of connecting subsystems, all of which must 
communicate effectively if they are to prevent medical errors.13 
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The complexity of the system which any seriously ill or injured patient finds him 
or herself in makes it probable that any occurring medical error or adverse event, if not 
detected and counteracted, will be compounded by subsequent treatment lead to further 
errors or both. For instance, a considerable body of research indicates that 
communication errors occur with some frequency during postoperative handovers, as a 
patient is moved from the surgical unit of the hospital to the ICU and all the various 
components of the patient’s background and history of treatment, including the anesthesia 
administered, the surgical procedures done, medications the patient is currently taking, 
the patient’s treatment plan, and the responsible physician responsible for care.14 Among 
the various technical errors which can cause delays in accurate diagnostic and effective 
therapy are gaps in the patient’s record as transferred, faulty coordination between teams 
at each end of the handoff, the absence of essential staff member at critical periods, the 
overburdening of staff with excessive concurrent responsibilities leading to inadequate 
attention to task, and the lack of continuity in procedures between departments.15 Various 
research studies have correlated the effectiveness of postoperative handoffs to prognosis 
of patient outcomes.16 On the other hand, in spite of finding over 500 published studies, 
31 of which focused specifically on postoperative turnovers, one meta-study’s 
investigators concluded that research into the effects of such transfers is in its early stages 
and lacking in clear findings.17 Given the obviously variation in procedures and standards 
so many aspects both within and between the multidisciplinary teams involved in a 
patient’s transfer, the potential for miscommunication leading to a medical error is 
great.18 This ramifications of such circumstances are like those of a patient with 
concurrent illnesses or injuries such as bipolar disorder and drug addiction who are 
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vulnerable if their care for the several conditions is fragmented, such that the different 
treatments are contraindicated by each other and receiving both exacerbates both 
conditions.19 
Chapter 5.A.3. Errors of Commission versus Omission  
Errors of commission, by their very nature, are more obvious and consequently 
less prone to be ignored or glossed over than are error of omission. For instance, if a 
doctor misinterprets symptoms and diagnoses the wrong affliction, the treatment 
prescribed whether therapy or medication will result in a noticeably inappropriate patient 
outcome, with the significant probability of a discernable unexpected negative effect. In 
contrast, errors of omission, because they stem from inaction whether or not intentional 
may go unnoticed with their negative effects interpreted simply has the patient’s failure 
to respond to treatment.20 As a result, research into the frequency and causes of errors of 
omission is distinctly and lamentably lacking; they are, moreover, more susceptible 
targets of intentional nondisclosure. Yet another circumstance which can camouflage this 
latter type of medical error is any lack of medical knowledge or consensus of opinion 
among healthcare professionals in relation to the patient’s original condition, the 
scientific diagnosis of its symptoms, or the treatment procedures that are effective in 
dealing with it.  
While precise statistics are unavailable, it is likely that medication errors 
constitute the greatest share, possibly as much as two thirds, of medical errors of 
commission in U.S. hospitals.21 Supporting this estimation is the complexity of standard 
procedures which must be followed individually for every medication administered to 
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each patient in the hospital ICU. This five-step protocol involves: 1) prescription, 2) 
transcription, 3) preparation, 4) dispensation, and 5) administration; while seeming 
simple, each step may be subdivided into hundreds sub-procedures. Every sub-procedure 
compounds the risk error, whether by a single individual involved or through 
miscommunication between several staff members. Viewed from this perspective, it is 
remarkable that medication errors are not significantly more frequent and damaging, in 
all fairness a credit of the staff of most hospital ICUs.22 Nonetheless, the negative impact 
of any error can be especially severe in the ICU, therefore warranting a thorough 
understanding of their causes as the first step to their prevention or at least minimization. 
Using the aforementioned five-step process as a framework, one research study that 
ranked medication errors by frequency in relation to the process, revealing that the 
majority of errors happened at some point in the final step, the administration (53%) - 
followed by errors occurring prescription (17%), during preparation (14%), and lastly 
during transcription (11%).23 One contributing factor in the frequency of errors during 
administration may have occurred in relation to the process known as postoperative 
handovers.  
Chapter 5.B. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Ethical Acceptance of 
Responsibility in the Hospital ICU 
This section of Chapter 5 is broken into two major subsections; the first 
focuses on Medical Standards, while the second covers the Responsibilities of 
Physicians and Medical Providers. 
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Chapter 5.B.1. Medical Standards 
In order to fulfill the fiduciary duties which physicians and others working in 
hospitals incur by virtue of the trust which their patients place in these medical 
professionals, the disclosure protocols which medical practitioners adopt need to be 
grounded in the acceptance of responsibility as it accords with the principles of 
biomedical ethics, which in turn grows out of the traditional teachings of Judeo-Christian 
ethics concerning confession, repentance, and forgiveness. In theory, this system of ethics 
entails the notions that the medical practitioner must: 1) accept responsibility for the 
medical error, 2) disclose all the circumstances surrounding the error, as well as its 
consequences both realized and potential, 3) sincerely apologize for the error, and 4) be 
accountable for the consequences of the error.  This last point implies that the medical 
practitioner will do his or her utmost to correct or if not possible least mitigate any 
negative effects of the error, while preventing any recurrence of the same or similar 
medical errors.24 All the following professional medical institutions have explicitly 
endorsed these principles as the cornerstone of the medical standards which they 
promulgate- the American Medical Association (AMA), American Nurses Association 
(ANA), American College of Physicians (ACP), the American College of Emergency 
Physicians (ACEP) and the National Medical Association (NMA) – It should be noted 
that this group constitutes the majority of most respected organizations of medical 
professionals in the United State; moreover their memberships include the large majority 
of medical professional current working in the field of health and medicine.  These 
behavior guidelines and expectations are in complete harmony with the fundamental 
ethical principles universally acknowledged in the field of bioethics as pertaining to all 
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the physician-patient relationships, namely non-maleficence, beneficence, patient 
autonomy, and justice. 
While, for medical professionals, following these standards is a fundamentally a 
matter of what is owed to the patient, it is equally beneficial to the medical professional, 
who thereby is able to experience an absolution of guilt which allows one to begin the 
process of self-forgiveness and thereby enables the medical professional to continued 
effectively delivering medical care and treatment to the injured patient, as well as to 
subsequent patients.25 Arguably, this process promotes psychologically healthier attitudes 
toward medical care, specifically attitudes more in tune with the realities of an imprecise 
field, in which errors are ultimately inevitable, even predictable. In the final analysis, 
such realistic perspectives promote increased trust as a strengthening foundation of the 
physician-patient relationship and ultimately more effective care, treatment, and ideally 
recuperation. Contrary to the fears which inhibit some in the profession from following 
these principles, their practice can lead to a less adversarial relationship in the wake of a 
medical error and actually reduce the propensity to engage in malpractice litigation, 
which would have the predictable consequence of reductions in the costs of medical 
liability insurance and of overall medical treatment in the long run. Other positive results 
from medical practitioners’ accepting their ethical responsibility as describe here include: 
1) an increased degree of patient safety; 2) significant progress toward reducing the 
incidence of medical errors, both individually triggered and systemic; 3) improved 
monitoring of active failures, enabling targeted efforts to prevent recurrence; 4) the 
revealing of latent or inherent risks for medical errors within the healthcare delivery 
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system; and 5) a psychologically healthier set of attitudes within medical culture, 
fostering appropriate handling of expected medical errors.26 
Chapter 5.B.2. Physician and Medical Provider Responsibilities 
Considerable evidence exists to support the assertion that the majority of 
physicians are reluctant to operate according to these standards of medical conduct when 
faced with an actual medical error situation.27 Reasons for such attitudes and behavior 
include the obvious concerns, including: 1) triggering malpractice lawsuits; 2) incurring 
some form of punishment, even as severe as incarceration; 3) losing one's professional 
reputation, one's hospital privileges, or even one's licensure; 4) as a result of any of the 
previous eventualities, losing one's livelihood; 5) being made the 'scapegoat' by being 
held responsible for a medical errors the ultimate cause of which was primarily systemic 
or cumulative due to the inherent inter-connectivity of complicated delivery of multi-
disciplinary medicine; 6) feelings guilty over having harmed a patient; 7) being 
ambivalent about the degree of severity of the error and whether the details should be 
reported; and 8) being shamed by an unforgiving culture which holds unrealistic 
expectations of perfection and omnipotence on the part of medicine and its 
practitioners.28  With all these inhibitory factors, it should be of little surprise to discover 
that while 70 to 80% of physicians pay lip service to the need for full disclosure of 
medical errors, merely an estimated 24 to 54% actually do so when the occasion presents 
itself.29 
In reality, it is not just the physicians who are reluctant.  Beyond the imposing list 
of factors causing doctors reluctance to fully disclose the errors they discover, a very 
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significant number of hospitals and other healthcare facilities have administrations and 
institutional cultures which are ill prepared and equipped to monitor for, investigate, 
handle, or reward and promote the reporting of medical errors.30 More egregious still, a 
very significant number of institutions even actively discourage the identifying and 
disclosing of errors.  
This reluctance on the part of the medical establishment stands in complete 
contrast to the attitudes of patients themselves, their relatives, and advocates, all of whom 
generally expect full disclosure and official reporting of errors, regardless of severity of 
consequences, candidly and descriptively with complete transparency. Among concurring 
research findings, one health maintenance organization (HMO) based in New England 
recently polled residents concerning hypothetical cases of medical error and found that 
91% of those whom they surveyed felt that each and every one should be disclosed, even 
if it never caused any injury or harm.31 In a similar study, a mere 12% considered it 
acceptable to neglect or intentionally avoid disclosing a medical error to the affected 
patient even when the error had no effect on the patient's health.32 In related studies, this 
predominant opinion has been substantiated using focus groups. This position is 
unanimously and unequivocally insisted upon in biomedical ethics and through 
professional codes of conduct; full disclosure of major medical errors is obligatory, given 
the potential, if not already realized, danger these errors patients, the consequences of 
which can range as severe as fatality or if not, at minimum, serious physical or 
psychological injury. Harm of this significance demands immediate corrective, 
preventative, or mitigating action in response. This the minimum effort that society will 
morally tolerate, and to do so effectively requires full disclosure.33 
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This disparity between what medical standards and bioethics demand, for which 
physicians pledge support on one hand and what physicians actually think and do on the 
other hand, along with the contrast between the doctors' thinking and that of patients and 
other affected by the error, causes great difficulty; specifically, it complicates and hinders 
any effort to establish disclosure protocols which deal appropriately with the ethical duty 
to accept responsibility. An understanding and acceptance of these ethical standards is 
apparently controlling the survey responses of medical providers when situations are 
described hypothetically in more abstract terms, but not so when questions are put into 
contexts of individual cases and elaborated in terms that presuppose personal 
involvement in the situation. Research has demonstrated that doctors and other medical 
professionals when asked about what should be done, their responses will exhibit a clear 
belief in and unqualified ethical acceptance of responsibility. On the other hand, the very 
physicians and medical providers, who responded as described above, will shift to 
hesitant, highly qualified, or even blatantly contradictory evaluations of their duties to 
disclosure, in the face of legal, cultural, and other practical considerations, especially 
when they perceived themselves to be involved in the situation.34  For instance, according 
to the “Principles of Medical Ethics” of the American Medical Association, all medical 
professionals must exhibit unflinching trustworthiness in every aspect of professional 
interactions with patients.35 The American College of Emergency Physicians, in its 
“Code of Ethics for Emergency Physicians,” demands the same standard of absolute 
truthfulness.36 The same standards are asserted, without stated or implied exception, by 
the American Nurses Association, the American College of Physicians, and the National 
Medical Association. On the other hand, when considering the When the concrete details 
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and circumstances of a particular scenario are introduced, however, numerous medical 
providers begin to disagree over what limits exist in their duty to be completely truthful. 
The distinction between dealing with the patient’s medical status and treatment plan and 
the personal relationship as human beings is a boundary that has become blurred, partly 
by trends toward good medical practice, in the modern physician-patient relationship.37 
Nonetheless, the rightful complexity of this relationship complicates the development of 
medical error disclosure protocols, in as much as these the relationships can vary 
significantly in character.38 Beyond these considerations, inherent limitations exist in 
communicating technical minutia and professionally significant nuances in information 
concerning the medical error that are not describable in language the patient can grasp, if 
only because he or she lacks the medical training to interpret the ideas.39 Even after these 
distinctions are delineated, many issues of interpretation and evaluation of specific, ‘real,’ 
cases remain to be resolved. Consequently, establishing an implementable disclosure 
protocol in practice requires careful attention to illuminating and considering the 
specifics of each individual case as part of arriving at decisions of how to proceed. 
A possible solution to the challenge of achieving more detail in carrying out 
disclosure protocols is to incorporate the legal definition of informed consent, which 
dictates the presentation of all information whether positive or negative, including the 
occurrence of a medical error by physicians so that the patient or his or her representative 
can make reasoned and informed decisions about treatment options that might fix or 
counter the effects of the error. Another possibility for ensuring more frequent and 
complete disclosure in practice would be for the protocol to explicitly stipulate scenarios 
necessitating detailed disclosure in terms concrete enough not to be open to 
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interpretation. For instance, disclosure to patients to be part of this mandate could include 
any accidental error that has a high likelihood of compromising the patient’s safety in the 
future, which would require full, detailed disclosure. Similarly, any error that necessitates 
adjustment to the patient’s original treatment plan would qualify for required disclosure 
on the grounds of preserving informed consent. By contrast certain types of errors the 
disclosure of which might remain optional could include those latent or potential errors 
that were discovered and prevented before they had caused any harm, as well as errors 
that have a more than a 50% chance of occurring and are thus the subject of assiduous 
monitoring.  More rare and debatable in the interpretation of when to use its rationale 
would the choice not to disclose errors to an excessively excitable or worrying patient if 
the stress related damage from knowledge of the error would significantly exceed any 
damage that the error itself has caused. Other concrete grounds might be set for delaying 
disclosure, such as when a patient is being prepared for imminent surgery, or the health 
care organization is under legal investigation, or the institution is ordered to refrain from 
doing so during the process of litigation, or the cause of the error is not yet known and 
investigation is underway.40 
Chapter 5.C. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on Type of Information  
 This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which 
will discuss respectively: 1) Better Communication, 2) Communicative 
Competency, and 3) Barriers to Communication  
Patient outcome, as opposed to accuracy in conveying all the complexities of the 
situation, must be the principal focus when formulating procedures or protocols and 
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overseeing their implementation in communicating with affected parties in the wake of a 
medical error.41 Disclosure of the error and its consequences needs to be guided by three 
major considerations: 1) the patient and any other involved layperson must be able to 
fully understand grammar and vocabulary of the language used by medical professionals 
at all points in the communications process; 2) the focus of the explanation should 
consistently be on the impact of the medical error, in particular any negative effects, 
damage, or risks incurred as opposed to an ‘cut-and-dry’ iteration of the antecedents, 
events leading up to, and characteristics of the error; and 3) the patient must receive a 
clear and thorough explanation of steps being taken to mitigate any negative impact, real 
or potential, options for correcting any damages that have ensued or may develop in the 
future, together with their prognosis for success.42 
Chapter 5.C.1. Better Communication 
There is research which demonstrates that an ongoing supportive attitude 
promoting patient autonomy in the ICU to the maximum extent possible in conjunction 
with concerted efforts toward facilitating communication between physicians and 
medical staff on one side and patients, surrogates, and family members on the other can 
and has fostered a collaboration in shared decision-making.43 This model envisions the 
doctor, the patient, and involved relatives or surrogates discussing and identifying the 
values, goals and priorities of the patient and family. Subsequent to this meeting as a 
consensus is achieved as to these general guiding consideration, the physician will 
explain the patient’s prognosis and will present options and recommendations how to 
move forward with treatment based on the evidence at hand concerning the patient’s 
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condition.44 Studies have further revealed that this collaborative decision-making model 
can be especially effective and advantageous in case no advanced directive exists, there is 
no proxy for healthcare, or medical certainty or clarity as to the clinical status of the 
patient is limited.45 
In meetings such as these between medical professionals and family or surrogates, 
at which the patient is unable to independently and constructively participate as is 
common in the hospital ICU setting, the patient’s prognosis becomes critical information. 
After it has been presented, it becomes important in the course of the conversation that 
time is allocated for dispelling any confusion or uncertainty, as well as for potential 
psychological, logistical, or emotional reactions, and any form of bereavement that can 
be anticipated.46 Depending on the ramifications of the medical error, consideration of 
any number of life-support therapies (LSTs), issues, or decisions, such as palliative, 
hospice, or end-of-life care, possibly focusing on a priority to manage pain or undesirable 
symptoms. Concurrently, withdrawal options such as do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders 
need to be addresses, along with the natural feelings many surrogates are prone to 
expressing concerning their doubt or reluctance to accept the accuracy of doctor’s 
prognosis; under these circumstances, the time to reconcile with the inevitable and the 
option of being able to decide for oneself will ultimately be appreciated.47 Studies have 
also shown a correlation between communication improvements between physicians and 
surrogates and improvement in clinical outcomes which include. According to a variety 
of research, the results of the enhanced communication envisioned with this model 
include: 1) ICU stays of shorter duration, 2) increased in referrals for hospice care and 
support, 3) earlier and less agonizing decisions concerning DNR orders and withdrawal 
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of other LSTs, and ultimately 4) a lowering of the frequency and incidence of medical 
errors.48 
Chapter 5.C.2. Communicative Competency 
Possibly one of the most indispensable facilitators of improved patient outcomes 
is increasing the level of doctors’ communicative competency in the following three 
areas: 1) expressing empathy, 2) sharing the patient’s prognosis with all involved parties, 
and 3) aligning the shared decision-making model with the habitual and preferred 
communicative norms and preferences, especially in terms of the pacing of interaction 
and communication.49 An established correlation exists in the research literature between 
empathy as expressed by the medical professional and the comfort level of both patients 
and family members. In particular, the physician’s acknowledging the family’s stress, 
difficulties in arriving at momentous decisions, and fears over the impending death of a 
loved one.50 This diverges significantly from historical precedent, according to which 
doctors actively restrained themselves from even appearing to become involved in the 
patterns of elevated emotion and levels of stress, which patients and relatives were 
experiencing.51 In the past, only in unusual circumstances did doctors into the family’s 
readiness much less willingness to discuss candidly the patient’s prognosis, let alone 
decisions concerning the employing versus withholding or withdrawing of life-support 
options in the ICU.52 Even today, many physicians are dubious about frank discussions of 
the uncertainties of prognosis, fearing that a realistic understanding of the lack of 
certainty will contribute to excessive stress and crush any hope the patient’s family has.53 
Research has demonstrated that contrary to these misgivings, relatives of patients report 
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more positive attitudes, i.e, are more optimistic when they feel they are receiving accurate 
information and candid appraisals even though that candor reveals how much is unknown 
or unknowable.54 A reason for this admittedly counterintuitive situation may lie in the 
time that a realistic assessment of the uncertainty gives psychologically preparing for the 
inevitability of the patient’s demise. Whatever the mechanism, family members, relatives, 
and surrogates reject the notion of concealing either the negativity or the uncertainty of 
the prognosis as ultimately causing greater stress and possibly unwarranted or false 
hopes, which will prove to be such in the end. Moreover, the individuals responding to 
the research investigation were clear that they did not expect omniscience or infallibility 
from physicians in charge of the case.55 
 With the frequency of cases in which the patient as an individual is not capable of 
personal exercising autonomy, the focus of decision making in the hospital ICU has in 
recent years migrated toward the model of shared or collaborative decision-making 
between physicians and the principal stakeholders, such as next of kin or surrogates.56 
Research findings would indicate that disclosure protocols should be grounded in the 
goals of determining optimal outcomes for the patient and corrective measures to achieve 
these outcomes, rather than dwelling on the antecedents of the error and causes of the 
current negative impact or the details of ameliorating procedures and implementation.57 
As enumerated above, the three principles of communication that need to guide 
disclosure are: 1) layperson-friendly terminology, 2) a focus of consequences in terms of 
risks or negative impacts, rather than simply a description of the error and its antecedents, 
and 3) a clear elaboration of options for correcting, mitigating, and preventing further 
negative consequences.58 Though far easier to describe than to implement, these 
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principles form a foundation for physicians and patients, along with other interested 
parties to agree upon an efficacious course of action for dealing with the ramifications of 
the error without getting bogged down in the complexities of detail.  
One of the inherent obstacles to this approach is the diversity of background 
which the different interested parties bring to the process in terms of motivations and 
interests, education and understanding of the medical aspects of the situation, perceptions 
and concerns, as well as stress levels and emotional states. Furthermore, any lack of 
preparation for such eventualities, such as advanced directives or powers of attorney will 
complicate the task of decision-making. In order for such communication processes to be 
effective, parties on all sides need to utilize the following interpersonal, problem solving 
skills: 1) openness and flexibility in exploring a variety of options, 2) willingness to 
maintain a sense of compatibility and cohesion while discussing and deliberating over 
options, 3) the basic willingness to actively listen to other points of view, 4) the ability to 
withhold premature judgment.  Aside from the lack of these skills among the participants, 
potentially working against these requirements for effective deliberation are: 1) the need 
for taking immediate action and consequently rapid decision making decisions rapidly if 
not instantaneously, 2) the elevated levels of tension and anxiety, exacerbated by the high 
levels of uncertainty, and 3) the high levels of drama and urgency emanating from the 
ICU environment itself. Moreover, some aspects of the discussion are inherently complex 
and difficult to communicate, such as how a prognosis was formulated, has been 
quantified and qualified, has evolved for significantly and radically altered over time, as 
well as how and why uncertainties have arisen or evaporated.  Given that making 
decisions, setting goals, and clarifying expectations are inextricably intertwined, the 
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assumptions by all parties underlying the communications process can be the source of 
obstacles and areas of potential conflict between the medical staff and the patient’s 
family members in particular.59 
Chapter 5.C.3. Barriers to Communication 
A considerable variety of obstacles at a number of different levels together form a 
series of barriers, each individually functioning to inhibit effective communication. For 
instance, the population of those residing in the U. S. continues to include a significant 
portion of potential patients who do not have the functional fluency to understand spoken, 
and something even written English, especially its idioms, making language a major 
barrier in all facets of negotiating the healthcare system.60 Even for the native speaker of 
English, communication can be opaque as medical practitioners, like all specialized 
professionals speak a “language of the field” all of their own, with frequently used 
terminology and jargon that is poorly understood if at all by the educated layperson, let 
alone those whose education is not as advanced.  Numerous terms consistently used 
within the ICU can cloud physician-layperson communication, thus impairing the 
decision making and treatment process, including abbreviations and terms such as DNR, 
AD, CPR, and intubation.61 Moreover, superficially comprehensible phrases such as poor 
prognosis, unlikely to work, withdrawal of care or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
can be imprecise, context dependent, or misleading, easily confusing or even causing 
unwarranted anxiety for the layperson.62 Some euphemisms such as letting nature take its 
course or do everything may so context dependent or used differently by different 
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professionals that even the medical practitioners themselves are vulnerable to 
misinterpreting the precise intent being conveyed.63 
Beyond language and vocabulary in the strictest sense, cultural and religious 
differences may also play a role with concepts such as patient autonomy that is not 
practiced in many countries that depend on relatives to make decisions of the patient or 
the patriarchal dictates of medical practitioners.64 Values will differ, impeding 
communication, with such seeming innocuous phrases as truth telling, in which the 
candor valued in U.S. majority culture may come across as cruel and offensive to those 
raised in societies with sharply differing attitudes toward what is polite. Ideas matter; for 
example, there is the globally somewhat widespread superstition that even discussing 
death elevates the likelihood that it will indeed occur.65 
Among the greatest challenges in cross-cultural medical communication is clearly 
explain of corrective treatment options, given that some outcomes and courses of 
treatment such those which are futile or inappropriate from the standpoint of Western 
medical practice, may even be fully expected by others related to the patient, who grew 
up with contrary beliefs or cultural traditions.66 Despite the best efforts to surmount other 
barriers to communication, these impasses involving futile or inappropriate treatment 
tend to be unresolvable.  Such impasses usually involve the physician refusing to take 
futile measures that family or relatives insist upon, which because the measures have 
been deemed useless, are unfundable through medical insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid; 
or even prohibited by institutions, professional medical associations, HMOs, or 
government agencies who deem these measures unethical to pursue. Furthermore, these 
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futile treatment are many practitioners to be unethical because of their cost, certainty of 
no beneficial outcome, and their diverting of resources from efforts with more positive 
prognoses.67 Simple though emotionally harsh as this type of situation sounds, it is vastly 
more complex because of the difficulty of qualitatively or quantitatively characterizing 
the specific situation and reliably identifying which case are indeed futile.68 Even when 
the complexities of a patient’s condition can be spelled out, there may be little chance of 
resolving a debate as to whether some treatments or all of the treatments under 
consideration will prove futile. Demonstrating this phenomenon, a recent study of 
hospital in Europe revealed that almost 75% of their ICUs had given admission to 
patients without no chance of survival even in the short term.69 As document in other 
research, in the U.S, almost 5% of Medicare patients received ICU care in terms of 
grossly expensive yet foreseeably futile treatment measures immediately before dying.70 
Chapter 5.D. Protocols for Medical Error Disclosure Based on the Anticipated Risk 
Management Strategy in the Hospital ICU 
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which will discuss the 
following aspects in relation to the disclosure of medical errors, respectively:  1) the 
Global Trigger Tool (GTT) of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 2) the 
Conditions for Informed Consent; 3) the Role of Surrogates. 
Chapter 5.D.1. The Global Trigger Tool (GTT) 
Although possibly intuitively self-evident, a body of research has emerged 
illuminating the intrinsically hazardous nature of being treated in a hospital’s intensive 
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care unit (ICU). Among these studies, one from 2011 focused on 3 hospitals in the United 
States, examining 795 patient records and identified 393 adverse events; such analysis 
suggests that these adverse events may prove to be more frequent by a measure of ten-
fold in hospitals than had been previously assessed on the basis of an earlier review of 
medical records using the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) of the Massachusetts based 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Backing up the 2011 research, the National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and its Prevention Index for 
Categorizing Errors revealed a nearly identical frequency and patterning in the 
distribution of severity of errors it studied. These findings represent events at least a 
decade subsequent to those of the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report suggesting that 
medical errors or adverse events are still as much as if not more than a problem for 
patients in hospitals today.71 
  Further revealing, the 2011 study’s findings placed medication errors, adverse 
events connected to surgery and other procedures, along with hospital-related infections 
at the top of their medical error frequency rankings – a situation similar that shown in 
earlier previously described research.  Related to this study, using the same GTT 
methodology that identifies more patient injuries that are a result of adverse events, 
Internationally and even more currently, in 2012 researchers studying average sized 
Swedish hospitals and their ICUs that various forms of adverse events were surprising 
common given that they had never previously been reported or documented as occurring 
in the ICU. Of greatest concern, over a two years interval, 128 patients fatalities were 
recorded as having been the results of some 41 different adverse events such as 
healthcare-related infections, hypoglycemia, pressure sores and procedural complications. 
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Distressingly, a full 54% of these medical errors, termed ‘adverse events’ were judged to 
have been avoidable.72 
Starting in 1991 with the Patient Self Determination Act, disclosure protocols 
began to be established in U. S. law, as part of the larger goal of promulgating policies 
and procedures to spur the use of advanced directives among medical institutions.73 
Subsequently, informed consent has come to include the notion of permission given by 
the patient to the medical practitioner to carrying out a regimen of medical treatment for a 
specific condition, on the foundation of knowledgeable decision made ultimately by the 
patient to subscribe to that treatment.  The circumstances surrounding surgery as 
treatment provide a clear-cut illustration of the specifics of informed consent. In this 
context, it refers to the physician-patient process of communication, possibly involving 
educational dialogue, definitely including an elaboration and mutual evaluation of 1) 
benefits and risks, 2) feasible alternative courses of action, and 3) characterization of and 
rationales for the various procedure options. In this context, the span of event during 
which informed consent is operative runs from the initial consideration of surgery as an 
option, all the way through subsequent recovery and includes any postoperative 
complications.74 By the same token and closely related, informed consent has also been 
characterized as the collaborative decision-making process shared and mutually 
reinforced by the doctor and the patient or the latter’s surrogate. 
Chapter 5.D.2. Conditions for Informed Consent 
The conditions required of providing consent are four-fold. The first condition is 
that patients must be capable of making a decision about their healthcare. According to 
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bioethics in healthcare, four conditions are prerequisite to the patient’s giving true 
informed consent:  1) that he or she clearly sees his or her condition as being in need of 
medical treatment, whether because of injury or illness; 2) that he or she is aware of and 
understands each of the therapeutic options which the physician has offered as feasible or 
at least possible courses of treatment, and moreover comprehends the advantages and 
potential drawbacks or negative consequences of each option; 3) that he or she can 
assimilate the information provided concerning the various options in order to resolve 
conflicting points of view and arrive at a decision consistent with his or her beliefs and 
goals, and finally 4) that he or she can clearly articulate the choice once made.75 
In order for the patient to demonstrate the second required condition in order to 
exhibit informed consent, he or she must have ready access to enough information about 
all options in order to deliberate and arrived at an informed choice. Although creating a 
precise measure of what constitutes sufficient information is elusive, a widely accepted 
criterion is that which a reasonable individual would need to have at hand in order to 
make a rational choice.  In practice, such a standard necessitates the patient having a 
working comprehension of both the potential advantages and the risks of all options the 
doctor presents for consideration, a standard given legal precedent in the appeal of 
Canterbury v. Spence 1972.76 An alternative disclosure standard has been stated in terms 
of the patient receiving sufficient information so that a patient could not objectively claim 
surprised by any foreseeable outcome that might follow treatment.77 
Implicit in the third conditional requirement of consent is the notion that the 
patient gives it free of any coercion or undue influence provides consent without coercion 
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from any source, whether the physician, relatives, or others. Obviously, this requirement 
does not exclude recommendations and reasons offered in support thereof. Rather, 
coercion is something that a reasonable person would have to struggle to resist; broadly 
defined, it can include decisions based deceptive misinformation or exaggeration. In 
order to prevent any accusations of coercion having been involved in a treatment 
decision, the physician needs to notes into the patient’s file summarizing any verbal 
conversations along with decisions made by patients and physicians as opposed to merely 
relying on standard consent forms.78 
The informed consent principle in biomedical ethics is especially applicable to 
care in the hospital ICU given the foreseeable, heightened risks of medical errors leading 
to serious additional injury or even fatality. Protocols need to incorporate both written 
permission and verbal (i.e, spoken communication) discussion of the risks, as well as the 
potential benefits; this dual approach helps to guarantee that the patient or surrogate 
completely understands the course of treatment being prescribed.79 Informed consent 
documents always need to comply with the principles of communication previously 
discussed in this dissertation; furthermore, they need to be compatible with subsequent 
communication which would be generated by the occurrence of a medical error. To 
facilitate this second goal, the informed consent document may even include anticipated 
remedial procedures for dealing with both foreseeable and unexpected occurrences, such 
as but not limited to medical errors.80 
There is no standardization of hospitals consent forms, just as facility operating 
procedures can vary as greatly as do medical and surgical procedures. Some forms 
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contain information about risks involved; others include space document patients’ 
reasons for declining a recommended procedure. With this degree of variation, any 
assumption that most or all patients understand what they are consenting to would be a 
gross error as at least one body of research has demonstrated.81 Particularly with surgery, 
consent for unanticipated eventualities becomes a complicated medical issue; therefore, 
as much prior discussion with the patient as possible is warranted and should cover 
realistic hypothetical scenarios such as the need for extended mechanical ventilation 
arising in mid-operation.82 Other procedures that can be anticipated as highly likely might 
also be considered ahead of time as well such as Postoperative procedures in the ICU are 
one of various foreseeable needs to be discussed in advance and ideally to have a 
surrogate designated for, should the patient not be able to give informed consent for the 
unexpected.83 
Chapter 5.D.3. The Surrogate 
Across the country, numerous state agencies advocate bringing a surrogate into 
any extended consent discussion between the doctor and the patient, along with having 
involved discussions between the patient and the designated surrogate. State level 
authorized surrogates acting on behalf of incapacitated patients fall under various 
nomenclature, such as healthcare agents, healthcare proxies, and designees having 
durable powers of attorney for healthcare. Given the serious complications which the 
absence of a surrogate can present, various states have further set out procedures through 
which a surrogate may be designated if needed and not already done.  Other states that 
default provisions for spouses or nearest of kin. Regardless of the arrangements in the 
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jurisdiction, the doctor needs to engage in prior consent discussions with the surrogate 
whenever possible.84 
The concept that, with medical advice, a surrogate can effectively provide 
guidance for an incapacitated patient needing surgery has considerable ethical and legal 
precedent. Whenever possible, having and following the patient’s written desires and 
instructions as nearly as the circumstances dictate is the best practice in this regard. When 
this ideal is not achievable given the unpredictability of foreseeing most eventualities, the 
surrogate needs to rely on a standard of substitute judgment, taking the patient’s known 
priorities and values into account. Thus, as extensive previous contact between patient 
and proposed surrogate as is possible is to be sought. In the absence of the knowledge 
and understanding that comes from interaction, the surrogate must rely on the standard of 
what is in the best interest of the patient, often necessary when the patient is a minor or 
has had long term mental incapacity. If surrogate and physician disagree, more likely in 
these latter circumstances, a professional ethicist may be consulted. The physician’s 
reason for disagreeing should has ethical merit, such as an honest conviction that the 
surrogate; 1) insufficiently understands the choices from a medical or ethical perspective, 
2) has a conflict of interest, 3) is making a decision which the physician has evidence that 
the patient would have rejected, or 4) has not followed the available and appropriate 
standards in arriving at the decision.85 
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Chapter 5.E. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Timing of Disclosure  
This section of Chapter 5 is separated into two subsections, the first discussing the 
advanced directive; (AD) and the second examining issues connected with verbal 
instructions. 
Faced with the possibility of either danger or harm, human beings as a species are 
apparently innately prone to finding discomfort in and avoiding uncertainty, which is 
course, inherent in medicine’s treatment of illness or injury.86 Consequently, any protocol 
disclosing ahead of time what can or should be anticipated throughout the course of a 
treatment regimen will relieve concern, stress, and worry, circumstances that will help 
reduce the chance of medical errors while providing a framework for contextualized 
understanding of any errors that might occur.87 While not always feasible in various ICU 
settings and circumstances, pretreatment disclosure brings the patient into the care and 
treatment decision-making process, laying the groundwork understanding the potential 
for medical error before one arises.88 
Chapter 5.E.1. Advanced Directives 
Advanced directives (ADs) allow patients to give a written account of their 
decisions concerning care and treatment, along with their choice of surrogate, all prior to 
any situation in which the need for decision making arises.89 Various research studies 
support the contention that individuals who have created ADs are more able to exercise 
individual autonomy, significantly increasing the likelihood their wishes will be 
followed. Further to their benefit, those with ADs can receive decision-making assistance 
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from the surrogates they have chosen, and are ultimately less likely to die in a hospital 
setting, where medical professionals might attempt “heroic’ measures that the future 
patient would not want and which would cost family members unnecessary trauma and 
expense at the end of the patient’s life.90 Despite the obvious benefits of advanced 
directives, along with the closely related living wills and powers of attorney, and in some 
case legal requirement that hospitals obtain ADs before admitting a patient, the majority 
of people have failed to create an AD. Furthermore, some recent studies have suggested 
that advanced directives are failing to achieve many if any of the goals for which they 
were developed, such as guiding the care provided by medical practitioners in settings 
like the hospital ICU and ultimately reducing the uncertainty, pain, and expenses of 
critical and end-of-life hospital.91 
The typical timing of the disclosure of a patient’s condition and prognosis in the 
ICU illustrates one failing in the use of advanced directives. Physicians make the decision 
of when to communicate a patient’s condition and prognosis to the appropriate persons, 
and tend to hold off on doing so when the prognosis is not good, ultimately shortening 
the time families or surrogates have to prepare themselves psychologically and to make 
decisions.92 The research on the phenomenon suggests that doctors are primarily 
motivated to delay informing those involved out of a desire reach greater certainty with 
less reliance on judgment or intuition. However, this attitude places a higher value on 
scientific accuracy than on the emotional and logistical needs of those close to the patient 
to prepare for what is inevitable.93 The stress in this situation is compounded if the 
physician gives the negative prognosis and immediately asks the surrogate and family to 
begin making end-of-life decisions. In this situation, loved ones will tend to feel 
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emotionally and cognitively pressured by the lack of time to resolve outstanding issues 
and to say farewell to the dying patient, all of which can lead to a subconscious sense of 
resentment should a medical error be discovered to have been involved. The body of 
relevant research clearly indicates that patients and family members want the earliest 
practical disclosure of prognosis, as soon as feasible after initial diagnosis and if possible 
before the patient is admitted to the ICU, all of which is decidedly before the doctor has a 
strong degree of certainty.94 Among the negative impacts of delaying disclosure is that in 
its absence, physicians and even other hospital staff are distracted by persistent queries 
from family members about the patient’s prognosis in terms of ascertaining some idea of 
his or her chance of survival.95 Furthermore, reducing the interval between a negative 
prognosis and the actual end-of-life reduces or possible eliminates the options of hospice 
or palliative treatment, which would have assisted the patient in managing pain while 
affording the family and the patient more time and a more comfortable environment than 
the ICU to prepare themselves emotionally and to deal with any unresolved issues or 
practical matters prior to the patient’s death.96 While there have been few studies 
attempting to delineate precise time preferences for disclosure, at least one has found that 
an average of 36 hours passed between initial communication and prognosis or a 
combination of prognosis with a negative conclusions of physicians in the ICU; in 19% 
of the cases sampled, no prognosis had even been communicated.97 
Chapter 5.E.2. Verbal Instructions 
Enhancing the process of disclosing a patient’s prognosis is not merely an issue of 
the attending physician intuitively prognosticating based on empirical evidence from vital 
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signs and communicating such prognosis to those involved with the patient’s treatment. 
From the perspective of the medical professional, envisioning ways to improve prognosis 
disclosure in relation to advanced directives once the patient is admitted to the ICU is 
difficult in large part because of the behavioral reluctance of most patients to specify in 
written or often even in spoken detail their wishes for advanced directive, living wills, 
powers of attorney; this is true even in the context of direct communication between, 
physicians, patients, and relatives or surrogates. The absence of advanced directives, or 
their lack of specificity when present, compound the uncertainties with which the 
physician must contend. One revealing body of research, conducted at a major teaching 
hospital in Illinois over a number of years and involving over 2,000 patients to the 
neurological and intensive care units, involved the collection of empirical evidence in 
both written and oral form of patient advanced directives.98   
Those patients or their surrogates and family members who stated that they had 
created an advanced directive, either previous or at the hospital amounted to only a third 
of those polled; even significantly fewer reported having it documented on the patient’s 
medical chart where it would be readily accessible if the situation arose for consulting it. 
While the study under consideration represents data from a single hospital, it give some 
impression as to the frequency and types of ADs which may exist. What is clearly the 
norm is a patient arriving at the hospital ICU unable to articulate personal wishes with 
family or a surrogate, if present, only able to reconstruct from memory any discussions 
relating to ADs, and no written documentation to be had.  Incomplete proxy statements 
are common, as are those deemed legally invalid for lack of being properly signed and 
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witnessed. Patient directives which actually were documented in hospital charts were also 
lacking in the specificity of their instructions.99   
 Lastly, the research study provided some record of the types of instructions and 
directives which arise out of the long-term spoken interactions and communication 
between doctors, patients, and relatives over the course of lifetimes of treatment. Being 
self-reporting of data as remembered, they may well represent inaccurate, distorted, or 
selective remembrance, and may prove incomplete, no longer current, or even complete 
fiction. Nevertheless, this body of data reveals that patients frequently want medical 
intervention to be limited and dependent on a reasonable prospect for recovery or 
maintaining a certain quality of life.  Patients with such perspectives were much more 
numerous than those who wanted every measure of care or treatment at all costs. The data 
reveals an interesting mix of detail or lack thereof, juxtaposed against a clear, general 
absence of specific temporal directives.100 
Chapter 5.F. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Stakeholders of Interest  
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into three subsections, which will cover: 1) 
communication failures; 2) the disclosure of information concerning the medical error; 
and 3) the transfer of patients, also known as handoffs. 
Chapter 5.F.1. Communication Failures 
Treatment of a patient in the ICU always involves stakeholders beyond the 
physician, the patient and close relatives; rather it involves the hospital, everyone serving 
on the care and treatment team, the patient’s insurance provider, manufacturers of the 
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ICU equipment used in care and treatment, pharmaceutical companies whose medication 
is part of treatment, and any relevant government regulators (as representatives of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Proactive disclosure to stakeholders of any 
foreseeable medical errors, possibly as part of informed consent documentation, could 
facilitate disclosure protocols should an error indeed occur. Such disclosure becomes a 
natural outgrowth of enumerating and describing the risks involved with anticipated 
interventions, outcomes, and contingencies to undo or mitigate the damage from a major 
medical error.101 
According to several research studies, a full 85% of patients deemed part of 
sentinel populations, and therefore at elevated risk of experiencing harm from a medical 
error had a communication failure linked to their particular case; among these ICU 
surgical patients experienced the greatest risk from such breakdown in communication.102 
While the patients themselves have the most significant stake in ensuring accurate 
conveyance and understanding of information, it is most often between the medical staff 
and family member that the breakdowns occur. As described earlier in this chapter, 
difficulties with and barriers to communication are complex, multifaceted, and 
bidirectional. In the ICU and for the patient, barriers to communication can further 
include: 1) ventilators, 2) intubation, 3) a tenuous grip on consciousness owing to 
sedation, 4) coma, and 5) physical and psychological distractions such as fatigue, distress, 
alienation, disorientation, pain, depression, or frustration.  For medical staff of the ICU, 
despite their substantial knowledge, skills, and experience, they face barriers including: 
1) the inability to read lips or to communicate with sign language, formal or impromptu; 
2) the inability to decipher what patients try to say during brief moments when the latter 
293 
are conscious or thinking rationally, or 3) a lack of understanding of the patient’s 
particular that would be necessary for decipherment of abbreviated messages. The 
complexity of these barriers predicts that neither technological breakthroughs nor 
specialized training would be likely to overcome these obstacles in any simple or highly 
effective manner.103 
Chapter 5.F.2. Disclosure of Medical Error Information 
 In the process of disclosure for a medical error, certain individuals and groups 
need to be considered in detail, given their roles as stakeholders.  This subsection is 
further broken down into discussions of three of these:  1) the family of the patient, 2) the 
medical staff of the ICU, and 3) those involved in transfers or ‘handoffs’ of the patient. 
Chapter 5.F.2.a. The Family 
Aside from the patient and the required documentation, him or herself, the group 
of stakeholders with the next strongest interest in disclosure of medical error information 
is the patient’s family.  Multiple studies have concluded that patients’ family members 
are frequently dissatisfied with and disapproving of the timeliness and the manner in 
which they receive medical information from ICU staff and the hospital in general. Close 
relatives cite the inadequacy of communication, as well as its unpredictability and 
inconsistency.  Many inherent characteristics of the circumstances create barriers to clear 
and adequate communication, such as the dynamics or lack of internal organization or 
cohesion in the family itself, severe time constraints and the lack of doctors and nurses to 
attend to the immediate demands of the ICU.  In the past, ICU staff have not observed a 
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tradition of engaging families in critical decision-making processes whether or not an AD 
has been created, and despite the shift in the field of medicine to collaborative family 
centered decision making, this trend has been slow to take hold.104 The result is the 
family’s heightened psychological worries and stress concerning invasive treatments 
without patient or family consent  and the awkwardness of interactions among the ICU 
staff as a multidisciplinary team.105 Various research surveys have revealed the deeply 
felt need and desire on the part of families of patients to be an active, informed part of the 
process of ICU care and treatment of their loved one, particularly in relation to end-of-
life care and decision making.106 
Chapter 5.F.2.b. The Medical Staff of the ICU 
The medical staff of the ICU in which the error occurred constitute only part of 
larger group of professional involved in dealing with the error. Insofar as the patient’s 
family members have been actively involved in decision making for the patient with 
regard to treatment of the original condition, they might conceptually be considered 
members of the staff. In fact, the medical staff itself may also regard the patient and 
family as part of their group, particularly in light of the current emphasis on patient 
autonomy and collaborative decision-making. However, this merging of categories 
further complicates disclosure protocols. Thus, the medical staff should be thought of as 
the professional team within the hospital ICU and thus faced with the challenge of 
providing expert medical care in this high-pressure setting.107 The degree to which the 
ICU staff works efficiently and smoothly as a team of highly skilled and specialized 
experts has the utmost bearing on the degree to which quality care is provided, in turn 
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determining the safety and probability of survival and recovery for the ICU patients.108 
Various studies have shown positive correlation between the quality of this teamwork in 
practice and a wide range of efficient operations in the department, while conversely a 
negative correlation with errors rates, medical difficulties, and fatalities. Coupled with the 
32 to 37% portion of documented medical errors related to verbal miscommunications 
between doctors and nurses, the need for the type of teamwork that incorporates efficient 
reliable communication becomes obvious, made all the more significant given these 
verbal miscommunications arise from a mere 2% of the doctors’ and nurses’ work 
activities.109 However, research studies also offer the promise of benefits from teamwork 
that includes effective communication; productive interaction between ICU caregivers 
has been found to lead to shorter ICU stays by fostering effective leadership, conflict 
resolution, and colleague sensitive cooperation.110 
Chapter 5.F.3. Those Involved in Transfers or Handoffs of the Patient 
Transferring patients, also referred to as a handoff, whether in either direction 
between the ICU and another part of the hospital or alternatively between two hospitals 
or even simply between the care of different physicians, constitutes among the most 
complex, challenging, and high risk activities for the medical staff.111 During such 
transitions, the patient in in a position of increased vulnerability, and it is at this point that 
all sorts of medical errors are prone to occur and more likely than other times to go 
unnoticed. The risks include the heightened opportunity for lapses in essential 
communication and confusion about responsibilities related to patient data involving the 
patient’s medication, diagnosis, tests results, ongoing treatment, special needs and 
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circumstances, as well as the overall goals of the patient’s care.112 There is substantial 
research findings to correlate the occurrence of medical errors and adverse outcomes 
directly with such transfers, in addition to which, patients tends to report more 
dissatisfaction with the quality of their care during these periods.113 As many as an 
estimated 18% of the reported adverse events affecting ICU patients are connected with 
their discharge from that hospital unit.114 
The benefits of accurate and timely handing off of critical patient information 
include: 1) reducing risks or eliminating sources of errors, 2) avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of diagnostics and laboratory testing, 3) minimizing the likelihood of needed 
re-hospitalization, and 4) overall, boosting the patient’s quality of life. Optimal patient 
outcomes are highly correlated with communication that is exhibits not just quantity and 
frequency, but also clarity in its content.115 In contrast, studies on the subject have found 
that inter-site communication and coordination of care and treatment has been noticeably 
absent; this phenomenon has been particularly evident between acute care providers in 
the ICU and the patients’ primary care providers (PCPs) to the distress of the patients 
themselves.116 In 2011, it was estimated that somewhere between $25 and $45 billion 
U.S. dollars could have been saved through better communications during patient 
transfers.117 
There is no indication at present that any country has established a uniform 
hospital discharge protocol, in spite of research indicating the advantage of such 
standardization.118 The complexity and considerable degree of variation in practice 
among discharge processes creates added risk of the occurrence of medical errors.119 For 
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example, a transfer to the ICU from the operating room (OR) involves inherent risk in 
that the patient is in a particularly fragile state physically, yet must be moved between 
environments; meanwhile the patient’s data, which can change rapidly and dramatically 
during this time must be passed between various medical professionals of differing 
specialties in different locations. In such a scenario, obviously the patient will not be in a 
condition to help monitor the process; all of these factors create an elevated potential for 
medical error.120 
Chapter 5.G. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on the Formal and Informal 
Acknowledgement of Medical Errors and Apologies 
This section of Chapter 5 is separated into two subsections, namely Informal and 
Formal Apologies; 2) Apology Laws. 
Chapter 5.G.1. Informal and Formal Apologies 
While minor medical errors, i.e, those whose consequences do not materially or 
adversely affect the patient’s original prognosis or cause separate damage can ethically be 
handled through informal apology protocols involving only those closely, formal 
procedures and policies for apologies must be adopted in advance of occurrence of any 
error with major consequences.121 This latter, admittedly broad, category will involve 
various parties or stakeholders who are secondarily connected to the event and have 
differing, possibly conflicting interests. Since this type of situation always includes the 
potential for communication problems to compound issues, having a well drafted formal 
apology at least in outline form is a wise precaution, although various researchers have 
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concluded that such pre-formulated apology statement can have mixed results in terms of 
successful resolution.122 
Given that informal apologies generally occur within the person-to-person context 
of the physician-patient relationship, the four cornerstone characteristics of successful 
informal apologies for medical errors are that: 1) the doctor acknowledges that an error 
has occurred, revealing who or whatever is responsible and the specifics of what has 
happened; 2) the doctor accepts responsibility and describes the effect it is having or will 
have on the victim; 3) the doctor expresses regret by admitting culpability, personally or 
on behalf of the institution and those responsible, along with showing humiliation, 
sincere contrition, and compassion; and 4) the doctor offers mitigation and compensation 
for the damage caused by the error.123 Informal apologies such as this constitute typical 
moral behavior in reconciliation between individuals in their interpersonal relationships. 
Absent from this scenario, in contrast to formal apologies in the wake of medical errors, 
are any involvement of any government agencies and regulators, legal institutions, or 
enforcement officers and mechanisms. Moreover, an informal apology can be more or 
less spontaneous and immediate, without need for forethought concerning its ramification 
in situations for which the stakes are small because the error was minor.124 
By contrast, formal apology for a medical error as is much more common in the 
ICU, is normally an affairs bringing in at minimum a number of doctors, other medical 
staff, and hospital administrators institutions, in addition to those experiencing the effects 
of the error.  Furthermore, apology protocols may very well involve secondary 
stakeholders such as medical insurance providers and legal counsel, as well as the 
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eventualities of malpractice litigation, major consequences in terms of damage, serious 
injury, death, and extensive financial burdens. Because of all the legal considerations 
involved, the formal apology process is inextricably linked to the legal processes of 
adjudication, objective determination of culpability, and compensation, as opposed to any 
face to face expression of responsibility.125 Thus, in the majority of cases in which formal 
apology protocols are needed, spontaneous admissions of responsibility or even regret are 
strenuously discouraged and avoided. 
Intrinsic differences in circumstances can logically account for differences 
between informal and formal apology protocols. On the interpersonal level, medical 
apologies can involve merely the simple, immediately implementable actions described 
earlier in accord with the religiously based, cultural expectations for apologies. By 
contrast, formal apologies involve institutions, bureaucracies with complicated 
procedures, multiple actors, all of which can delay the protocol weeks or months, 
possibly years if litigation ensues. Moreover, formal apologies correlate with medical 
errors occurring at large facilities, where determining causation as due to a single act of 
omission or commission, as opposed to a complex systemic failure, or anything in 
between, is an involved time consuming endeavor.  Thus, in cases such as those in the 
ICU, the medical staff may face various constraints in communicating to patients details 
about the incident, details which the patient and family members are anxious to learn. 
Unfortunately, given society’s tendency to overestimate the certainty of medicine and the 
omnipotence of physicians, patients can be prone to confusing tragic outcomes of 
medical procedures that are high-risk or have a small chance of succeeding with those of 
a medical error involving culpability.126  
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Chapter 5.G.2. Apology Laws 
In an effort to promote timely apologies for medical errors partly as a means of 
enhancing patient safety, several countries including the United States, New Zealand, 
Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, have adopted apology laws intended in part to remove 
the fear of legal action from suppressing explanations of errors, expressions of regret, and 
apologies.127 Prompting this change in perspective, the Institute of Medicine report of 
1999,128 had documented the following disturbing trends: 1) a rapid increase in the rates 
of medical errors, 2) commensurate rises in the costs of medical care and malpractice 
litigation, 3) rapid technological change as contributing factor, and 4) significant decline 
in the public reputation of physicians stemming from conflicts over medical error and the 
lack of patient involvement in the process of making decisions about care and treatment. 
It is important to note that the Although the 1999 report did not address the issue of 
changes to how apologies are treated in legal contexts, it did advocate for adjusting the 
imbalance of power dynamics in the doctor-patient relationship, in which patients lacked 
both knowledge of medical healthcare and technology and a lack of decision-making 
power that was a long established tradition in medicine.129 
The apology laws which resulted from this shift in thinking did make the use of 
some aspects apologies by doctors inadmissible in court, but were weak at best, lead to 
half-hearted expressions of sympathy rather than apology that failed to assuage patients’ 
concerns and fears, and in the end did little or nothing to improve the physician-patient 
relationship.130 While over two-thirds of the states in the U.S. passed into law some form 
of these statutes, Colorado’s apology law was the only that unequivocally barred all 
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statements of apology by doctors from being admitted in court proceedings.  One of the 
problems was that From the point of view of many victims of error-related adverse 
outcomes, the type of apologies without admission of fault, which these new laws 
engendered lacked and sense of self-examination on the part of the physician and thus 
lacked honesty and sincerity.131 Research finding are clear in that patients want 
explanations aside from any compensation, and if they sense insensitivity and a lack of 
honest remorse they will resort to legal action, in part to prevent others from suffering a 
similar fate.132 
The intent of apology laws was to remove the barrier that the threat of legal action 
had on candor and apology in the wake of a medical error so that other benefits would 
accrue; whether these laws did anything to foster better doctor-patient communication, 
facilitate more patient control in treatment decisions, or even reduce the rate of medical 
errors, improving patient safety in the process is still undecided by the research 
community.133 As a case in point, Minnesota and Florida have similar apology statutes. 
While the former has no cap on medical malpractice awards, physician-patient apologies 
and medical error disclosures are quite frequent, and along with those circumstances, the 
rates of medical errors, malpractice litigation, and concomitant insurance rates are near 
the bottom ranked among the 50 states. More to its credit, Minnesota’s payouts for 
awards are only marginally above the nationwide average despite the absence of any cap 
on judgments.  On the other hand, Florida’s ranking in the same categories are among the 
highest in the nation, in some cases 19 times as high as those of Minnesota.134 All these 
statistics call into question whether state apology laws aimed at fostering disclosure 
protocols have had any inhibitory effect on either malpractice litigation or medical costs. 
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In the final analysis, the incidence of medicals errors is high and on the rise, apologies for 
errors remain strikingly infrequent, physicians still are typically vulnerable to having an 
apology used against them in court, and medical costs continue to rise far faster than 
inflation.135 
Minnesota’s overall approach to dealing with errors in healthcare is notable in 
several ways; the state has had since 1999, its Adverse Health Care Events Law, which 
mandates the reporting of adverse events, categorized into one or more of 28 groupings, 
documented to the Minnesota Medical Practice Board, including an determination of root 
causes and a plan for corrective action.136 Some of the categories match those of the 
National Quality Forum, such as surgical, product or device, patient protection, care 
management, environmental, and criminal events.137 Fundamentally, this policy is an 
outgrowth the state’s prioritizing public safety in medical practice over punishment 
through the legal system. Five years after implementation, 90% of all hospitals in the 
state had adopted policies of disclosing adverse events to all patients and family member 
victims.138 Even earlier, the Children’s Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota (CHCM) had 
created and instituted its own patient safety program, which included disclosure to all 
families whenever an adverse event had occurred or might foreseeably occur in the 
future, along with the steps being done to remedy the effects of the adverse event and 
prevent any reoccurrence.  The Board explicitly declared when adopted these policies 
that they believed it was the right thing to do, even in the face of liability to medical 
malpractice litigation.139 Ironically, Minnesota’s patient apology law actually resembles 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous Miranda ruling in its statement everything said by the 
apologizers can potentially be used against them in a court of law.  In the final analysis, 
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Minnesota’s success have resulted primarily from its creation of a ‘culture of safety’ 
founded on the principle of doing what is ethically right.140 
Chapter 5.H. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols Based on Compensation 
This section of Chapter 5 is divided into two subsections, the first of which is 
entitled Medical Error Disclosure Protocols and Compensation, with an implied focus 
only financial reimbursement for damages, harm, or loss.  As its name implies, the 
second subsection, entitled Non-Monetary Compensation, covers other forms of 
restitution. 
Both the principles of biomedical ethics and legal statutes concur in requiring just 
and sufficient compensation for any harm done, moreover, the legal systems presupposes 
at least the potential for adjudication between adversarial parties and the need for 
enforcement. By contrast, if agreement concerning fair compensation is possible without 
formal legal action, all parties involved may reap the benefits the cost saving in the form 
of time and resources expended, in the avoidance of distraction from other priorities and 
responsibilities such as doctors focusing on other patients and patients concentrating on 
recovery, and finally in the substantial reduction of emotional duress. Specific disclosure 
protocols as related to detailed procedures and criteria for arriving at equitable 
compensation promise to significantly increase the likelihood of an amicable settlement 
with all the advantages that it would entail.141 
 
 
304 
Chapter 5.H.1. Medical Error Disclosure Protocols and Compensation 
From the patient’s point of view as well as that of those who support him or her, 
any disclosure of a medical error will inevitably lead to a discussion of compensation, 
and thus any procedure or protocol developed for the purpose of disclosure must take this 
factor into account. However, the minute, disclosure and compensation are broadened in 
scope this way, the issue is no longer simply an ICU matter, but becomes system wide 
matter for the institution as a whole, engaging new stakeholders with concern and 
policies related to apologies in relation to the potential for lawsuits, insurance coverage 
for medical errors, opportunities for mediation, and binding arbitration versus non-
binding arbitration.142 From this broader perspective compensation includes not only 
financial remuneration for loss and damages, but also:  1) apologies, 2) sincere 
expressions of regret and contrition, 3) admissions of guilt by those culpable, 4) an 
explanation of the series of events leading up to the error, 5) expressions of compassion 
and empathy, and 6) outlining of procedures being or to be taken to prevent any repeat of 
the same or similar errors in the future.143 The broad view towards disclosure and 
compensation would enable medical error disclosure to be conceptualized as a process 
encompassing the error, and its reverberations, aftermath, and ultimate outcome.  The 
1999 publication of the report entitled To Err is Human by the Institute of Medicine laid 
a conceptual foundation for this broader notion of compensation. Following in the same 
vein, a 2009 Canadian research team gathered data concerning of 64 malpractice cases 
and found that 59% of medical error victims instigating lawsuits over medical errors were 
primarily motivated by the desire to force the medical practitioners involved to 
acknowledge their culpability in the matter, as well as to force these professionals and 
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facilities to take measure that would ensure there would no be repeating of the error.144 
Despite the differences between the Canadian and U.S. healthcare and legal systems, the 
findings of this study are generalizable given that they concern patient attitudes, 
expectations, and dissatisfaction with behaviors among physicians which are not specific 
to either country.145According to the Canadian study, 53% of respondents claimed their 
main goal was to obtain explanations for what had happened to them. While 41% did 
admit to wanting to enable some form of punishment, a nearly equal number, 40%, were 
focused on forcing an apology as their primary goal. By contrast, a mere 18% stated that 
obtaining monetary compensation was their first priority as a goal. Another 35% of 
respondents relegated obtaining money to the status of secondary goal, and scarcely 6% 
declared that financial compensation was their sole goal. Most tellingly, a full 41% of the 
participants in the Canadian study did not cite money as their purpose at all, let alone as 
either as their primary or secondary goal.  Revealing of the disparity in perspectives 
between the medical establishment and of patients and family members affected by 
medical errors, the same Canadian study found that surveyed members of the 
professional medical and legal communities were strikingly out of touch with the feelings 
of their legal opponents. Perhaps less surprisingly, over 90 % of the defense attorneys 
representing the doctors involved contended that the sole purpose of patient-victims 
lawsuits over medical errors was to get money; compounding this misperception, 65% 
percent of the hospital administrators who were themselves or had their facilities named 
in the suits, along with the attorneys for the latter group of defendants, thought that 
monetary compensation had been the victims’ primary goal although this latter group 
admitted the possibility of other secondary goals such as receiving an explanation, 
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justice, the acceptance of responsibility, or insuring corrective measures to forestall 
recurrences.146 
Chapter 5.H.2. Non-Monetary Compensation 
The findings of the research presented above imply that desired non-monetary 
forms of compensation, as mitigation for medical errors could may be viewed by patients 
in a substantially divergent manner than do medical professionals and their legal counsel. 
While the results of this study suggest that attorneys, insurers and many hospitals, view 
lawsuits as appropriate disclosure protocol in cases of significant medical errors, the 
response of plaintiffs in these cases, the injured patients and their representatives, indicate 
that much of the need for litigation could be avoided to the advantage of all parties, with 
the possible exception of legal counsel.  Further supporting this notion, researchers for 
the Pew Charitable Trust conducted a series of studies in New York state and 
Pennsylvania, which compared the mediation efforts made by medical practitioners and 
institutions to resolve issues in the wake of errors with subsequent litigation when it 
developed. Their findings indicate that the more doctors and hospitals showed sincere 
remorse and made specific, good faith efforts to improve in the aftermath of a medical 
error, the more willing the patients became to resolving the case through mediation rather 
than pursuing a lawsuit.147  
However, in line the attitudes suggested by the Canadian study, physicians and 
hospital administrators supported with advice from their defense lawyers attempt to 
forestall legal proceedings by engaging in legal delay maneuvers, fighting to maintain 
secrecy, dispute any suggestion or responsibility for the error. The result is invariably 
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long protracted court battles with increasing animosity, when the patient or family 
member initiated the malpractice suits out of confusion, anger, and frustrated at doctors’ 
and hospitals’ unwillingness to candidly reveal what had occurred, admit to their 
mistakes, and apologize for them.148 Putting all this into perspective and casting further 
doubt on the wisdom of the medical practitioners’ and institutions’ strategies, studies has 
shown that the clear majority of patients who are victims of medical error do not pursue 
litigation.149 One practical reason for this hesitancy on the part of those injured through 
medical errors is the long delays which are likely and the fact that such a large portion, 
54% of the compensation eventually paid out according to one well regarded study, was 
consumed in prosecuting costs and legal fees.150 
Even though there is clear evidence that forms of non-monetary compensation are 
the primary concern and motivating force behind patients’ initiating legal action, 
monetary compensation does play a role in their decision to pursue litigation. Isolating 
the monetary aspects of the legal cases, one major research endeavor focused on 1452 
closed malpractice litigation claims and brought to light insights concerning the nature of 
the claims being made, as well as and the final settlement or judgment figures.151  
A sizeable body of research, focusing on the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Southwest, 
and West of the U.S, investigate the workings of 5 malpractice insurance providers 
companies operating in the target areas. This data pool amounted to 33,000 physicians 
work in 61 acute care hospitals, of which 35 were academic and 26 were non-academic;  
added to this pool were 428 outpatient facilities. Significant subgroups of plaintiffs 
included 60% females with a median age of 38; 19% newborns and infants, and 12% 
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seniors, age 65 and above.  Given that the study concentrated on four clinical categories, 
namely obstetrics, surgery, missed or delayed diagnosis, and medication errors which 
comprised that 80% of claims investigated, predictably the classes of medical 
professionals most frequently the defendants in lawsuits were obstetrician-gynecologists 
(OBGYNs) at 19% and general surgeons at 17%, followed closely by primary care 
physicians at 16%.  Adverse impacts motivated a substantial amount of the lawsuits; 39% 
were cases of those whose injury resulted in significant disability, 15% were those whose 
resulting disability was classified as major, and 26% were on behalf of those who died as 
a result of the error. Less frequently at 4% were those who had experienced emotional or 
psychological trauma, 1% who claimed their informed consent has been violated, and 3% 
who pursued cases despite there being on adverse outcome.152 
 In terms of time and money, the average period from initiation to settlement was 
five years, for an average monetary award of approximately $485,000 in 1995–2004 
dollars, this latter average representing 56% of the applicable cases. While just 15% of 
the lawsuits went as far as a trial verdict, the chances of winning were much lower with 
plaintiffs winning only 21% of their cases, as opposed to 61% of litigants who won 
settlements out of court. However, of those who did win at trial the average award was 
approximately $799,000 in contrast to settlements averaging about $462,000. The mean 
administrative costs for claims decided by trial was On the other hand, at an average of 
around $113,000, administrative costs for cases that went to trial was nearly triple that of 
out of court settlements, at about $42,000. In the final analysis, the investigators in this 
study found these costs to be exorbitant and unwarranted.153  
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Among the large number of cases included in the study, medical error was the 
sole or significant partial cause in 63%; of these, in 73% of the cases, the plaintiffs 
received compensation. In contrast, of all the lawsuits in which errors did not play a role, 
72% of the plaintiffs failed to receive damages; among the claims in this group, 84% 
failed to receive compensation if no injury was sustained. Based on the corpus of cases 
studied, the investigators in study concluded that: 1) from a legal perspective, the 
concepts of medical error and negligence are not easily disentangled, 2) contrary to the 
charges of a vocal body of critics, many lawsuits are not frivolous and inherently without 
merit, and 3) the proportion of legal actions which are initiated by victims of medical 
errors is, as other researchers have puzzled over, surprisingly small given the frequency 
at which errors are documented or believed to have occurred.154  
Recently, in addition to researchers, academic hospitals, medical professionals, 
and some state agencies and entities have been discussing initiatives and making efforts 
to and implement disclosure and compensation protocols that would replace the 
traditional litigation, arbitration, and mediation model for resolving cases of medical 
error. With some limited success, protocols for offering formal apologies, fully disclosing 
medical errors, and offering immediate compensation have been implemented, such as 1) 
the “disclosure-and-offer approach” in operation specifically at the Veterans Affairs 
Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky; 2) the “reimbursement model” in which the institution 
automatically offers compensation to the patient for any losses in time, wages, and 
expenses incurred due to the medical error; 3) the “early settlement model” as 
implemented by the University of Michigan Health System, which sets no cap on 
compensation, which is dispersed when the facility has confirmed that a medical error has 
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occurred; and 4) the “avoidability standard” model, in which an panel of experts 
determines whether the same error would have still occurred if the patient were being 
care for and treated at the a top quality healthcare system or by the leading specialist in 
the field. Under this last model, upon the panel’s ruling that the medical error would not 
have occurred under these ideal conditions, the patient or his or her representative 
receives remuneration for both economic and noneconomic losses corresponding to the 
seriousness of the harm or damages.155 Despite substantial savings in terms of time and 
money some of these initiatives have achieved in terms of enhancing disclosure and 
involving patients in the process, these models still have flaws and inefficiencies, which a 
small number of researchers are quick to point out.156 
Chapter 5.J. Conclusion  
In the final analysis, a critical step in improving ethical behavior involves 
establishing and implementing protocols for disclosing medical errors when they occur in 
the ICU.  Protocols need to be commensurate with the scope and scale of errors and 
proactively address the acceptance of responsibility, considerations involving risk to 
patient outcomes and loss, management of the risk to the medical institution, anticipation 
of consequences, identification and involvement of stakeholders, and disclosure timing, 
apologies, and compensation.  
This chapter has analyzed in detail eight aspects of disclosure protocols for 
dealing with medical errors in the hospital ICU whenever it may occur, specifically, the 
scope and scale of the error, the ethical criteria supporting the acceptance of 
responsibility, measures to correct the impact of the error and establish the prognosis of 
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the patient, strategies for managing anticipated risks, the timing of disclosure, the various 
stakeholders in the apology process and their interests in the case, informal and formal 
acknowledgement of the error and apologies for it, and the compensation, in both its 
monetary and non-monetary forms.  Specific facets of the issue of medical errors have 
been explored, leading to the following insights, among others, into where protocols will 
have special needs in their development and implementation:  1) biomedical ethics, along 
with most professional medical associations, takes a clear stand advocating full and 
detailed disclosure, 2) transfers and handoffs of patients in and out of the ICU are 
particularly prone to the occurrence of medical errors, 3) barriers to communication in all 
their forms need to be addressed proactively, 4)great differences exist between acceptable 
protocols for informal versus formal apologies, and 5) apology laws while well 
intentioned have had mixed results.  
Among the themes that cut across the various sections of this chapter are that: 1) 
medical professionals acknowledge ethical obligations for disclosure in concept, but live 
up to these duties in practice, 2) patients and those close to them expect answers, 
explanations, and apologies stemming from sincerely felt contrition, 3) physicians 
severely misunderstand the perspectives and motivations of patients as victims.  
Patients and family member harmed by a medical error are neither solely nor 
primarily interested in gaining money as compensation, as the 2009 Canadian study 
indicates. Further supporting this, the Pew research study of mediation and litigation 
described above is one of numerous studies suggesting the tendency of victims of 
medical errors to avoid resorting to going to court if they receive what they most want, 
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namely a sincere admission of fault, apologies, and efforts to prevent errors in the future. 
Despite this tendency, physicians throughout the medical establishment, including the 
ICU, remain distinctly reluctant to admit their culpability in cases of medical errors based 
on their concerns about potential negative impacts on their reputations, careers, and even 
livelihoods. From a myriad of research, it is clear that medical professionals, facilities, 
and institutions are very far out of touch with the feeling and priorities of victims or 
medical errors, real or potential.  
One possible solution has been exemplified by the experiences of the medical 
establishment in Minnesota, where they have achieved lower rates of errors, litigation, 
and malpractice insurance rates, not so much by shielding physicians from legal 
consequences of admitting fault or apologizing for errors, but rather by proactively 
committing to take the ethical course of action, i.e, by ‘doing the right thing,’ despite 
possible ramifications. 
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Chapter 6. Systemic Endeavors to Diminish Medical Errors in the Hospital ICU 
Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on protocols relating to the disclosure of medical 
errors once they have occurred; this chapter of the dissertation, its sections, and 
subsections together with the protocols and recommendations they describe concentrate 
on efforts and procedures to prevent medical errors before they happen to the extent 
humanly possible, or when not, to lessen the severity of and mitigate the harm caused by 
medical errors. These protocols include prevention planning, communication, 
administering medication, as well as preventing and managing equipment failure and 
system failure. Subsequently, the chapter’s analysis will consider the history of tort 
reform in the U.S., describing the direction that such reforms need to take in order to 
ensure justice for all parties and to discourage medical errors.  Further recommendations 
concern the educational system for training future physicians and other healthcare 
professionals, which along with legal reforms, are aimed at getting the medical 
professional, as well as the administration of medical facilities and institutions to handle 
medical errors with the high standards of biomedical ethics which they claim in theory to 
espouse. 
Chapter 6 is divided into six sections, which will cover respectively; 1) 
Prevention planning protocols, 2) Communication protocols, 3) Medication 
protocols, 4) Equipment failure protocols, 5) System failure protocols, and 6) Tort 
and medical education reform.   
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The first section discusses organized effort to minimize if not preempt the 
occurrence of adverse events, considering the role and potential of information 
technology.  Since, they have long been a practical cornerstone in forestalling 
adverse events, cleaning and decontamination techniques are analyzed here in 
detail.  The potential of teamwork to reduce errors is described in parts of this 
chapter; in conjunction with this emphasis, the second section analyzes how 
effective communication, both internally and external to the medical institution 
should function.  The section concerning medication protocols highlights three 
innovations that promise to significantly reduce, or in some cases eliminate specific 
causes or sources of this very common classes of medical errors. In terms of 
technology, computerized physician order entry in particular does away with a 
number of causes of medication error that have plagued the traditional prescription 
and treatment process.  While the benefits of eliminating the overworking of 
physicians and other involved personnel are understood, if difficult to get facilities 
to commit to, an innovative approach, feasible at least for the ICU is to include 
pharmacists in patient rounds.  After these sections, the two subsequent one will 
focus on the need for and obstacles to creating effective protocols for the prevention 
of equipment failure and system failure, respectively.  In both areas, complexity as 
well as other features common to the two make preparing to identify risks for and 
the occurrence of, to avoid or minimize them, and to deal with them once they have 
been discovered, uniquely difficult among the various root causes of errors and 
adverse events. 
While recommendations for improving the prevention or minimization of 
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medical errors, the hospital ICU and elsewhere are incorporated wherever 
appropriate, the final section of this chapter is devoted to badly needed changes in 
both the legal foundations for handling claims of negligence and malpractice and 
the system of educating future medical professionals. 
Chapter 6.A. Prevention Planning Protocols in the Hospital ICU  
The prevention, or at least to the extent possible, the minimization of medical 
errors in the hospital ICU or elsewhere in medicine is the primary aim behind planning; 
furthermore the achievement of this goal necessitates anticipating foreseeable risks and 
tendencies toward error, which in turn requires that planners know the circumstances that 
foster the occurrence of errors comprehend the characteristics of these events and be able 
to realistically assess the likelihood of their happening.1 
This section on planning protocols is divided into two major parts, with the latter 
containing a further four subdivisions. As presented, they include 1) Prophylaxis and 
Monitoring Procedures and 2) Steps to Avoid Adverse Events.  This second part is 
segmented into subsections dealing with:  a) The Role of Information Technology, b) 
Cleaning, Disinfection, and Sterilization Procedures, c) Investigative and Evaluative 
Procedures, and d) Reorganization of Medical Team Operations in the ICU. 
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Chapter 6.A.1. Prophylaxis and Monitoring Procedures 
Chapter 6.A.1.i. Prophylaxis Procedures 
 The term prophylaxis procedures refers to tangible actions taken in the course of 
the diagnosis and treatment of a patient that are aimed at error prevention, implying that 
such must be a priority for hospitals in general and ICU departments specifically. 
Accurately assessing the probability of medical errors in advance enables the medical 
staff to take two preemptive measures- first, increasing vigilance in high risk places and 
procedures, and second, developing strategies and protocols ahead of time to forestall the 
anticipated type of error. The ultimate benefit of such efforts is more effective and 
accurate patient care. The majority of these prophylactic activities and strategies have 
been incorporated into established and widely available procedural checklists for all sorts 
of medical professionals from attending physicians and specialists such as cardiologists, 
anesthesiologists, and laboratory technicians to nurses and other care staff to follow in 
carrying out their respective duties.2 The principle goal of this standardized approach is to 
guarantee that all procedures are not forgotten but are conducted, yet not repeated in so 
much as unnecessary duplication is not only a waste of resources, but could constitute a 
medical error causing harm in and of itself. The natural next step beyond the use of such 
checklists is the development of contingency plans to correct any omissions or 
consequences of repetitions. On a broader scale, such detailed understanding of the day-
to-day functioning of the ICU enable more efficient general administration of the unit 
through sufficient staffing and supervision.3 
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The body of research literature available specifically focusing on medical errors 
points to the effectiveness of dividing errors for the sake of prevention into two types: 1) 
those which can be forestalled through improved medical management, typically relating 
to planning and implementation; and 2) those which typically can be prevented through 
appropriate interventions in course of diagnosis, treatment, or specifically the 
administration of medication. A significant portion of the potential advantages of these 
checklist lies in their timely and continuous documentation of any and all occurrences, in 
turn reducing liability in the form of alleged negligence while assisting in prevention of 
future errors by enabling the regular improvement of prophylactic protocols.4 
Chapter 6.A.1.ii. Monitoring Procedures 
As typically employed, the general term monitoring procedures is not restricted in 
scope to overseeing the treatment plan of the patient and its progress, but rather includes 
the overview of standard procedures for administration of all routine activities of 
departments such as the ICU and for specific categories of treatment such as surgical 
interventions. As an integrated component of general monitoring, procedural checklists 
have been proven to contribute to noticeable decreases the rate of medical errors, as well 
as reducing the level of harm caused by those errors that did occur.5 The hospital ICU in 
particular is a unit in which the routine use of checklist program is not a foreign concept 
and is most essential, given the complexity of activities in the unit. At minimum, this list 
needs to be employed daily and must include: 1) the patient’s status, in terms of code; 2) 
the patient’s degree of sedation; 3) the patient’s GI and DVT Prophylaxis, 4) the patient’s 
levels of fluids, electrolytes, and nutrition; and 5) an assessment of the patient’s 
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disposition. Beyond this minimal level of monitoring and data collection, it is important 
to frequently and regularly assess and record:  1) the I/O for each patient, recorded with 
daily cumulative totals; 2) each patient’s IV access, with ready access to the dates and 
times at which the central lines were installed; and 3) for each patient, the occurrence and 
length of any administration of steroids for shock purposes. There are additional checklist 
items for any and all patient receiving mechanical ventilation, namely: 1) the date of 
initial intubation; 2) the gage of the tube; 3) the settings for the vent, specifically the 
mode, the rate, the volume, the pressure, the PEEP, and the FiO2); and 4) the 
peak/plateau pressure.6  
A mnemonic device which serves as an additional monitoring reminder in 
numerous ICUs is termed FAST HUG, which stands for:  1) feeding, 2) analgesia, 3) 
sedation, 4) thromboembolic prophylaxis, 5) head of bed elevation, 6) stress ulcer 
prevention, and 7) glucose control. According to Vincent, “The concept of the Fast Hug, 
a simple, short mnemonic to highlight some key aspects in the general care of all 
critically ill patients, which should be considered at least once a day during rounds and, 
ideally, every time the patient is seen by any member of the care team. This approach 
helps involve all members of the critical care team, including nurses, physiotherapists, 
and respiratory therapists.”7 The goal of all these checklist style monitoring measures is 
the comprehensive and systematic overseeing of the status of the patient’s condition, his 
or her response to the prescribed course of treatments, adding up to an accurate prognosis 
for recovery or improvement.  
A study conducted by Carless et al., investigated two procedures aimed at 
333 
enhancing quality of care in the ICU, namely facilitated incident monitoring (FIM) and 
medical chart review (MCR), looking at both comparatively as implemented by ICU 
staffs. In order to observe the FIM in practice, the researchers trained the participating 
ICU staff in the course of the latter group’s ICU orientation. Subsequently, staff members 
were asked to recall incidents of medical errors they had been witness to or a part of; they 
were then asked to document each occurrence an incident report form. Meanwhile, as a 
component of more established quality control procedures, the investigators had MCR 
used as a part of peer review. In the final analysis, Carless et al. concluded that in an ICU 
setting, FIM was more effective at potential and real problem identification and alert than 
was MCR. Explaining their analysis, these researchers noted that FIM was superior to 
MCR in 1) yielding more contextualized data, revealing both more problems overall and 
specifically more, as well as a higher percentage of those deemed preventable, and 2) 
being easier to integrate with existing ICU clinical routines.8 
Chapter 6.A.2. Steps to Avoid Adverse Events 
The first step toward systematically planning and implementing medical errors 
prevention is to create a classification scheme for medical errors in order to properly 
identify them and investigate their causes. One widely used categorization scheme labels 
them as: 1) adverse events, 2) near misses, 3) slips, 4) lapses, 5) mistakes, 6) errors of 
omission, and 7) errors of commission although these last two categories may be argued 
to overlap with some of the others. To clarify, in order to be labelled an adverse event, 
the harm or damage must be the result of a flaw in the medical management rather a 
negative development in the patient’s condition through a progression of the injury or 
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illness in spite of appropriate treatment. Even excluding these unfortunate setbacks in the 
face of efficacious, diligent treatment, Brennan et al. assert that, “There is a substantial 
amount of injury to patients from medical management, and many injuries are the result 
of substandard care.”9 As any system designed to aid in preventing medical errors must 
include those events that did not cause harm in the case in question, but could well have 
done so in other circumstances, in other words, near misses. For example, any error in the 
creation of a treatment plan is a mistake if it could have led to harm, even though it 
actually didn’t. Medical errors categorized as mistakes are most clearly defined by 
precipitating circumstance occur when anyone involved in care or treatment of a patient 
must perform a non-routine action, often a novel undertaking for the caregiver; the task 
will necessitate concentration and possibly judgment or problem-solving skills.10 Any 
deviation from a set of standard procedures for treatment and care can increase the danger 
and probability of errors or adverse events although even the deviations themselves may 
be hard to document. One difficulty with assessing and analyzing medical errors on a 
scale beyond that of the individual institution is that various facilities have their own 
schema for identifying and classifying errors, as well as determining the likelihood of 
their occurrence which nevertheless may be very useful to doctors and other medical staff 
in adhering to standards and formulating corrective measures when errors arise.11 
Chapter 6.A.2.i. The Role of Information Technology 
Two obvious methods of medical error detection typical come to mind first, 
namely spontaneous reporting by those involved and manual review by disconnected 
observers; however, both are impractical for accurately revealing the broader picture of 
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the situation in that the former methods elucidates only a small fraction of occurrences 
and a glimpse of the situation that enables them while the latter is prohibitively labor 
intensive to be cost effective, except as targeted sampling in the context of a broadly 
based research investigation.12 Originally brought into hospitals and similar facilities for 
billing and payment processing, as well as for other high-volume, time-sensitive needs 
such as lab tests, computer and electronically facilitated technologies are increasingly 
being employed to monitor, evaluate, and enhance the quality of patient care which 
hospitals and outpatient facilities deliver.13 
 The use of information technology can eliminate the drawbacks mentioned above 
that make strictly human monitoring unfeasible, yet has its limitations in that coded data 
only will not reveal all forms of medical error. Thus data from a variety of sources, both 
quantitative and qualitative, such as clinical narratives, must be synthesized in order to 
identify a truly broad range of adverse events that have or could occur.  
Given the promise of gaining a more complete picture of error generation, 
investigation needs to move toward understanding the process by which it occurs. To 
date, the focus of research has been reactive, identifying the occurrence and analyzing the 
causes of errors, and not on developing adverse event detection systems or effective 
procedures for prevention.  Advances in the thoroughness of medical error detection 
should enable the study of the effectiveness of various approaches to enhancing patient 
safety through adverse event prevention. This progress will be of significant benefit in 
that the unpredictability of most medical errors coupled with the high costs of 
interventions makes definitively determining their effectiveness very difficult.14 
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Chapter 6.A.2.ii. Cleaning, Disinfecting, and Sterilization Procedures 
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.a. Cleaning Procedures 
The term decontamination is refers to a variety of activities, the goal of which 
alone or in combination, is to eradicate or at least render innocuous any pathogen or other 
dilatory substance enabling the reuse of anything coming in contact with multiple 
patients. Decontamination can take the form of: 1) cleaning, the physical removal of 
infectious agents and the organic matter that supports them, typically without destroy 
them; 2) disinfection, the killing or rendering harmless of most but not all 
microorganisms; and 3) sterilization, the complete eradication of anything living or 
potentially so, such as bacterial spores, whether or not deemed harmful.15 
Sharbaugh asserts that cleaning is the first and most critical step in preventing 
adverse events caused by contamination, in addition to being a prerequisite to 
disinfection and sterilization. Significantly advances in preventing infection within 
hospital settings, including rigid cleaning and reprocessing standards along with the rise 
of one-time use equipment, have made infectious complications during hospitalization 
attention getting exception, as opposed to the norm of centuries past. Cleaning may need 
to be either a manual or automated task, depending on the features of the equipment or 
implement to be cleaned; alternatively, it may require a combination of both methods, the 
operative factors being preserving the proper performance of the device while insuring 
the safety of the one doing the cleaning. Depending on the task, acceptable cleaning 
methods, as provided by the manufacturer of the article to be cleaned, include: 1) simply 
applying soap and water, 2) applying another specified chemical agent, 3) manual 
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scrubbing, i.e, by human hands, 4) ultrasonic cleaning, and either 5) washer disinfecting 
or washer sterilizing, i.e, by placement in a machine.16 
For cleaning to be effective, it must involve the complete removal of foreign 
material; otherwise, any subsequent disinfection or sterilization will be more time and 
energy intensive and possibly ineffective in the end. It consists of washing an item with a 
detergent or a disinfectant detergent and water, rinsing the item, and thoroughly drying 
the item. Multiple research endeavors concerning endoscopes, surgical instruments, and 
other equipment have document exponential and logarithmic scale reductions in 
microorganisms from cleaning alone. As alluded to above, a direct correlation exists 
between the level of biological material present at the inception of disinfection or 
sterilization and the time delay needed to effectively accomplish those processes. 
Reducing what is referred to as bioburden reduces time and costs while increasing 
effectiveness and safety, including that of employees who undertake subsequent 
equipment handling. Sufficient, effective cleaning further prevents of release of 
potentially harmful endotoxins, removes barriers that would otherwise shield 
microorganisms from contact with liquid disinfectants or sterilizing agents, while 
preventing any deactivation of the latter two groups of agents.17 
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.b. Disinfecting Procedures 
Crucial to preventing adverse events proximally caused by harmful 
microorganisms coming into contact with the patient under treatment is disinfection, 
which by definition kills or renders innocuous pathogenic organisms other than bacterial 
spores.18 Immersing medical equipment in liquid chemicals for sufficient periods of time 
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and processing them through wet pasteurization are the two most common ways of 
handling the non-living objects and surfaces with which the patient comes into contact.19 
Obviously, disinfectants cannot be used directly on the patient or with items such as 
eating utensils by means of which the disinfectant could be ingested.20  
Sharbaugh classifies disinfectants into three categories, namely; 1) the high-level 
ones, which eradicate all microorganisms other than some types of bacterial spores; 2) the 
intermediate-level ones, which kill off vegetative bacteria, the majority of viruses and 
fungi, along with (of special importance) the organism Mycobacterium tuberculosis, but 
not bacterial spores; and finally 3) the low-level ones, which kill most bacteria, as well as 
a number of virus and fungi types, yet are ineffective against M. tuberculosis or bacterial 
spores. Outside Sharbaugh’s scheme is sterilization, defined as the killing of absolutely 
all microorganisms without exception.21 
Reporting on research by Rutala, and Weber highlighted the former’s conclusion 
concerning the efficacy of classifying the sterilization of equipment for patient care as 
being either critical, semicritical, or noncritical, with the criterion for categorization being 
the level of the danger of infection. Two policy guidelines, namely the "Guidelines for 
Environmental Infection Control in HealthCare Facilities" and the "Guideline for 
Disinfection and Sterilization in Healthcare Facilities" both published by the U.S. Centers 
for Disease Control, the (CDC), incorporate this three-fold system of classification. 
Those instruments considered critical items include anything subjected to potential 
microorganism or bacterial spore contamination and a correspondingly high risk level. 
Semicritical items, including everything from diaphragm-fitting rings to respiratory 
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therapy and anesthesia equipment, may come into contact with a patient’s mucous 
membranes or nonintact skin. By contrast, equipment and instruments that come in 
contact only with intact skin and no moist tissue, such as mucous membranes, are 
designated as non-critical, inasmuch as the large majority of microorganisms cannot 
penetrate the unbreached epidermis. Such noncritical equipment would include, the ICU 
surroundings consisting of furniture, curtains, bed rails, linens, and floors, as well as 
those items the come into bodily contact in the way that crutches, blood-pressure cuffs, 
and bedpan do.22 
Chapter 6.A.2.ii.c. Sterilization Procedures 
Sufficient heat, frequently by means of steam, is the most efficient method of 
sterilization for healthcare institutions, given the heat tolerance and stability of most 
equipment in need of the process. On the other hand, cost saving and other trends over 
the last six or seven decades have led to a growing segment of the medical device and 
instrument arsenal that cannot tolerate high-temperature sterilization and therefore 
necessitates a low-temperature equivalent. One such alternative is ethylene oxide gas, 
effective for medical devices sensitive to both heat and moisture. More recently, the 
following processes: 1) hydrogen peroxide gas plasma, 2) peracetic acid immersion, and 
3) ozone have been engineered and proven effective in the sterilization of medical 
devices. The following portion of this sub-section analyzes various procedures for 
sterilization as currently used in the fields of medicine and healthcare with the goal of 
identifying their optimum usage in the effort to forestall the contamination of medical 
devices leading to medical errors.23 
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The purpose of sterilization is to eradicate all living organisms from the treated 
implement or surface, among the most dangerous of which are staph infections.24 
Sterilization destroys all microorganisms on the surface of an article or in a fluid with the 
goal of eliminating any risk of disease transmission through the use of the sterilized item 
in treating a patient. Although common sense dictates that inadequate sterilization creates 
a decisive risk of pathogenic infection, the documentation of such occurrences is 
extremely sparse. While a wide variety sterilization methods are in use, the present 
discussion focuses on the two most common, namely steam sterilization and ethylene 
oxide or "gas" sterilization (ETO).25 
As a form of moist heat, saturated pressurized has a multiplicity of advantages, 
leading to its frequency and recommendation as the first choice for sterilization wherever 
feasible; these advantages include: 1) dependability, 2) low cost, 3) nontoxicity, 4) rapid 
and thorough killing of microorganisms and spores, and 5) rapid heating and penetration 
of fabric. These properties make sterilization by steam advisable for treating anything 
that tolerates high temperatures and moisture, such as respiratory therapy and anesthesia 
equipment, even when doing so would not be strictly necessary for preventing pathogen 
transmission. This process, over a longer time frame, can even be used in the 
decontamination of microbiological waste. Four parameters are required for steam 
sterilization to be effective, namely sufficient steam, pressure, temperature, and time of 
exposure.26 
The other widely utilized sterilization technique is ethylene oxide "gas" 
sterilization (ETO).  Inasmuch as this gas is a colorless gas, as well as both flammable 
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and explosive, its use by hospitals and other healthcare institutions is generally confined 
to sterilizing moisture or heat sensitive equipment and implements the complete 
decontamination of which is semi-critical or critical.27  
One of the innovations within the medical field in recent decades has been the 
inception of single-use medical implements, which substitute the costs, problems, and 
risks of waste disposal for those of disinfection or sterilization and reuse; these should, 
however, be utilized whenever appropriate. Infections fall within the scope of medical 
errors as unintended and largely preventable harmful consequences, constituting a 
foreseeable adverse event of elevated consequences in the hospital ICU and a legal 
responsibility to prevent to the extent possible. Just as any medical device or piece of 
equipment may become recontaminated as easily as it became contaminated before 
sterilization, infection control and prevention must be a coordinated endeavor by the 
entire medical facility, rather than merely the task of the sterilization processing unit or 
staff. Comprehensive guidance for cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing of medical 
devices and equipment is contained in the MAC Manual of the Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency.28 
Chapter 6.A.2.iii. Investigative and Evaluative Procedures 
Chapter 6.A.2.iii.a. The Basic Concept of Checklists 
Like airline pilots, doctors must work with sophisticated equipment under 
circumstances that can evolve rapidly in terms of the source of the threat and the degree 
of the hazard.  While safety in both professions is an absolute, cost containment is always 
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a potentially conflicting priority.29 In recent years, a number of medical institutions have 
been able to reduce error rates noticeably by imitating the adopting investigative and 
evaluative procedures comparable with those used by the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s policies and procedures for monitoring prior to and investigating in the 
wake of adverse incidents. A powerful tool for error reduction or elimination, developed 
in the fields of aviation, aeronautics, and product manufacturing, now becoming 
increasingly utilized in the field of medicine is the checklist. Its spread as a tool is 
predictable in that just as in the other fields safety and precision are uncompromising 
standards in the delivery of services, and given that lives are at stake, errors are 
unacceptable even when unavoidable.30 Conceptually, checklists may assume the format 
of a list of: 1) factors, properties, or aspects to consider; 2) components or dimensions of 
tasks; or 3) criteria or decision trees for decision-making.31 Checklists are distinct from 
cognitive aids in that they lack the informality and ambiguity of a posted note or the 
proverbial string around one’s finger; they differ from the protocol in that they normally 
do not mandate the completion of specified tasks leading to predetermined outcomes. 
Thus, checklists give guidance, organizing sub-tasks and routines, providing verification 
of completion, but not specifying the end result. According to Hales and Pronovost, 
“Checklists can have several objectives, including memory recall, standardization and 
regulation of processes or methodologies, providing a framework for evaluations or as a 
diagnostic tool.”32 Checklists are designed with the goal of preventing potential errors 
which would otherwise occur due to oversight or omission of necessary procedure or 
action by preventing or else catching the omission and rectifying it prior to any damage 
or injury.33 The routine use of checklists facilitates and preserves the qualities of 
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precision, focus, clarity, and memory recall in the performance of tasks whether routine 
or otherwise and by those on all levels of medical staff; their use has proved particularly 
effective in preventing errors under conditions of elevated stress.34 
Chapter 6.A.2.iii.b.  The Effects of Checklists in the ICU 
Yet another area in which healthcare institutions are adopting successful practices 
in aviation is in the organization and deployment of crews or, in the case of medical 
facilities such as ICUs, teams. Promising as this apparently analogous situation seems, 
the theories and approaches of checklist implementation and error management have to 
date been incompletely adapted or implemented at best, and not without reason. Unlike 
flight processes which deal with the operation of machines, inherent factors in healthcare 
and medicine, such as the unpredictability of the human body in the course of illness, 
injury, and recuperation, make the rigid standardization in the use of checklist 
unfeasible.35 Nonetheless, there has been some slow movement toward the adoption of 
checklists in the critical care branch of medicine, albeit adapted to fit the complexities 
and uniqueness of this environment, with moreover, some indication of beneficial 
outcomes. One investigation involving the medical-surgical ICU tertiary care units at two 
teaching hospitals report that some 80% of the nurses felt that the adoption of checklist 
procedures had enhanced the quality of patient end-of-life care, including when it 
involved the withdrawal of life support. More objectively, the study found that a 
significantly smaller number of patients were subjected to inappropriate resuscitation or 
comfort medications during the final 12-hour period of their lives.36 
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Chapter 6.A.2.iv. Reorganizing the Medical Team in the Hospital ICU 
By fundamentally rethinking their medical staffing and task allocation 
approaches, various hospital ICU departments have implemented creative and effective 
models of staffing, with the result being an increase in teamwork and a corresponding 
decrease in the dependence on isolated individual specialist to independently select and 
implement steps in the treatment process.37 
Chapter 6.A.2.iv.a. The Effects of Teamwork in the Hospital ICU  
Manser defines teams as consisting of “Two or more individuals who work 
together to achieve specified and shared goals, have task-specific competencies and 
specialized work roles, use shared resources, and communicate to coordinate and to adapt 
to change. Compared with teams in other industries, medical teams especially in the 
dynamic domains of healthcare such as operating rooms, intensive care, emergency 
medicine, or trauma and resuscitation teams.”38 These changes in conceptualization have 
increased the responsibilities of professional medical staff members at all levels, have 
reduced the clarity of boundaries between professionals, and have increased the 
interdependence and correspondingly the collaboration among the medical professionals, 
as well as that of others in support and managerial position. On the other hand, all of 
these theoretically positive outcomes are inherently linked to an increased risk of 
interdisciplinary communication failure, often leading to consequences potentially more 
disastrous than with the previous paradigm. While surgeons had been at the forefront of 
this teamwork approach and touted it as quite effective, their teams were invariably 
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strictly hierarchical with themselves as the individual authoritative leaders, such would 
and could not be the structure of the multidisciplinary team.39 
Wheelan et al. assert that physicians, nurses, and even support personnel do not 
receive anything close to adequate training in team building and teamwork skills although 
doing so would be extremely beneficial to healthcare facilities and to patients alike, even 
if accomplished in the form of in-service training. Furthermore, access to assistance from 
professional consultants would be very useful when problems arise, yet only a small 
fraction of facilities have this resource available. Improved patient outcomes and higher 
quality work environments for healthcare staff are inherently connected, explicit goals of 
the healthcare industry, and achievable through the development and fostering of 
supportive, productive healthcare teams.40 Among the benefits claimed for teamwork 
from an administration perspective better teamwork: 1) reduces costs, 2) reduced staff 
turnover and absenteeism, 3) diminishes interstaff conflict, 4) increases the level of 
quality care, 5) bolsters staff motivation, and 6) improves patient outcomes. All these 
benefits stem from improving the psychological health and well being of the healthcare 
staff. Concomitantly, stress decreases while greater effectiveness and innovation bloom 
wherever a team of healthcare professionals are working harmoniously.41 
The first step in evaluating the quality and effectiveness of teamwork i n specific 
situations is to identify, in general, behaviors and characteristics which form the 
foundation of efficacious teamwork, interrelate to constitute successful clinical 
performance, and finally manifest themselves in positives outcomes for the patient. 
Measuring tools or instruments for the assessment of teamwork competencies and 
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processes are neither new nor unique to the field of medicine, and has been promulgated 
throughout the research literature. As in other fields, in this process of measuring and 
assessing teamwork in the care and treatment of patients, attention must be devoted to 
ascertaining the degree to which these skills and processes must be adapted or 
individually prioritized in defining what is effective teamwork in individual 
circumstances, such as a hospital ICU.42 Asserting that potential performance indicators 
in the ICU include level of available technology, case mix, nurse staffing and patient 
ratios, and caregiver interaction, Rafferty et al. proceeded to test the hypothesis that each 
was related directly to quality of care. In order to do so, the author further defines 
caregiver interaction as being an amalgamation of five different aspects, namely: 1) 
culture, in its manifestations as the shared norms, beliefs and expectations of a particular 
group; 2) leadership, as displayed by the medical practitioners involved with the case; 3) 
coordination, not only ICU internal, but also with other acute care units of the hospital; 4) 
communication between all of the aforementioned parties; and 5) management of the 
conflicts that inevitably arise. Given the complexities of the ICU setting, Rafferty singled 
out communication for special in-depth analysis.43 
Chapter 6.A.2.iv.b. Teamwork and Patient Outcomes in the Hospital ICU 
The value of proper teamwork in promoting productivity has been established in 
many in the work environment is universally recognized throughout the public and 
private sectors, whether for profit or nonprofit. Despite this conclusion, to date the 
relationship between teamwork among healthcare professionals and patient outcomes 
remains unclear. Wheelan et al. report the existence of apparently contradictory finding 
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from various studies as to whether patient outcomes were impacted positively or not at all 
by how well the staff members attending the patients worked as a team.44 One recently 
published study does conclude that the lack of or poorly coordinated management of staff 
likely contributes to a dominant percentage of adverse events experienced by patients.45 
In many hospital ICUs, effective communication and teamwork between doctors and 
other healthcare staff members is advocated as a means of enhancing the care that 
patients receive. Ideally, such coordination and teamwork lead to more complete 
information which becomes the foundation of better decision-making. The collaboration 
needed to achieve this was defined as physicians and nurses sharing the task of problem 
solving in making decisions in selecting the optimal plan for patient treatment and care, 
as well as implementing that plan.46 
Chapter 6.B. Communication Protocols in the Hospital ICU 
Just as communication which is clear, accurate, and timely is a necessity in 
preempting the occurrence of a medical error, it is equally essential in dealing with and 
minimizing the harmful consequences of an error.47 Although physicians must prepare 
themselves to be medical experts through rigorous education, extensive both in scope and 
depth, all this training includes scant attention to the development of communications 
skills.48 In spite of this omission, the physician in clinical practice is faced with the near 
constant demand to utilize these skills at an extremely high level of proficiency in dealing 
with not just colleagues, other medical professionals, and staff members, but also with 
patients and family members, not to mention facility administrators, insurance 
representatives, and government agency bureaucrats.  All of these interactions take on 
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heightened requirements for communicative proficiency when a medical error is 
involved.49 The consequences of mistakes in communicating, not only yet particularly in 
the ICU, but also throughout the medical institution and its dealing with outside entities, 
can be catastrophic to the point of irreparably harming or end careers or exponentially 
increasing the costs of dealing with a medical error.50 To their credit, the large majority 
of physicians comprehend the dangers of ineffective or inappropriate communication, yet 
with equal frequency, they lack the time or the motivation to take action to improve their 
communication skills.51 At its most simplistic description, effective communication 
means assuring that the substance of the message being sent equals that of one being 
received; nonetheless, many factors can impede this ideal.52 Bypassing a theoretical 
analysis of these impediments and bringing the discussion to a practical level, hospital 
administrations must focus their efforts on fundamentally revising both external and 
internal communications protocols, well beyond measures such as extending the use of 
informed consent paperwork or building more extensive networks of internal 
communication between the medical professionals, administrators, and support 
personnel.53 The following section will divide the topic of communication into two parts, 
namely internal communications and external communications. 
Chapter 6.B.1. Internal Communication 
Adverse events, whether on not properly classified as medical errors, are often 
discovered to have had faulty communication among those medical professionals 
involved in critical care as a contributing factor. Research is now being directed toward 
the goal of isolating those features of effective communication, which will assist in 
349 
protecting against and preventing medical errors.54 Poor communication is a 
multidimensional problem, one of the most fundamental aspects of which is the 
divergence of the way doctors and nurses communicate according to their respective 
medical training regimens.55 Baggs et al. reports on several studies as conducted by 
Knaus et al, on one hand and Shortell et al on the other compared 13 ICUs and 
established differences in the ratio of actual to predicted mortality, after controlling for 
severity of illness.  The former group of researchers developed an instrument they named 
the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) and used it to measure 
differences in the ICUs of 13 hospitals between the proportions of predicted fatalities and 
those which actually occurred. Kraus et al found that the interaction and coordination 
among staff members, basically measuring the same phenomenon the other investigators 
have labelled collaboration, proved to be the crucial determinant in the cases studies. 
Subsequently, the latter group of researchers, Shortell et al, expanded the study to include 
data from some 42 hospital ICUs analyzing the influences of a collection of variables 
related to communication and coordination, which these investigators conflated in a 
collective group which they labelled, "caregiver interaction.” While this group of 
researchers could not make definitive conclusions concerning their chosen variable and 
long term or overall risk-adjusted survival, they did uncover a positive correlation 
between caregiver interaction and the shorter risk-adjusted duration of a patient’s stay in 
the ICU. Moreover, Shortell et al. determined based on this study that positive 
organizational characteristics, such as communication and collaborative problem solving, 
lead to better ICU care.56 
The characteristics and components of team communications which facilitate or 
350 
inhibit effective teamwork have been the subject of significant research, not only for the 
purpose of analysis, but also for the development of training in the appropriate skills. 
Specifically focusing on the ICU, a number of studies have identified neglect or 
misunderstandings in inter-team communication as a frequent causal contributor to 
medical errors; nonetheless, this relationship has been far less explored, analyzed, or 
understood in comparison to the work that has been accomplished in other equally high-
risk field of endeavor where stress levels can be intense, the pace fast and the course of 
activity rapidly and unpredictably changing, the stakes high, and safety paramount.57 
Ironically, while the need for effective, error-free communication and teamwork would 
be universally acknowledged, systematic efforts to provide formal training and to 
evaluate their quality in practice have been severely lacking.58 In one of the most 
extensive human factors investigations of error in the ICU, According to Donchin et al. in 
possibly the most thorough studies to date of human factors which precipitate medical 
errors, the communications between doctors and nurses in the ICU constituted merely 2% 
of the activities which each were engaged in during the course of their work in the unit; 
on the other hand, this 2% was involved in approximately 33% of medical errors 
detected. Undoubtedly, communication skills in the ICU are an integral part of ensuring 
safety and quality patient care. Other research has demonstrated a correlation between 
greater degrees of collaboration between doctors and nurses and decreases in both patient 
mortality and average length of stay in the ICU.59 
A clear prerequisite to creating training and assessment mechanisms for 
enhancing teamwork in the ICU is an in-depth understanding of the process and an 
identification of the precise communication skills critical to preserving patient safety.60 
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Crew resource management (CRM) is an example of one such communications tool, 
which since its adoption in the aviation industry in 1979 has experienced success in 
reducing the frequency of accidents caused at least in part by human factors, especially in 
time-sensitive critical situations similar to those involving interdisciplinary teams in the 
ICU. The CRM approach concentrates on upgrading the safety of systems, eschewing 
individual culpability while employing standardized communication tools to ensure 
safety. Despite the similar challenges faced in the fields of aviation and medicine, CRM 
has yet to prove its effectiveness in terms of patient safety and outcomes. Although some 
earlier thorough surveys of the published literature had failed to demonstrate any 
significant relationship, some more recent research into the use of CRM and improved 
patient outcomes is beginning to suggest a positive correlation.61 
Chapter 6.B.2. External Communication 
While modern medicine, with its technological advances and multidisciplinary 
focus, has improved patients’ health and extended their lives, it has typically done so at a 
cost to their psychological well-being. In contrast the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship, many a patient today senses that medical professionals see him or her as 
merely as set of data based on test results, rather that taking an interest in him or her as a 
human being.62 In this environment, the National Patient Safety Foundation exhorts 
medical professionals on all levels to be forthright, candid, and compassionate disclosing 
and explaining medical errors to patients and family members.63 Each doctor-patient 
relationship is unique; time and effort are needed to build it, in part because of physical 
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and psychological influence its character will have when injury or illness impacts the 
patient’s life.64 
While circumstances requiring the conveyance of unpleasant or negative 
information occurs throughout the field of medicine, sensitivity or lack thereof in sharing 
such news can all the difference in how it is handled by receiving patients and family 
members. Increased psychological trauma, inhibited coping mechanisms, denial, anger, 
and the elevated tendency to pursue legal redress are all predictable responses. 
Contributing to the problem, the situation is typically stressful for many physicians 
themselves, as they lack effective training in how to handle such situations, and may 
thereby do or say something that aggravates the situation.65 Even from the point of 
preliminary diagnosis, the patient must deal with the stress of uncertainty.66 In recent 
years, an acknowledgement of the significance and gravity of such communication has 
grown, and with it an understanding of the need to incorporate appropriate skills into 
undergraduate and postgraduate medical education curriculum. Bad news poorly 
communicated stimulates confusion, extended stress, and ultimately resentment; in 
contrast to the understanding, acceptance, and adjustment fostered by handling the same 
information with sensitivity. To be effective, communications training for medical 
professionals must adhere to sound educational approaches and be evidence-based, as 
well as supported by adequate monitoring, coaching, and practice.67 In conveying 
unpleasant information, the physician must be aware of current aspects of the cultural 
climate, such as the predominance of and comfort level with electronic communication, 
which among other things constantly surrounds people with one report after another of 
suffering and death.68 
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Chapter 6.C. Medication Protocols in the Hospital ICU 
One of the most significant categories of medical error, in the ICU as in other 
hospital departments, is that of medication errors.69 In the ICU environment, medication 
errors are most common at the stage of finally administering the substance prescribed, 
outnumbering all other types of errors and adverse events.70 Implied by investigations of 
their root causes is the conclusion that systemic flaws in the training, communications, 
monitoring, and implementation of protocols by staff members are core contributing 
factors.71 Further complicating the process of analyzing and combating these systemic 
errors is their possible source in the sequential accumulation of various individual errors, 
each with a distinct ultimate cause.72 In order to have any prospect for prevention or 
minimization, the analysis and evaluation must sort out and as far as possible isolate all 
these causes which may trace back to the initial diagnosis of the original illness or injury, 
likely involving environments outside the ICU.73 The subsequent section endeavors to 
explain strategies recently promulgated in an effort to prevent medication errors in the 
ICU; these include 1) the implementation of computerized physician order entry; 2) the 
elimination of extended work by individual physicians; and 3) the participation of 
pharmacists in hospital rounds. 
Chapter 6.C.1. Computerized Physician Order Entry 
Estimates by the Institute of Medicine suggest a rate of medication errors in 
hospital setting as high as one error per patient per day, based on their 1999 report, which 
documented 7,000 fatalities connected to medication errors. Since then, electronic 
prescription, such as Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) systems, have come 
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into wide use and are endorsed by the British Department of Health as having proven to 
reduce the likelihood of medication errors.74 The CPOE functions as the cornerstone for 
clinical information systems; by permitting doctors to input their prescriptions 
electronically, the system saves the professional’s time, reduces the potential for 
misreading handwriting, and allows the computerized system to provide real-time 
recommendations to the physician concerning dosage, potential multiple drug 
interactions, and any duplication of medication, all in time to catch medication errors 
before administration of the drug.75  
While these systems have frequently been successfully incorporated into the 
routine of healthcare institutions, just as many have failed or caused enormous problems, 
including: 1) significant implementation delays, 2) chaotic transitions, 3) cost overruns, 
and 4) threatened work actions by staff members or groups hostile to the systems. This 
last problem of human opposition can be explained in part by: 1) changes in work 
routines necessitated by implementation of the system, 2) shifts in roles among of the 
members of the care team, 3) the need for retraining, and 4) conflicts with institutional 
policies.76 Despite the negative experiences many institutions have had, benefits from 
successful implementation of CPOE are unassailable, and include the virtual elimination 
of lost, delayed, overdue, and ambiguous orders, all by directly inputting the initial 
prescription order into a computer database. The automation inherent in a CPOE system 
ensure automatic: 1) orders for routine procedures, such as heparin-flush orders for 
intermittent injection sites; 2) stop orders, such as for prophylactic antibiotic treatments; 
3) monitoring to prevent order duplication; and 4) reduction in time lapses in filling drug 
orders.77  
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Camire et al. report on a study done by Shulman, et al. which analyzed, “The rate 
of medication errors before and after institution of computerized physician order entry 
without decision support in their 22-bed multisystem ICU. A pharmacist prospectively 
identified medication errors during prescription review over 26 days of data collection. 
Following the introduction of computerized physician order entry, the proportion of 
prescriptions with errors decreased from 6.7% to 4.8%.”78 
Chapter 6.C.2. Elimination of Extended Physician Work 
As with all other human beings, physicians, nurses, and all other care staff feel the 
effects of excessive workloads and long working shifts, resulting in fatigue and sleep 
deprivation and leading to vulnerability to making mistakes. Though often thought of as 
unavoidable in healthcare, such administrative staffing is not a necessity but rather a 
short-sighted mistake with negative consequences for the safety of medical professionals 
and patients alike.79 Medical professionals in this country, regardless of level of training 
and expertise, are typically required to work longer both by hours per week and by length 
of shift than considered safe or allowed by law in equally hazardous environments such 
as transportation or nuclear power. Similarly mandated limits in the fields medicine and 
healthcare would reduce the dangerously high risk to patients, given that institution and 
facilities are highly motivated to contain soaring medical costs by scheduling long shifts 
and much overtime.80  
Among the sparse efforts to date to curb the practice of overworking staff at 
medical facilities, New York is the sole state to mandate a limit on working hours during 
residency, along with increased residency supervision. Among its 27 committees 
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overseeing residency program review, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (ACGME) has a mixed record in terms of setting standards for work hours, on-
call rotations, and time off; moreover, from one specialization to another, the variation in 
these standards is great vary widely among specialties. For instance, while strict limits of 
60 hours per week hold for emergency medicine, no such limits or even 
recommendations exist for pediatrics, or for obstetrics and gynecology, the former of 
which can be as unpredictable, critical, and stress inducing as can emergency medicine.81 
Landrignn et al. found a positive correlation between hospital interns regularly 
working shifts equal to or in excess of 24 hours and a substantially higher rate of 
behaviors leading to serious medical errors, as opposed to period of time when these 
interns were responsible for significantly shorter shifts. Clearly, the authors conclude, 
abolishing these shifts of extended duration, along with reducing the total number of 
hours that any given intern works in a week has the potential to precipitate a noticeable 
decrease in serious medical errors occurring in the hospital ICU.82 Moreover, Camire, et 
al. report on a recent study comparing the clinical work schedules of interns with their 
propensity for making medication errors. The research compared two groups of interns, 
one of which averaged 77–81 hours a week, a traditional clinical schedule, while the 
other averaged a lesser 60–63 hours a week, which furthermore, capped the number of 
hours that could be worked at a stretch to 16. The results for the group of interns whose 
hours were limited was a 17.3% lower rate of serious medication errors, specifically a 
rate of 82.5 errors per 1000 patient-days, rather than the 99.7 errors reported by those 
working a more traditional schedule. Nor was this reduction limited to interns in the ICU, 
but was similarly seen across hospital units.83 
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Chapter 6.C.3. Participation of Pharmacists in ICU Rounds 
One of the root causes of medication errors is the absence of critical information, 
both about the drug and about the patient, at the point of selecting a particular medication 
as treatment. Given that the pharmacist is the professional whose expertise includes 
knowing what information is needed to accurately evaluate a proposed regimen of 
medicine, having that individual on hand as a part of the team conducting patient rounds 
can forestall many adverse drug events (ADEs).84 Research data documents cases of 
pharmacists preventing medication errors which would otherwise have occurred in the 
hospital ICU, as well as giving advice that lead to lowering medication costs. 
Traditionally, due to the accepted communications paradigm, pharmacists merely 
responded to prescriptions made by physicians without interaction and without critical 
knowledge of the patient and in the ICU, unlike in outpatient circumstances, without the 
opportunity to at least meet the patient and ask crucial questions.  Ideally, the 
pharmacist’s expertise would prove most efficient and error preventing if it were 
available at the point of decision-making.85 
Supporting the value of immediate input from pharmacists, one of the studies 
mentioned above, demonstrated a 66% reduction in the occurrence of adverse drug events 
when a pharmacist participated directly in ICU medical rounds.86 Camire, et al. also 
report on another study, which investigated the effects of having pharmacists participate 
in ICU hospital rounds. In this study, the author gathered data on the incidence of adverse 
drug events in an ICU prior and subsequent to having pharmacists involved, using a 
coronary care unit of the hospital in which no pharmacists were involved as a control for 
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the comparison. While the control unit reported the rate of adverse drug events 
statistically unchanged, the group into which pharmacists were incorporated saw a 66% 
decrease in the rate, dropping from 10.4 to 3.5 events per 1000 patient-days. Supporting 
the contention that such collaboration between medical professionals is feasible, the 
researchers documented a 99% acceptance rate of pharmacists’ advice by attending 
physicians over the course of the nine month study. Such participation is not a unique 
innovation of this study; both the Society of Critical Care Medicine and the American 
College of Clinical Pharmacy have been advocated just such pharmacist participation in 
hospital rounds as part of multidisciplinary teams for some years.87 
Chapter 6.D. Equipment Failure Protocols in the Hospital ICU  
As medical technology and its capabilities have increased exponentially in recent 
decades, the hospital ICU has become ever more reliant on complex and sophisticated 
systems and equipment for the monitoring of patients, alerting of medical staff, and even 
the automatic delivery of treatment. Exacerbating the potential for medical errors due to 
equipment failure is the disconnect between the understanding and perspectives of onsite 
ICU staff and higher levels of institutional administration, along with an across-the-board 
lack of understanding of the vulnerabilities of these system and their associated risks. 
Inherently, the ICU is a transcendently complex environment to start with, and the 
advances in medical technology only make it more so, necessitating the absolutely 
highest standards of continual vigilance.88 As a significant portion of this technology and 
associated equipment is devoted to supporting the patient’s life functions so as to permit 
recuperation, flawless functioning of these systems is crucial.89 
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The next section includes two subsections, both focusing on errors in relation to 
medical equipment and technology, namely:  1) Equipment Failure in the ICU, and 2) 
Medical Equipment Maintenance in the ICU. 
Chapter 6.D.1. Equipment Failure in the ICU 
Inasmuch as all these sophisticated equipment and systems require expertise to 
understand, maintain, and repair, equipment failure is intrinsically elusive both to 
diagnose as the source of a medical error and to repair so as to prevent recurrence. It 
would be stating the obvious, but needs to be emphasized, that the entire spectrum of 
medical staff, supervisors, and administrators alike are far from being competent to 
diagnose the causes of mechanical or electronic malfunctions beyond identifying what 
errors have been produced. The resulting conundrum is that while manufacturers and 
technicians have initial responsibility for control of systems so as to prevent errors before 
the equipment and systems are actually in use, once they are in operation and errors can 
actually occur, the technologically untrained healthcare provider has become proximately 
responsible for preventing any errors from the poorly understood technology.90 Shirley 
and Bion note that, “From a total of 7525 incident reports collected over the course of 
approximately 6 years, they identified 176 reports of 191 incidents relating to intra-
hospital transportation from 37 ICUs. Clinical management errors accounted for 61% of 
the problems, and equipment failure for the remainder.”91 The speed at which medical 
technology and equipment is becoming ever more complex and sophisticated only 
exacerbates this trend. Paradoxically, even as medical facilities and staff grow more and 
more reliant on the proper functioning of the technology, they become less and less able 
360 
to monitor its performance or identify and fix its malfunctioning.92 Two potentially 
effective measures for dealing with this problem of equipment failure and the errors it 
creates, albeit at a significant additional cost, would include either having available a 
sufficient quantity of backup equipment or integrating representative of the equipment 
manufacturers into all stages of planning for and using the equipment.93 The growing 
capability and sophistication of technology in modern healthcare, along with its ever 
increasing role, necessitate that maintenance and management issues be given ever higher 
priority.94 
 Chapter 6.D.2. Medical Equipment Maintenance in the ICU 
Obviously, any use of equipment in the ICU requires prior testing out on site.95 
Subsequently, proper maintenance is essential to continued delivery of quality, error free 
patient care, given that poor maintenance, planning, and management are the most likely 
root causes of adverse events involving equipment. One remedy consists of employing 
computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS), which can provide an 
abundance of relevant data for both maintenance, analysis, and long term planning. 
Utilizing CMMS can be crucial for managers and engineers, who must both respond 
quickly to issues and plan in order to forestall future problems.96 
According to Taghipour et al., “The ever-increasing number and complexity of 
medical devices demands that hospitals establish and regulate a Medical Equipment 
Management Program (MEMP) to ensure that critical devices are safe and reliable and 
that they operate at the required level of performance. As fundamental aspects of this 
program inspection, preventive maintenance, and testing of medical equipment should be 
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reviewed continuously to keep up with today’s technological improvements and the 
increasing expectations of healthcare organizations.”97 The authors further describe the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) four-category classification system for essential 
medical equipment, based on delivery of specific types of health services, namely: 1) 
diagnostic imaging equipment, 2) laboratory equipment, 3) general electro-medical 
equipment, and 4) other support equipment.98 Recently, the clinical engineering 
departments of hospital as far apart as the entire United States, Australia, and Canada 
have come to view simply adhering to the recommendations of medical equipment 
manufacturers as insufficient and have pursued a variety of maintenance strategies aimed 
not only at reducing errors, but also at being simultaneously more efficient and cost-
effective.99 According to Taghipour “Ridgway provide concise guidelines for 
maintenance management of medical equipment and address methods which have been 
used for a long time in other industry segments, such as Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM). RCM is a structured methodology for determining the maintenance requirement 
of a physical asset in its operating context through a thorough and rigorous decision 
process.”100 
Chapter 6.E. System Failure Protocols in the Hospital ICU  
Indisputably, areas of overlap between or among various systems whether human, 
technological, or both are juncture at which the propensity for errors is elevated, and yet 
is more difficult to identify and prevent or fix, given that with their complexity comes a 
degree of uniqueness, frustrating attempts to create standard protocols.101 Among hospital 
departments, the ICU represents perhaps the greatest confluence of interacting systems, 
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possibly accounting in part for the prevalence of this type of medical error in this part of 
the institution.102 System failures can either be the immediate cause of a medical error or 
just as frequently the root cause; moreover, they can be due to problems as simple as 
neglected maintenance of equipment or as complex as issues of ergonomics or 
institutional culture of an institution.103 The following subsection will discuss: 1) 
improvements in the quality of healthcare in the ICU; and 2) analysis of the causes of 
errors in this department of the hospital. 
Chapter 6.E.1. Improvement in Healthcare Quality in the ICU 
Although quality improvement is universally acknowledged as one of the highest 
priorities for healthcare institutions and facilities and has been studies regularly for over 
twenty years, ascertaining which approaches are likely to prove effective is still a mystery 
to be solved.104 Some trends even suggest that it is becoming more elusive. Al-
Doghaither contends that the shared responsibility among different doctors for individual 
patient care and treatment inherently creates a propensity for disagreements based on 
sincerely held professional beliefs and judgments.105 Batalden and Davidoff define 
quality improvement as “the combined and unceasing efforts of everyone—healthcare 
professionals, patients and their families, researchers, payers, planners and educators — 
to make the changes that will lead to better patient outcomes (health), better system 
performance (care) and better professional development.”106 Al-Ahmadi and Roland 
assert that both internal and external forces are capable of stimulating enhancements in 
the quality of care, the internal ones on the basis of systematic efforts within the system 
while the external ones on the basis of public pressure.107 Groene, et al., take this 
363 
specification further, labeling these forces in terms of healthcare industry-wide actions 
aimed at improving quality and safety, including:  1) aligning organizational processes 
with external pressure, 2) elevating the quality of service delivery to highest priority, 3) 
developing and implementing quality support mechanisms across the organization, 4) 
building teamwork throughout the institution with clear responsibilities and general 
expertise in team building, 5) creating and utilizing experientially based ‘care pathways’ 
that focus on safety and quality of patient care, 6) restructuring information systems 
according to a pathway focus, and 7) integrating feedback focused evaluation and 
recommendation into routine operations.108 
Given the complex interaction of the wide range of diverse and hard to quantify 
variables that make up healthcare delivery, evaluating its quality in any given setting is 
inherently extremely difficult. Patient satisfaction may be the best parameter for 
evaluating specific aspects of healthcare. From the perspective of commerce, the degree 
of patient satisfaction predicts the use of services and market share, but this assumes the 
patient’s continuing need and ability to choose between providers.109 Nevertheless, levels 
of patient’s satisfaction with their treatment and care have proven measurable to an extent 
such that the extent to which care is patient-centered can demonstrably be identified as a 
crucial component in how satisfied the patient ultimately feels. Moreover, two distinct 
assessable circumstances that undermine patient satisfaction are, first, insufficient 
instruction prior to hospital admission, and second, communication difficulties with the 
care-giving staff. Conversely, other research has identified two factors for doctors which 
lead to the greatest satisfaction, namely incorporating the patient’s opinions and wishes 
into treatment and care decisions, and maintaining the highest possible levels of privacy 
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for the patient. Ironically, satisfaction ratings were at their lowest when doctors explicitly 
asked patients for feedback on the quality of their care and treatment, as well as about 
what difficulties they were having.110 Focusing more generally on their satisfaction, Al-
Doghaither found that those hospital patients who receive regular checkins and updates 
from their attending physicians rated their level of satisfaction twice as high on average 
compared to those who did not and thus lacked a clear idea of how their treatment was 
progressing.111 
A related component of this sense of satisfaction is the timeliness of responses by 
medical professionals and support staff to questions and concerns expressed by the 
patient. The Al-Doghaither investigation reinforces this conclusion, finding a significant 
correlation between how promptly requests were dealt with by doctors and whether the 
patient gave a significantly higher satisfaction rating.112 
In one of the more specifically focused studies, Mokhtar et al., recommend better 
education of diabetic patients as part of improving the quality of their care.113 A research 
investigation involving that same specific medical condition but focusing more 
tangentially on satisfaction as a measure of quality in inpatient diabetic care in relation to 
early hospital readmission documented the predictable correlation, namely higher quality 
care and lower chances of early readmission. Although groups with strong reputations, 
such as the American Diabetes Association, have promulgated guidelines for measures 
known to reduce the likelihood of readmission, medical practitioners and the facilities in 
which they work have been reluctant to embrace the guidelines in practice, undercutting 
the effectiveness of diabetes care. As an antidote to this Hussein recommends prioritizing 
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and emphasizing team building among physicians and healthcare professionals of various 
specialties.114 
Other indications of barriers to improving quality in patient care residing within 
the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, and practices of medical professionals and hospital 
staff have been documented in a number of research studies, Among these investigations 
the use of clinical practice guidelines (CPG) ran up against resistance in the form of 
survey responses among healthcare professionals indicating that only a minority agreed 
with the idea that scientific evidence ought be utilized as the priority consideration 
selecting a patient’s course treatment, which reveals a definite reluctance to trust and 
adopt the practices of evidence-based medicine. Along the same lines of thought, a 
separate study reported that both doctors and nurses, by their own admission were 
dubious or skeptical of the value and importance of patient-centered care as a determinant 
of the quality of medical care and treatment; in fact, fewer than 60% of respondents 
thought of the concept as important to any degree. It has been hypothesized that a failure 
of administrative and institutional leadership is the root cause of these attitudes. Were the 
leadership in understanding of and promoting the patient-centered approach, it should 
translate into commitment and support from the policy making and planning stage 
onward. In contrast to these negative or discouraging attitudes, within the same surveyed 
population, 97% of respondents acknowledged that CPGs are a valuable educational tool; 
moreover, in excess of 90% claimed that the CPGs have value in the quest to coordinate, 
standardize, and improve the quality of healthcare for patients.115 
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According to Hussein, the perception of doctors and nurses differ substantially in 
terms of patient safety in a given environment, with physicians giving higher ratings of 
62.9 compared to that of the nurses at 56.6, which Hussein interprets as possibly a sign of 
poor leadership in facilitating a culture of safety in the hospital.116 Speculating on 
Hussein’s finding, Hughes notes the heavier burden of workload nurses are faced with 
involving extended contact delivering patient care, frequently round the clock, and 
involving more routine tasks, all of which leads to greater fatigue, and thereby the 
difference in perceptions.117 According to El-Jardali et al. based on their work, and 
inverse correlation exists between disclosure and communication in the wake of a 
medical error, and how routine the normal activity related to the error is or how 
frequently it is performed. In such cases, the authors hypothesize, the fear of 
repercussions from committing an error in the context of a routine activity add to the 
reluctance to report it.118 Van Geest and Cummins contend that healthcare professionals 
fail in their ethics-grounded obligation to report medical errors and adverse incidents 
because they experience fear, shame, or guilt, anticipating punitive measures and a 
readiness on the part of administration to label someone, anyone as culpable. On a more 
hopeful note, the most recent reaccreditation process for hospitals documented some 
significant improvement in the way in which medical professionals communicated with 
their patients with regard to safety concerns.119  
Chapter 6.E.2. Root Causes Analysis 
With the increasing prioritization of patient safety, analysts in the healthcare 
industry have been searching for tools which will aid in uncovering system vulnerabilities 
367 
so that they may be strengthened and monitored.120 Root cause analysis (RCA), first 
promulgated in the field of psychology, and systems engineering are among those being 
applied to the field of medicine and healthcare in the attempt to uncover fundamental 
causal factors which account for variations in the quality of performance with regard to 
healthcare delivery. Such tools have already proved successful in fields as disparate as 
aviation and nuclear power by enabling systematic post hoc analysis of errors, identifying 
latent potential for errors in the process.121 So far, these tools are already in use by the 
healthcare services of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).122 Root cause 
analysis is rapidly becoming a well understood approach in many hospitals and 
healthcare facilities and anecdotally has had success identifying various problems and in 
point to potential solutions.123 In the process of addressing a medical error, the RCA team 
meets on three times, first to identify known versus unknown facets of the case, second to 
document established facts and to prepare to investigate those that are unknown, a flow 
chart of events is developed, and third to determine the ultimate or root causes and to 
make recommendations for response and future prevention, focusing on addressing 
systemic weaknesses rather than individual blame.124 The three goals of the RCA are 
embodied in the following fundamental questions: 1) What happened? 2) Why did it 
happen? and 3) What can be done to prevent it from happening again? Root cause 
analysis is quite adaptable in healthcare, useful in environments as diverse as inpatient, 
outpatient, long term, acute, and even home care.125 
Root cause analysis has been embraced by both the Veterans’ Administration and 
the Joint Commission; the latter currently mandates an analysis of every adverse event 
while the former facilities the submission of RCA reports on significant adverse events to 
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the National Center for Patient Safety. As for other governmental bodies, 25 of the states 
mandate that adverse events, which are intended to include medical errors, be 
documented with the information forwarded to the health department of the state in 
question. Both among and within organizations, the required or implemented parts of a 
root cause analysis and its report may vary; for instance the VA mandates that each RCA 
include recommendations as to corrective measures and a plan to monitor and ascertain 
that the action taken produces its intended results. However, the follow-up to these 
corrective action plans is entirely in the hands of the individual facilities. Alternatively, 
the Joint Commission’s handling of the RCA involves commissioning healthcare 
institutions to develop their independent criteria for what constitutes a sentinel event and 
to voluntarily report any such events they uncover to the commission. Here, too, an 
action plan with measurement strategy is required; moreover, in some instances, the Joint 
Commission has been known to follow up on how the plan has worked out. Although, 
one fifth of the states in the U.S. require root cause analysis including the development of 
a plan for remedial action, the follow-up on compliance with these regulation is spotty at 
best on these plans, given that the regulations vary significantly to begin with.126 
Chapter 6.F. Needed Reforms and the Disclosure of Medical Error in the Hospital ICU 
 Under current conditions, inherent institutional barriers to the disclosure of 
medical errors exist in the areas medical educational, administration, and legislation; 
therefore reforms in all three of these areas are necessary to combat the rising incidence, 
harms, and costs of errors. The next two subsections will discuss areas in which reforms 
are needed as part of the larger quest to reduce and effectively deal with the 
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consequences of medical errors in the hospital ICU.  They are: 1) tort reform, in 
conjunction with legislation reform, and 2) medical education reform. 
Tort law refers to the body of legislation and the process it establishes for injured 
patients or those acting on their behalf to pursue whatever restitution for their injury is 
not already forthcoming whether in the form of “repairing” damages, to the extent 
possible, or compensating for physical, emotional, and other damages or loss. Within this 
legally based approach, medical errors are seen as a matter of negligence for civil 
jurisprudence to handle with the goal being correcting an injustice to the victims of the 
medical error.  However, the increasing preponderance of opinion in the field is that the 
current system fails far more than succeeds at either adequately redressing injustice or 
preventing future occurrences of harm to patients.127 
Chapter 6.F.1. Tort Reform 
While historically, the individual doctor or attending physician was the 
predominant focus of care for the patient and thereby uniquely accountable any harm 
done through negligence, today health care has become an affair involving whole systems 
of medical professionals and support staff, with accountability becoming an institutional 
responsibility. Emblematic of this shift are the increasing numbers of physicians working 
as professionals yet as employees of medical facilities, established systems of 
institutional quality control, In particular, more physicians are employed, quality and 
outcomes are routinely measured, and reimbursement increasing being handled according 
to the consumer model of a value-based purchase.128 Tort reform has become an 
expensive aggressively fought battle over the last twenty years, focusing increasingly on 
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the issues of physician liability and the costs of an already exorbitantly expensive health 
care system.129 To its discredit, the current system; 1) elevates administrative costs, 2) 
actually discourages legitimately injured patients from using civil action to seek 
compensation, 3) sets up an adversarial process with unreasonable delays and a low 
probability of winning, and 4) rewards attorneys and others with no directly hand in the 
initial adverse event with a more than fair share of whatever compensation is 
forthcoming.130 
In order to understand calls for reform, one must first understand the legal 
foundations invoked when a medical error leads to litigation. Medical malpractice is 
classified under tort law, civil wrongs which do not involve explicit legal contracts, and 
negligence, an alleged wrongful act of commission or omission leading to injury of 
another person or damage to his or her property, which the accused presumably should 
have been able to avoid. In recent years, the chances of any given doctor, regardless of 
specialty or practice, having an open malpractice claim against him or her was recently 
reported to be 7.4%, of which 1.6% had claims resulting to a payment to the plaintiff. 
Over the course of a career, by the traditional retirement age of 65, 75% of physicians in 
low-risk specialties and 99% of physicians in high-risk specialties can anticipate having 
faced a malpractice claim, irrespective of resolution.131 Conceptually, malpractice 
liability exists in the legal system to ensure that quality healthcare and especially 
treatment is equally and mutually in the interests of both health care providers and 
patients by creating penalties and disincentives for poor performance leading to harm. 
Thus any effort to limit liability or excessive judgments for compensation can be opposed 
as reducing incentives to provide proper care and ultimately harming patients 
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outcomes.132 Nonetheless, both of the two most recent U.S. presidents, Bush in 2004 and 
Obama in 2009, have recommended placing limits medical malpractice liability with the 
ostensible goal of keeping healthcare costs in check, thus making health insurance more 
affordable and thereby raising coverage rates.133 
There has been a disconnect between to stated aims of reform in terms of curbing 
negligence and the ulterior motives of reducing malpractice liability premiums as 
opposed to increasing patient safety.134 Unfortunately, rather than promoting ethical 
behavior in reporting, disclosing, and dealing with the consequences of medical errors, 
the cumulative effect of repeated rounds of tort reform has been to create and enhance a 
‘conspiracy of silence’ throughout the institutional hierarchy, including the ICU.135  
By contrast, the thrust of currently proposed reform measures must foster a non-
punitive atmosphere, which in turn will facilitate complete and timely reporting of and 
learning from medical errors without sacrificing organizational accountability or fair 
redress for those who have been harmed.136 The currently advocated tort reforms if 
achieved would constitute a fourth round, subsequent to major reforms in each of the last 
three decades of the 20th century.137 Legitimate tort reform has the potential to lower 
excessive monetary awards, as well as curb the practice of defensive medicine. In theory, 
any change that, on balance, lowers healthcare costs should raise the rates of health 
insurance coverage rates, further reducing healthcare costs in general. Even before the 
Affordable care act, from 1981 and 2007 reforms capping damage awards, along with 
redefining collateral sources and joint-and-several liability were documented to increase 
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health insurance coverage by those most sensitive to the rising cost of insurance from  a 
half to a whole percentage point for each such group.138  
The goal and focus of legislative reform needs to be ensuring patient safety rather 
than suppressing medical liability. Measures now in place which: 1) limit non-economic 
damages, 2) set statutes of limitations, and 3) redefine the concept of joint and several 
liability are all are due for reevaluation from the perspective of prioritizing patient safety. 
In addition, upgrading the standards for qualification as an expert witness in litigation and 
ongoing oversight of trends in health insurance industry should help to preserve justice 
and ethical treatment for side involved in litigation in the wake of a medical error.139 
Other supportive steps of reform to be recommended include: 1) further revision of pay-
for-performance incentives, which will ultimately support litigation reform, 2) revising 
the Medicare system for greater efficiency and effectiveness, which will help avoid 
medical errors while rapidly, comprehensively, and compassionately responding 
whenever preventable errors have occurred.140  
Avraham and Schanzenbach report on a 2002 conclusion by the Department of 
Health and Human Services, which argues for curbing unreasonably high monetary 
judgments for non-economic damages in civil suits, claiming that doing so would create a 
savings of between 5%–9% of nationwide healthcare costs, thereby enabling somewhere 
between 2.4 and 4.3 million Americans who could not at the time afford to do so to 
obtain health insurance. A number of interest groups, such as the national association of 
health insurance providers, working under the name, America's Health Insurance Plans 
(AHIP), have been advocating for tort reform, on a platform asserting that defensive 
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medicine and litigation costs add approximately 9% to the growing costs of health 
insurance premiums. Furthermore, despite the obvious increase in availability and 
affordability subsequently brought about through the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the 
potential savings and benefits of tort reform remain unchanged.141 
 Other studies on the consequences of tort reforms have concentrated on how 
reforms have influences award payments. This body of literature supports the conclusion 
that capping the award levels for noneconomic damages has led to a reduction in the 
amounts of payments to plaintiffs in cases for which juries had exceeded such limits in 
determining the value of non-economic damages. Although predictable, these findings 
confirm that caps can be effectively established and adhered to in trial law.142 
Furthermore, Gilmour reports that tort reform has typically included, in addition 
to capping damage awards: 1) offsetting payments from collateral sources, 2) placing 
limits on legal fees for plaintiff representation, 3) setting periodic payments of damages 
either on a discretionary or mandatory basis, 4) restricting the manner in which damages 
are labelled in relation to joint and several liability, and 5) raising the criteria for 
qualification as an expert witness.143 Looking back historically, Stamm et al. classify 
reforms into two generations, namely first-generation measures, which aim by direct 
means to decrease the number of malpractice claims and to reduce the levels of 
settlements, and second-generation malpractice reforms which are currently being 
experimented with in pilot programs at individual health care facilities and systems and 
whose measures are more varied and less direct. The former group have resorted to: 1) 
monetary caps on malpractice awards, 2) shortening of the statutes of limitation, 3) 
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pretrial screening, and 4) eliminating rules concerning joint and several liability. Such 
reforms have been in effect long enough for significant research literature to document 
their impact, albeit inconclusively. For example, according to Stamm et al., “There is also 
good evidence that noneconomic caps reduce malpractice claim volume and payment 
amounts by 20%-30%. 11 Much less literature is available describing the impact of these 
early measures on patient-centered outcomes, such as access to care and patient 
safety.”144 The latter group, Stamm et al’s second generation of malpractice reforms, 
tends to employ concepts such as schedules of noneconomic damages, health courts, 
along with mandated or voluntary communication procedures and resolution programs, 
among other ideas. 
All such attempts tort reform share two common characteristics; first, their 
primary aim is reduce the costs of malpractice litigation and in particular the amounts of 
monetary awards, and second, they have unfortunately created a significant impediments 
to the ability of injured patients, along with their families, to establish which parties were 
negligent and thus liable, making rightful compensation harder to obtain.145 
Chapter 6.F.2. Education Reform 
The first step in educational reform is to integrate explicit training in preventing, 
minimizing the effects of, and handling medical errors into the curricula of medicine and 
nursing schools, a primary educational objective of which must be instilling a 
commitment to behaving in accordance with the principles of biomedical ethics in 
dealing with all types of errors.146 
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The call for adding to the curriculum of professional medical training is not at all 
a new phenomenon. At various points in its history, medical education in the United 
States has expanded from a pre-World War I undergraduate medical education, 
specifically at a medical school leading to the MD degree to a post-war realization that 
the rapid increase of knowledge, techniques, and practices necessitated further clinical 
training in the form of the internship and later the residency before commencing general 
practice. Further expansion of medical education was called for at that time to prepare 
individuals who wished to pursue a clinical specialty or take up medical research.147 
Thus, the call for various extensions of medical education made in this analysis, are not 
without precedent. 
Subsequent to the 1999 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the body of 
professional literature concerning medical errors and patient safety in general has 
expanded exponentially; however, while frequently advocated in these publications, 
reports on efforts to educate future medical professionals in this regard are not to be 
found.148 Among the IOM recommendations for improving patient safety were the 
following: 1) voluntary error reporting, 2) re-evaluating the design of safety systems, 3) 
revising and implementing these enhanced designs, and 4) setting out clear standards for 
healthcare professionals with regard to safety, many aspects of which specifically focus 
on both preparatory and continuing education of medical and health care professionals.  
The report implies that these avenues of improvement have a profound ability to 
beneficially alter the flaws in current practice and advocates the creation of broadly focus 
programs promoting patient safety in order to accomplish this. Overall, the IOM report 
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advocated coordinated efforts to raise both standards and expectations in terms of 
prioritizing, monitoring, and ensuring patient safety.149 
According to Halbach, while legislators and agencies at various levels of 
government, along with NGOs, such as the National Patient Safety Goals of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the Leapfrog Group 
relating to the field of healthcare have exerted considerable effort toward reforms aimed 
at curbing unsafe practices at healthcare institutions and the medical errors they lead to, 
the research literature appears to indicate a distinct lack of attention being paid to 
educating medical students and other healthcare professionals in best practices for 
prioritizing and maintaining the safety of patients. Reports on any efforts to incorporate 
this aspect of medical care into the curriculum were conspicuously absent.150 According 
to Dr. Dennis O’Leary, who at the time in 2003 served as President of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, in testimony held by the U.S. 
Senate Subcommittee on Government Affairs, “I would finally suggest that consideration 
be given to a government commissioned study of the content of professional education as 
it relates to patient safety. Such a report could create pressure for sufficient reforms of 
medical and nursing education to permit appropriate allocations of time to systems 
learning, education about the contribution of human factors to patient safety, and 
interprofessional team training.”151 
What reform has been achieved in medical education has been restricted nearly 
exclusively to the preclinical phase of training.152 The type of reform that will positively 
and significantly affect patient safety requires that provide future physicians be provided 
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with the opportunity and time for meaningful interaction with patients in clinical settings, 
including the in-depth study of and critical reflection on their cases.153 The results of any 
effective reforms in the training of healthcare professionals must be doctors who are 
prepared more that solely as experts in the theory and practice of biomedical science, but 
are moreover adept at the skills of human interaction as taught in the social science 
disciplines, especially when dealing with difficult situations such as medical errors.154 
Halbach contends that explicit instruction in the principles and practices of patient 
safety is to be mandated for many reasons, with medical error prevention quality of care 
enhancement topping the list. Beyond these two reasons for integrating patient safety into 
the medical school and residency curriculum, another five include: 1) the enormous 
effects of medical errors on society, 2) the lagging attention of academic medicine to 
patient safety issues in comparison to others in the field and in government, 3) the need 
of medical schools to instill in future physicians attitudes toward disclosing and handling 
errors, which align with the expectations of patients and the public, 4) the assessment of 
many physicians themselves that such training in dealing with medical errors is sorely 
needed, in particular with how the medical professional can cope and recover from the 
psychological impact of being responsible for an error, and 5) the need to reduce the 
emotional and cultural barriers in medicine to handling medical errors. Creating barriers 
against these reasons for change are various attitudes and motivations, including: 1) fear 
of encouraging malpractice litigation, 2) perceived threats to professional autonomy, 3) 
discomfort with and reluctance to engage in practical applications of systems theory, 4) a 
lack of faculty with the expertise to train in these matters, and 5) the crowded field of 
worthwhile topics and needs all in competition for the attention of medical practitioners 
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and educators.155 Sales asserts that three integrally related aspects of effective reform 
include: 1) Medical school admissions policies, 2) academic and intellectual preparation, 
and 3) professional and clinical training.  Reform in the first aspect involves shifting 
admissions criteria away from it over-reliance on the ability memorize facts in the natural 
science as assessed in the likes of standardized test.  The second aspect refers to the need 
to more fully and extensively incorporate the social science framework and skills needed 
for best practices in medicine into the existing preclinical medical school curricula. The 
third and final aspect deals with the need, in the course of professional and clinical 
training, for rising medical professionals to learn to integrate administrative, policy, 
management, and research, components of clinical practice with direct patient treatment 
and care.  The aim here is to integrate these parts of the job in order to serve goal of 
quality improvement in healthcare delivery, and not to view those activities that are not a 
direct part of the physician-patient relationship as unwelcome, but unavoidable intrusions 
on the care and treatment of patients.156 
Overall, the U.S. system of medical education has been quite successful, adapting 
to a rapidly advancing field throughout the last century. Still, the system has always 
lagged behind its own ideals in terms of adequately preparing students for the rising 
standards of the profession. Inasmuch as the field of modern medicine has become 
incredibly complex, rapidly changing, and unprecedentedly demanding on current and 
future practitioners, the need to reform medical education has taken on a corresponding 
urgency.157 
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Chapter 6.H. Conclusion 
The topic of protocols covers a much wider scope that simply the response to 
adverse events or medical errors, as dealt with in the previous chapter under the heading 
of disclosure and apology. In contrast, the primary goal behind the process of establishing 
protocols, from their conception, creation, and development to their implementation and 
monitoring, is to eliminate wherever possible errors and adverse events. Moreover, as 
complete prevention in the broader sense is not feasible, the implementation protocols is 
essentially proactive seeking to decrease the frequency with which medical errors occur, 
to mitigate their severity, and to undo or at least ameliorate any harm or damage they 
may have caused.  
The process of establishing and using protocols for the prevention of medical 
errors, in the hospital intensive care unit or elsewhere, commences with prevention 
planning starting with prophylaxis, which focuses on anticipating vulnerabilities to error 
so as to strengthen against them and monitoring, which inherently can never be absolute 
but which is becoming feasible to a much greater extent through the aid of information 
technology. The avoidance of medical errors and potential adverse events necessitates the 
teamwork by and increasingly larger group of medical professionals who must work 
efficiently together, needing enhanced communications skill, not just in terms of the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, which requires special effort at personalization, 
given the trends toward impersonalization in modern medicine.  For the medical 
professional, the imperative of better communication does not stop with the patient; 
accurate mutual understood communication must occur with the patient’s family and 
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relatives, as well as internally with other staff member, facility administrators, insurers, 
and government regulators. As one of the major routine components of the care and 
treatment of most patient, particularly in the hospital ICU, the process of providing 
medication from prescription through administration, is uniquely vulnerable to the 
occurrence of adverse events and medical errors. In general, improvements in the 
administration of medication in terms of better training for and communications among 
staff members, more effective monitoring, and protocols will help to significantly reduce 
this vulnerability. Two promising innovations described here to combat medication errors 
are computerized physician order entry (CPOE) and, specifically in the ICU, the practice 
of having a pharmacist participate in patient rounds. Yet another means of preventing or 
minimizing the occurrence of medical errors the root cause of which is equipment failure; 
the obvious, solution is ensuring access to backup equipment although in many cases it is 
not financially feasible and requires that the malfunction be detected prior to its leading 
to and adverse event. A more practical solution would be to keep a representative of the 
equipment’s manufacturer in touch for advice and monitoring.  
Finally, this chapter has discussed at length and made recommendations 
concerning three areas in which it would be possible with the correct approach to 
substantially reduce the occurrence of adverse events and medical errors.  These three 
include 1) adopting measures to prevent system failures; 2) instituting the type of tort 
reform in the judicial system through legislation that would promote adherence to the 
principles of ethics and provide justice, rather than create protracted adversarial 
proceedings; and 3) restructuring the system of medical education, so as to prepare future 
physicians and other medical professional to be more effective communicators and to 
381 
handle medical errors, whenever they happen, according to the highest standards and 
principles of biomedical ethics. Reforms in these areas, while they cannot be 
accomplished through protocols per se, will significantly assist in lowering the rate of 
medical errors across the board in the field of medicine, not just in the ICU, all of which 
ultimately is the purpose behind this chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The very facts that humans are fallible and that they are integrally involved in the 
delivery of healthcare and medical treatment guarantee that medical errors will occur 
despite the best of training, skills and vigilance, precautions, or preventive procedures. 
The analysis presented in this dissertation makes this conclusion clear and that, 
furthermore, the fast paced development of innovative medical techniques and 
procedures, along with evermore sophisticated technology only intensifies the risks and 
multiplies the opportunities for adverse medical events.  
While medical errors occur across the spectrum of care and treatment, the 
propensity for their occurrence and the severity of the damage they are likely to inflict are 
undeniably greatest in the hospital intensive care unit (ICU). Through the chapters of this 
dissertation, the research and analysis has provided the following: 1) a detailed account, 
to the extent that it has been documented, of the high frequency of errors occurring in the 
U.S. in general and specifically in hospital intensive care units, as well as the range and 
extent of the harm done to patients and family members, both physically and financially; 
2) a classification and analysis of the proximate, intermediate and ultimate causes of and 
contributing factors to medical errors, which in addition to identifying causation has 
formed the basis for this dissertation’s recommendations aimed at developing procedures 
and protocols to effectively reduce errors to the greatest degree possible while 
minimizing their harmful impact; 3) an in-depth analysis of expectations, grounded in 
biomedical ethics, for dealing with the consequences of medical errors including 
disclosure and communication, the expectations of patients and family members, the 
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attitudes and concerns of medical professionals, the disconnect between these two 
groups, and recommendations for procedures and protocols to ensure prompt, complete, 
and just handling of all consequences of the error; 4) an in-depth framework, based on 
Western religious and cultural foundations, for both those responsible for and those 
injured by medical errors to interact in handling the consequences of the error, as well as 
all of the communication which it engenders; and 5) proposals for numerous procedures 
and protocols, both for lessening the vulnerability of hospital ICU patients to suffering 
the effects of an error and for addressing and counteracting the variety of systemic 
problems which create or heighten the propensity for the occurrence of medical errors. 
It is the contention of this dissertation that biomedical ethics, no matter what 
philosophical foundation serves as its basis, demands that nothing less than continual 
vigilance to anticipate and forestall the occurrence of even the most minor or errors, be 
justifiable. This stand insists on every effort being made to plan for prevention, including 
training, monitoring, procedures and protocols, along with the incorporation of 
technology directed at prevention and the prior establishment of protocols for dealing 
with errors once they are discovered. Furthermore, in the event of a medical error, the 
only acceptable course of action is complete and honest disclosure to the patient and all 
other relevant stakeholders of the error and its consequences, both real and potential.  In 
keeping with the principles of biomedical ethics, the key necessities for such disclosure 
include: 1) explaining the circumstances leading to the error in layperson’s terms, 2) 
describing both the real and potential consequences of the error, 3)  accepting 
responsibility for the error, either personally or on behalf of the institution and 
individuals responsible, as appropriate 4) presenting a proposed course of action and 
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alternatives if appropriate to ameliorate, and to the extent possible, to reverse the negative 
effects of the error; and 5) proposing equitable arrangements to compensate the patient 
for any and all negative consequences of the error.  
As part of the overall conclusions and recommendations provided by this 
dissertation, the greatly elevated tendency of medical errors occurring in the ICU. Such is 
to be anticipated, given the weakened and thus vulnerable physical condition of ICU 
patients, the large number of medical professionals and staff members who must 
coordinate their care, the complexity of both the patients’ treatment plans and the 
communication involved in implementing them successfully, and the ever increasing 
reliance on sophisticated equipment and other technological support. Therefore, every 
hospital ICU must engage in the development, implementation, and periodic review of 
system wide, as well as individual staff member and action specific, protocols designed 
to prevent medical errors to the absolute minimum that is possible. All of these efforts 
must be developed on a foundation consistent with the highest standards of biomedical 
ethics, acknowledging that medical errors will inevitably occur and that when they do, 
principles of ethics must take precedence over other considerations, whether financial, 
reputational, or other. The last two chapter of this dissertation address the need for, 
barriers to, and specifics of creating and implementing protocols and proposals both to 
prevent and to deal equitably with medical errors in the hospital ICU, with applicability 
to the rest of the field of healthcare. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation presented an overview of the extensive scope of 
medical errors, in terms of their severity from ‘near misses’ that lead to no negative 
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consequences all the way on the scale up to errors that cause fatalities. The analysis in 
this chapter has further classified typical medical errors and adverse events in the hospital 
ICU as either errors of commission or omission; errors of commission are those events 
that should not have happened potentially causing damage because they did, while errors 
of omission are planned and intended actions in the treatment process that failed to occur 
at all or within the necessary timeframe potentially causing harm by their absence. The 
unifying characteristic of both types of error, and indeed of anything that all discussions 
of medical errors agree on, is that to be classified an error the event must not have been 
caused by the disease, injury, or ailment for which the patient is already being treated, 
except in those cases in which the error precipitated a negative progression in the original 
affliction which would not otherwise have occurred as swiftly or severely.   
Among the forms that errors of commission may take are: 1) improper execution 
of treatment or of treatment not called for, 2) incorrect diagnosis or selection of and 
planning for treatment, 3) any delay in correct administration of treatment including 
medication, 4) the failure of sophisticated technology or equipment, and 5) 
miscommunication between any of the various medical practitioners involved with the 
patient’s care. Errors of omission usually fall under specific descriptors, such as the 
failure to administer some preventative treatment, such as neglecting decontamination or 
sterilization procedures, a lapse in monitoring, and the omission or poor implementation 
of a scheduled step in the patient’s treatment regimen, implementation of medical 
management.  
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This chapter has further documented the specifics of medical errors within the 
context of the hospital intensive care unit (ICU). While the ICU constitutes an 
environment with an inherently and extremely elevated risk of medical error, which 
moreover will involve patients for whom any error can be of greater severity than in other 
areas of the facility, the ramifications of a medical error in the ICU can range as widely 
as its cause, from virtually no effect at one end of the continuum to irreparable damage or 
even fatality at the other. Despite this variety, one clear trend among the types of errors 
occurring frequently in the ICU is the preponderance of errors involving medication. All 
the above factors point to the hospital ICU as likely to be one of the most, if not the most, 
medical error prone environments in the field of medicine.  Furthermore, the harm caused 
by an error is likely to be more severe than in most other environments, considering the 
following circumstances: 1) patients in this unit already are dealing with life threatening 
illness or injuries, 2) they are in a weakened physical state as a result, often with 
compromised or suppressed natural immune systems, 3) they are frequently sedated, 4) 
they require constant monitoring and are under the care of many different medical and 
healthcare personnel, and 5) they are being cared for according to complicated treatment 
plans, typically involving multiple medications. 
The statistics on preventable medical errors in the hospital ICU are grim, with 
preventable fatalities estimated to range between 44,000 and 98,000, in addition to 
economic costs of 17 to 29 billion dollars. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the 
ICU is the setting for more than an estimated one third of all the medical errors in any 
particular medical facility; this estimate hold for both the number and frequency of 
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incidents, as well as the percentage of the hospital’s annual budget devoted to ICU in an 
effort to prevent even greater error costs and consequences.  
In this dissertation, Chapter 3 focused on the principles of biomedical ethics, 
which have been espoused and publicized by the American College of Physicians, the 
American Medical Association, and other professional medicals groups based in the 
United States, which have indicated that these standards are mandated foundations and 
guiding principles for both preventing and dealing with medical errors occurring in the 
ICU or elsewhere within professional practice.  Central to these principles is the complete 
and candid disclosure of every medical error or adverse event, including all relevant 
details and the informing of all stakeholders.  Aside from legal duties, which have been 
addressed in later chapters of this dissertation, by virtue of professional oaths and codes 
of conduct, every medical practitioner, institution, facility, and organization is bound to 
these standards. 
 The discussion in this chapter addressed the foundations of these ethical 
principles in consequentialism, teleological theory, and utilitarianism. The first two of 
these are focused on promoting and ensuring optimal outcomes in medical treatment and 
healthcare; the last focuses on providing the greatest degree of positive benefit to the 
largest segment of the population. The discussion has further considered the premises and 
claims of deontology and principlism, which are in many ways in distinct opposition to 
the aforementioned ethical schools of thought.  Nevertheless, despite fundamental 
differences, all the theories of bioethics agree that the principles of autonomy, justice, 
beneficence and non-maleficence are necessary cornerstones in dealing with medical 
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errors.   
Regardless of the philosophical foundations of these approaches to bioethics, they 
are unanimous in insisting that medical errors be fully disclosed to all involved parties; 
they come into disagreement over questions such as how to deal with patients who lack 
the capacity to provide informed consent or are in futile circumstances, as  are those 
receiving end-of-life care, both situations more common in a hospital ICU.  Ethical 
dilemmas, such as the conflict between family members agitating for every attempt to 
prolong the life of a loved one against the medical professional’s judgment of futility and 
the violation of professional ethical standards that continued or extreme measures would 
entail, are situations which complicate the determination of and handling of medical 
errors, real or perceived. 
Among the inherent characteristics of medical services in the ICU, which bring 
many ethical issues and dilemmas to the forefront, are the limitations on its resources 
compounded with the unpredictability, intensity, immediacy of the services required at 
any given point in time. To begin with, a high proportion of the Unit’s patients are 
experiencing terminal illness, which means that they need extensive resources that even 
though expended may do little to extend let alone improve the quality of life. Thus, acting 
in each patient’s best interest simultaneously becomes an impossible ideal. These realities 
require painful, ethically charged decision making frequently with foreseeably fatal 
outcomes. Having discussed and assessed various ethical foundation principles for 
allocating treatment resources, this dissertation has concluded that no single strategy, 
such as: 1) treating each patient thoroughly in order of he or she presents, 2) favoring 
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those patients whose conditions are more life threatening, 3) seeking to treat the greatest 
number of patients to the greatest extent possible in other words, utilitarianism, or 4) 
prioritizing those patients deemed to have the most social usefulness, can be considered 
completely satisfactory or even fully ethical in the practical circumstances of the ICU. 
Integrating multiple ethical principles can better achieve equity and adherence to 
standards, but at a cost of increased complexity and thus, difficulty with implementation. 
The chapter has concluded by examining the issues surrounding the withholding and 
withdrawing of life-saving treatment and the ethical or legal distinction which may exist 
between the two treatment decisions, particularly within the ICU. Medical errors and 
adverse events occur in the hospital ICU in the climate of all these already complex 
ethical circumstances and must be dealt with accordingly. 
Chapter 4 began with an overview of those precepts with which most Western and 
other cultures and religions across the globe concur in relation to the responsibilities of 
those involved in the aftermath of a medical error, regardless of how minor or 
devastating. These moral traditions require that any person, group, or organization that is 
responsible for causing harm or damage to another  individual or group, explicitly 
acknowledge that responsibility to all those affected by its consequences and offer some 
appropriate form of restitution or compensation to the extent possible.  From the point of 
view of the hospital ICU, what is demanded by ethics is full disclosure of the error, 
including: 1) all relevant contributing conditions and circumstances; 2) all already 
manifested impacts- typically negative; 3) all those consequences which can be 
anticipated; 4) a sincere confession and apology; 5) proposed courses of action to 
alleviate any suffering caused by the error, to rectify or undo any damage caused; 6) 
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proposed steps to prevent further occurrence of the same or similar; and 7) proposals for 
rectifying the error and compensating the victim.  
The ultimate conclusion of all these ethical considerations is that it is the 
undeniable responsibility of those in the ICU to completely communicate the 
circumstances leading up or contributing to all errors, together with explicit 
acknowledgements of responsibility and apologies from those responsible.  Society as a 
whole expects all these elements; moreover, they are the priorities desired by those 
experiencing the effects of the error. This group of affected individuals indicate, both in 
hypothetical scenarios and as experiencers of the situation in reality, that receiving the 
details of how the error occurred, what its consequences are or can be anticipated to arise, 
how these consequences of the error will be managed and corrected, and what will be 
changed to forestall future occurrences.  
Despite the combined force of cultural norms, moral dictates, principles of 
biomedical ethics, codes of conduct from professional medical associations, policies of 
the more enlightened medical facilities and institutions, and even legal mandates, the 
norm among medical professionals is either to conceal part or all of the circumstances 
surrounding a medical error or to distort the situation in an attempt to hide fallibility or 
culpability. The pressure to follow the route of concealment is formidable. The list of 
fears counteracting the sense of professional obligation in the minds of medical 
practitioners includes: 1) feeling of guilt and shame, 2) lasting impairment to professional 
reputations, 3) fear of loss of employment and permanent damage to one’s career, and 4) 
civil litigation for malpractice with the accompanying publicity.  From the perspective of 
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biomedical ethics, motivations to deny or otherwise avoid responsibility are ultimately 
irrelevant in that such actions expose patient, in the ICU or elsewhere, to additional 
trauma both psychologically and physically. 
As the analysis in this chapter concludes, contrary to the intended results of 
concealing fault and culpability, such behaviors or measures readily produce the very 
results medical professional had wished to avoid, namely patient dissatisfaction, harm to 
professional reputations, and litigation.  
The chapter goes on to describe the procedures necessary in dealing with a 
medical error.  The first step in the disclosure process involves collecting and reviewing 
all pertinent data; documenting it; identifying all those whose actions contributed directly 
to the error; creating a presentation of all that is known and surmised in the case, as well 
as preparing the apology, the plan for dealing with the effects of the error, and taking 
measures to ensure that there will be no recurrence.  The second step is planning for the 
disclosure meeting itself constitutes the second step in the disclosure process and includes 
many details concerning time, place, attendees, and who is speak, when, and how during 
the meeting; all aspects of which must be considered in order to optimize clarity of 
communication and understanding and at the same time minimize the concern and stress 
felt by the patient and others. Research has shown that the lack of careful implementation 
of this process is the likely cause of approximately 70% of patients and others involved 
reporting unmet expectations in the wake of the disclosure process. This chapter of the 
dissertation concludes that a reevaluation of the institutional disclosure process is called 
for, the goal of which needs to be no less than a fundamental restructuring of the process. 
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The initial step in achieving this goal needs to accomplish significant improvements in 
notification and documentation in the wake of any medical error. 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation rests on the premise that the high standards of 
biomedical ethics inherently cannot be upheld, complied with, or achieved in the absence 
of the prior development and implementation of a comprehensive systems of protocols 
for the disclosure and handling of every medical error in the ICU, from the most minor to 
the most severe. Given that medical errors vary widely in the scope and scale of their 
causes and consequences, protocols must be equally flexible, not only to ensure 
adherence to ethical standards, but also to be consistently commensurate with the 
intensity and severity of the error in question. These protocols must also be designed 
flexibly enough to: 1) handle issues of accepting responsibility before errors occur, 2) 
proactively manage risks to patients from errors, 3) deal with risk to the medical facility, 
4) anticipate the consequences of an error, 5) identify and deal with all the stakeholders in 
the event according to their individual relationship to it, and 6) coordinate the timing and 
execution of disclosure, apologies, and compensation.  
This chapter has described eight essentials of designing disclosure protocols 
including: 1) uncovering the scope of the error, 2) adhering to the ethical principles in 
acknowledging responsibility, 3) accurately assessing patient prognosis and planning to 
correct the consequences of the error, 4) managing foreseeable risks arising from the 
error, 5) coordinating the timing of disclosure to various stakeholders, 6) incorporating 
these stakeholders into the process of disclosure and apology, 7) informal and formal 
acknowledging the error and providing apologies, formally and informally as appropriate, 
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and 8) handling compensation, in all the forms it will take. Moreover, this chapter’s 
analysis has clearly established a number of basic factors which must be taken into 
account when creating protocols and other efforts to combat medical errors in the hospital 
ICU: 1) both the principles of ethics and those of professional medical associations insist 
on full disclosure, 2) transfers and handoffs of patients are an especially vulnerable 
activity, 3) a pressing need exists to work proactively to overcome barriers to 
communication, 4) the differences in what is appropriate protocol in formal as opposed to 
informal apology is considerable, and 5) current apology laws in many jurisdictions do 
not achieve the positive results that were intended.  
The various sections of Chapter 5 converge in establishing four distinct and 
contrasting attitudes among those involved in adverse medical events and medical errors 
in particular. First, medical professionals unanimously, or nearly so, concur in principle 
when confronted with the issue hypothetically, that standards of biomedical ethics oblige 
them to provide full disclosure and apologies. Second, these same physicians and 
administrators consistently behave in directly the opposite fashion when confronted with 
a medical error and its ramifications, involving them personally. Third, the clear priorities 
of patients, as well as their relatives and friends are to receive answers, explanations, and 
apologies from the medical professionals responsible, all of which should be motivated 
by sincere regret and contrition. Fourth and possibly forming the greatest obstacle to 
satisfactorily resolving the consequences and problems created by a medical error, 
medical professionals fundamentally misjudge the attitudes and motivations of these 
patients who have been exposed to a medical error, as well as the desires and feelings of 
those concerned for these victims. 
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Contrary to the presupposition of many medical professional, and even more so 
their legal counsels, the primary aims of those patients who have been victims of medical 
errors or their relatives and who subsequently pursue legal redress is not the pursuit of 
financial compensation, as documented by a Canadian study from 2009. Findings of the 
Pew research group, looking into research on mediation and litigation in the wake of 
adverse medical events document the results of various studies concurring on the point 
that victims of medical errors first and foremost desire a candid acknowledgement of 
culpability, a sincere apology, and a demonstrable commitment prevent similar mistake 
in the future. As this dissertation as discussed at length, all these findings starkly 
contradict the presumptions of the majority of doctors and administrators in all segments 
of the medical establishment, including the ICU, who see all legal recourse as motivated 
by greed or the desire to inflict financial punishment, and thus, out of fear for their 
reputations, careers, and finances remain distinctly reluctant to admit anything hinting of 
negligence or responsibility. One major conclusion that the analysis of this dissertation 
establishes is the extreme degree to which professionals in the medical community 
misunderstand and misinterpret the feeling and priorities of patients who experience and 
suffer the consequences of medical errors and their family members.  
The experience of the medical institutions in the state of Minnesota provides an 
example of the positive outcomes or proactive measures to combat medical errors, in 
terms of significantly reducing the frequency and severity of errors, which has been 
accompanied by declines in the frequency of lawsuits and concomitantly a significant 
drop in the rates of malpractice insurance premiums. These impressive goals have been 
achieved by doing the opposite of what has been the instinctive inclination of the medical 
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community, in particular physicians, along with the thrust of the legal reforms of recent 
decade. Those predominant attitudes, which Minnesota has eschewed, have been realized 
in efforts to either hide medical errors, to make circumstances extremely difficult for 
patients to successfully pursue redress in the courts, or to protect doctors from legal 
ramifications they may engender by acknowledging medical errors and apologizing for 
them.  To the contrary, the professional medical community in Minnesota dedicated itself 
to adhering proactively to the standards of biomedical ethics, in other words to ‘do the 
right thing,’ without regard for possible consequences. 
The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6, concentrates on the development 
of protocols and procedures, both to prevent and to dealing with medical errors occurring 
particularly in the hospital ICU, but also in the broader scope of the fields of medicine 
and healthcare. Protocols, as discussed in the previous chapter which were related 
directly to disclosure and apology, are a vital yet narrowly focused portion of the full 
scope of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach to the prevention, 
minimization, and ethical handling of medical errors and adverse events.  While, the 
primary aim of protocols for disclosure and apology is the minimization of harm to and 
the ensuring of justice for the injured patient and others aggrieved as a result of the error, 
the broader focus in this chapter has been the prevention and elimination of the 
occurrence of these errors and adverse events in the first place, along with the blunting of 
their severity when they do occur, as stipulated at the outset of the investigation of this 
dissertation. This comprehensive approach to recommending protocols encompasses their 
conception, creation, and development, implementation and monitoring on an ongoing 
basis, as well as their invocation once a medical error or its effects have been detected. 
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Moreover, as complete prevention in the broader sense is not feasible, the implementation 
Thus, as highlighted in this chapter, protocols are inherently proactive in their goal of 
reducing both the rate at which medical errors occur and the levels of damage they inflict, 
just as much as they aim to undo or minimize the ill effects on the patient, to the extent 
possible.  
The beginning of instituting, implementing, and administering the protocols 
described in this chapter, whether for the hospital ICU in particular or the facility in 
general is a comprehensive assessment of the institution’s specific and distinct 
vulnerability to medical error as a precursor to the anticipation of definable weaknesses 
that need to be proactively addressed and targeted with specific measures aimed at 
correcting conditions that would foster errors, forestalling errors in inherently highly 
vulnerable and unavoidable activities, and systematic monitoring of all areas and 
activities prone to the occurrence of medical errors. On a promising note, this final goal 
of monitoring is being increasingly facilitated by advances in information technology. 
Just as modern medicine typically brings larger groups of medical professional working 
together as teams dedicated to the care and treatment of various individual patients, so 
too must the effort to prevent and counteract the effects of medical errors and adverse 
medical events.  Achieving these goals requires: 1) the efficient cooperation of various 
professionals with individual specialties, 2) prompt, clear, and accurate, communications 
between professionals explicitly trained and proficient in such skill, and 3) a concerted 
effort to retain the personal dimension of the traditional doctor-patient relationship in the 
face of the impersonalization in which is the natural tendency of the aforementioned 
trends in modern medicine.  The need for more effective communication extents beyond 
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exchanges between physician and patient to encompass interactions with family and 
relatives, other medical staff member, institution supervisors and administrators, 
insurance providers, legal counsel, and government agency representatives. This need is 
especially true for the error-prone activities surrounding the delivery and administration 
of medication in the ICU, where training in communication skills, enhanced monitoring, 
and appropriate protocols promise to significantly reduce errors. As part of these 
recommendation, computerized physician order entry (CPOE), including pharmacists in 
patient rounds, and providing access either to backup medical equipment or to expert 
equipment technicians will each contribute to forestalling many adverse medical events. 
Beyond the recommendations for protocols to forestall, minimize the effects of, 
and deal with the consequences of medical errors, this dissertation calls for three major 
initiatives in the broader context of the field of healthcare, which will aid in significantly 
diminishing the frequency and harm caused by adverse events and medical errors while 
improving the profession in other ways.  First, measures need to be devised and 
implemented to eliminate failures to deliver quality care and treatment resulting from 
system-wide flaws or inadequacies. Second, tort reform needs to be undertaken 
throughout the legal system with the expressed aim and which results in fostering 
adherence to the highest ethical standards and the delivery of timely justice, as opposed 
to protracted adversarial legal processes. Third, the process of educating future 
physicians and other medical professionals needs fundamental revision, so as emphasize 
and thereby prepare medical and healthcare students in effective communications in 
general and specifically for dealing with medical errors. Since it is not possible to achieve 
the goals behind these proposals through protocols along, these recommendations will 
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contribute significantly to reducing the incidence of medical errors throughout the field of 
medicine, beyond the scope of the hospital ICU. 
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